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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Commander of Leningrad MD Interviewed

93UM0119A Moscow VOYENNNY VESTNIK
in Russian No 5-6, May-Jun 92 pp 2-6

[Interview with Col-Gen Sergey Pavlovich Seleznevoy, commander of the Leningrad Military District, by associates of VOYENNNY VESTNIK; place and date not given: "The People and the Army Are One, But Does This Mean That the Army Should Sew Slippers?"]

[Text] *As paradoxical as it may be, the Army today is forced to engage in uncharacteristic matters: bake bread, build houses, harvest crops, unload railcars and ships...*

Yes, the Army is part of the people. It lives its concerns and shares with it all the joys and misfortunes, but is it able to patch up the deficiencies in the economy? Are we doing even more damage to the country when we take the troops away from combat training? Is this the way a state should do things? This also was discussed during a meeting between associates of the journal and Colonel-General S. Seleznevoy, commander of the Leningrad Military District [MD].

[VOYENNNY VESTNIK] Comrade commander! On behalf of our readers, we congratulate you on your appointment and promotion. In this regard, permit me to ask the first question: How do you feel as commander of one of the renowned military districts?

[Seleznevoy] I view the appointment as commander of the Leningrad MD not only as trust on part of the leadership of the Russian Federation and military leadership, but also as an extremely crucial assignment. Let us recall the district's history and its heroic pages. Its beginning dates back to the Petrograd Military District of the RKKA, formed in March 1918. Back in February, the Red Army units and detachments that were formed had given a decisive repulse to the German troops near Pskov and Narva. We celebrate one of these victories on 23 February.

During the period of restoring our national economy and peaceful construction, the Leningrad MD became one of the leading scientific centers of the Armed Forces where theoretical tenets of new manuals and regulations are tested and updated and methods of conducting combat operations using the latest models of weapons and combat equipment are studied.

But the events associated with protecting the city during the Great Patriotic War occupy a special page in the district's history. The Leningrad fighters stood to the death at the walls of the Neva stronghold for 900 days and nights.

The motherland highly valued the combat accomplishments of the Leningrad fighters. Dozens of formations and units were awarded orders, transformed into guards units, and given the honorary name designations of Leningrad, Vyborg, Krasnoselskiy, Novgorod, and so forth. Tens of thousands of soldiers, sergeants, officers, and generals were noted for mass heroism and courage by government award, and many were conferred the honorary title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

That is why today I sense enormous personal responsibility above all for today's generation of colleagues: generals and

officers, soldiers and sergeants, who for the part are multiplying the glory of their fathers and grandfathers through selfless labor.

[VOYENNNY VESTNIK] All the same, Sergey Pavlovich, what is the most important thing in your work?

[Seleznevoy] You cannot answer that in one word. You see, there are a lot of issues that have a priority direction in a commander's work. One of them is working with officer personnel. The accomplishment of all tasks facing the troops will largely depend on how we accomplish this. The most painful problem is, above all, the reduction of the Army.

Now the situation in the world has changed fundamentally. The policy of detente led to a reduction not only of strategic but also conventional offensive arms both in our country and in states of the NATO bloc. In such conditions, there was no longer a need to have the three-million-strong Armed Forces of the former Soviet Union. Moreover, we simply are unable to maintain such an army from an economic standpoint. And one does not have to go far for an example. Let us recall how the military budget was being distributed until recently. The lion's share of it went to developing the latest military systems. There was little left for social needs of service members, including for pay and allowances. Therefore, in conditions of an economic crisis, the lack of housing for officers and elementary everyday conditions for their family members became the problem of all problems like never before. The number of service members deciding to leave the Army increased sharply in recent years just for this reason. Already today there are many vacant positions in the district. And what is most disturbing is that they are at the primary level: in the platoon and company.

Recently I had the opportunity to visit the artillery regiment in which Major V. Smirnov serves. They have the same problems. In talking with people, I learned something interesting: it turns out that far from all the young lieutenants have been trained to endure the difficulties which we officers of the senior generation had to experience at one time. It is understandable that the times are different today, society is changing, and people are changing. The lieutenants want more attention for themselves, including in questions associated with housing, daily life, and duty. Well, all that is right. But how can we help them? We have to rack our brains. Just yesterday I was able to reach an agreement with city authorities on building two 200-flat buildings for officers. They promised to build them this year.

But this, I repeat, is only one of the problems. Take an issue such as people's attitude towards restructuring of society. Not everyone understands and favorably perceives the democratic processes, which also have not bypassed the Army. Conflicts are occurring on this account. Therefore, much explanatory work has to be done in the troops. I do not hide the fact that we are not always able to convince people. People are filling out applications to request discharges from the Armed Forces.

Yes, the military specialist today is valued highly among domestic entrepreneurs. Although not everyone, I repeat, is finding his place, more than 500 discharge applications were submitted in 1991. We meet with each of them. Not

a single young officer leaves the Army without talking to the command of the district or the chiefs of headquarters. Still, we cannot keep the majority of them. That is why I see my most important task to be working with officer personnel. I admit, the statements of the President of Russia and the commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS are imparting confidence and strength in this work.

[VOYENNNY VESTNIK] Sergey Pavlovich, you have touched upon problems which concern all service members today. In particular, you broached the problem of reducing the armed forces. Such news, in and of itself, robs officer personnel of confidence in tomorrow. In this regard, I want to ask: By how many percent will the troops of the district be cut? And the most important thing, what is the command planning to do to ease the social tension in units and subunits?

[Seleznevoy] The reduction will take place just like everywhere else. On the whole, we are looking at a troop reduction of 20-30 percent. I will not cite an exact figure, since I do not yet know it. You see, the new structure or either the armed forces or the military districts has not yet been determined, but I think officers who have reached retirement age will be subject to the cuts first. The fact that not a single officer will be discharged until he is given an apartment will become a social guarantee on the part of the armed forces. I do not think that the social rights of officers and warrant officers will be abridged.

[VOYENNNY VESTNIK] The need for reforms in the armed forces has become an indisputable fact for everyone. What is your opinion of what we call military reform and those processes which are taking place in district troops?

[Seleznevoy] First of all, I will say that reforming the Army is a positive phenomenon, because it simply is impossible any longer to maintain the troops in the form in which they now exist. We must preserve the Army, or more precisely, that portion of it which will ensure sufficiently reliable protection of our state. I must note that the ideas which were at the basis of the military reform strategy one and a half years ago are largely outdated today. With the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the situation had changed fundamentally. That is why we need fundamentally new approaches to reforming the armed forces. The General Staff and Main Combat Training Directorate of the Ground Forces are now engaged in this. We are also doing our part. The district command has made its proposals on this account. Some of them have been taken into consideration.

Unfortunately, the process that has begun of separating the army by nationality barracks not only makes it difficult to conduct reform, but also painfully affects personnel. In particular, fugitives have appeared in our district who, having given in to the promises of the presidents of certain independent states, are absent without leave from their units and are returning home. But can this really be?! Is this really a civilized solution to the problem? In pushing young people to break the law and violate the oath, such leaders do not understand that tomorrow these same young people will refuse to execute their laws. Let us recall the events in Georgia. You see, Zviad Gamsakhurdia also

called upon his fellow countrymen to leave units of the Soviet Army of "occupation." We know well how this all ended.

[VOYENNNY VESTNIK] Sergey Pavlovich, I would like to clarify something... Precisely what kind of proposals did you send to the military department for reforming the armed forces?

[Seleznevoy] We proposed a review of the entire system of pre-induction training of young people for service in the Army. Personally, I believe that it must be revived in schools and other educational institutions. Its absence has already largely adversely affected, above all, military-patriotic education, preparation for service in the Army, and also the quality of inductions. As a result, we are forced to invite to the military councils representatives of power of oblasts and krays and explain the importance of an organized induction of youth for military service. Nevertheless, for Saint Petersburg the plan was 65 percent fulfilled. This is the lowest indicator. Meanwhile, Arkhangelsk Oblast fulfilled the plan for induction of young people into the Army 85.4 percent, Vologda Oblast—78 percent, Karelia—72 percent, and Murmansk Oblast—76.1 percent. The reason for this situation is still the fact that law enforcement bodies and local authorities do not want to deal with these and other problems. It seems to me that the time has come to pass the appropriate legislative acts and increase the accountability of local leaders for their implicit fulfillment.

I think that the time has come to reorganize a number of formations and units of the district, since their structure does not enable personnel to engage in combat training effectively. Marshal of Aviation Shaposhnikov also shares this point of view. We are convinced that it is necessary already now to switch to manning so-called constant-readiness units and formations. There will be far fewer of them than there are now, but then they will be distinguished by high mobility and combat effectiveness. In this regard, we absolutely must create subunits to support the training process; they would be involved in administrative work and free personnel from performing tasks unrelated to their specialty. I repeat, combat subunits should engage only in combat training. Hence, another of our proposals: to provide incentives for job performance of officers and warrant officers. For example, why not do it this way: if you get an excellent rating on a firing practice drill, you receive a monetary bonus; if you destroy the target with the first round, you receive the value of the ammunition saved.

Or take an indicator of combat proficiency such as proficiency rating. Why is its importance leveled out when computing pay and allowances for officers and warrant officers? Why don't we take into account the physical training of service members and their attitude towards service? As you can see, there are quite a few problems that must be solved immediately.

[VOYENNNY VESTNIK] Much is being said today about the need to switch to manpower acquisition on a volunteer basis. In your view, how realistic is the creation of a professional army in the near future?

[Seleznevoy] I do not like the interpretation "professional" army. After all, that is what we are not, including the

soldiers. It is another question if you are talking about manpower acquisition of the armed forces. It seems to me that for the transitional period we need a mixed principle of manpower acquisition, and with the right for inductees to choose alternative service.

People not well-versed in army matters believe that if the Army will take people under contract, inductees will stream into the army in a crowd. But they will not. At least not until a person is paid in full for his difficult labor can we hope for an influx of highly intelligent, physically prepared young people. Let us also add here the guarantee that a military person will be provided housing, leave, and a set workday. For the time being, everything comes down to slogans. Today not a single soldier, believe me, will serve in the Army for 1,000 rubles [R].

Another good thing is that the government has finally understood that young officers should conclude a contract for a specific term of service after graduating from a school. Then if they want to extend it or be discharged from the Army, this will be done in a civilized manner. But these are just general workings. It is still a long way off until passage of the corresponding law.

[VOYENNNY VESTNIK] It is no secret that the link between the military district command and local bodies of power has taken on special importance today. How are your mutual relations with the city's leadership taking shape?

[Seleznevoy] We have traditionally good relations with the leadership of Saint Petersburg and personally with the mayor. In general, the city authorities had and have an understanding attitude towards the needs of the Army. The leaders of the oblasts on whose territory the district's troops are stationed also provide us assistance.

On their part, service members are doing much to stabilize the economic situation both in Saint Petersburg and in the oblasts. I will take the liberty of citing a few figures. In the past year, more than 5,000 soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers, and officers worked on the fields of 45 sovkhoses at harvest time. More than 100 vehicles were used each day. This is not to mention the motor vehicle battalions dispatched to harvest crops in other areas of Russia. And today we have to assign quite a few service members to unload cargo coming into the city in the form of so-called humanitarian aid.

In the spring, the leadership of the city requested that we assist in transporting fuel. More than 1,200 tonnes of gasoline were hauled in. The military combine for repairing clothing and related gear produced R157,000 worth of consumer goods for the citydwellers in 1991. They included sleeping bags, fishing mittens, motor vehicle covers, slippers, and so forth. Military laundry combines did several dozen tonnes of laundry for Saint Petersburg residents. More than 2,000 townspeople were treated at military medical institutions, including at the Military Medical Academy. Military physicians have been receiving civilians for a long time now at a number of garrisons.

The figures speak for themselves. Don't be surprised, such mutual relations and mutual assistance are needed today.

[VOYENNNY VESTNIK] Sergey Pavlovich, still, what kind of assistance is the city administration providing to military units located in Saint Petersburg and its environs?

[Seleznevoy] I have already said that an agreement has been reached with the city administration on construction of housing for servicemen. In particular, we are constructing two buildings jointly. Thus, 100 apartments have already been received by settling the previous 10-percent indebtedness, a 240-flat apartment building is next. As you can see, the debts for housing are gradually being repaid, and we believe they will be repaid. The President of Russia assured us of this in his speech at the All-Army Officer Assembly. As a reference, I will note that there are 10,500 families in the district today without apartments, including 5,000 in Saint Petersburg. In 1991, the military built 1,990 apartments through its own efforts. The oblasts are also helping us during this difficult time, for example, with food rations and with finding employment for and training officers discharged into the reserve.

[VOYENNNY VESTNIK] What problems today are the most difficult to overcome for the district troops and you personally?

[Seleznevoy] Housing, housing, and, again, housing. We must provide it for all officers who do not have a roof over their head. But it would be wrong to think that the difficult problems end with this. Of course, we are concerned with operational and combat training. Their level has declined in recent years for objective and subjective reasons. The reasons for this are well known: difficulties associated with drafting a young man for military service, taking personnel away from activities, a decrease in discipline, and so forth. These problems are very critical today. It is no simple matter to solve them, but we can.

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A Professional Approach to a Professional Army

93UM0119B Moscow VOYENNNY VESTNIK
in Russian No 5-6, May-Jun 92 pp 25-26

[Article by Col V. Ryazanov and Col A. Kokushin: "A Professional Approach to a Professional Army"]

[Text] What kind of army should we have? The debate over this is expanding. It seems that many authors have lost the very subject of the arguments in the dust of the polemics, studying only socio-legal and economic aspects, forgetting about the purpose of the armed forces. In my view, the type of army and, above all, the principle of manpower acquisition are determined not by the acuteness of socio-economic problems but by the conformity to the requirements stemming from its purpose. What do I have in mind here?

"Professional army," as a lexical analysis of the term itself shows, should mean armed forces in which military service is the main profession and type of activity for personnel. Proceeding from this, it is permissible to formulate the following premise: a professional army is an armed formation manned with servicemen who have undergone special training and testing on a state level, permitted independent performance of duties, and bearing personal responsibility for the quality and effectiveness of their activities.

In our view, this definition corresponds fully to the way armed forces are usually characterized. What republic would refuse to have "powerful, mobile, multinational, regular armed forces manned on a mixed voluntary-compulsory basis and meeting the requirements of reasonable and reliable sufficiency for defense and capable of repelling aggression from any direction in the most unfavorable situation conditions?" (I am quoting the draft concept of the 1990 military reform.) The need for the army to shift to a professional basis today is not causing doubts. However, I do not think we should blindly copy the structure of armies of other states, no matter how good they may seem at first glance.

An analysis of the capabilities of sovereign states and of their union as a whole and the historical experience of Russia convince us that in our conditions it would be unwise to reject universal military service altogether. It is important to determine in what ratio we can combine in the new type of army the historically established principles and the desire to have modern armed forces that are, at a minimum, as combat effective as the armies of the leading states. The system of manpower acquisition and personnel training being proposed below, in my opinion, can be used quite well in reforming the army in accordance with the level of military danger and the new political, economic, and social conditions.

It seems that service in the army would be in two stages. The first stage is compulsory service, which includes military and alternative service. The second is service under contract (on a voluntary basis). Both types are combined by a single law on universal state service, in accordance with which every citizen is obligated to perform either military or alternative service.

It is now already generally accepted that the duration of military and alternative service should be different and be determined by their content. The essence of the latter is known in principle. Military service at this stage involves only training a highly skilled specialist for a specific combat arm. Its duration, based on the experience of district training centers, apparently will not exceed four to six months. It follows, naturally, to revise the existing training programs and provide the district training centers with modern equipment to increase the intensity and effectiveness of instruction. It makes sense to leave service at this level under the Ministry of Defense.

Upon completing the training subunit, the serviceman takes proficiency rating tests and is discharged into the reserve. As we know, when a serviceman completes training now, for example, as a tank commander, he receives the sergeant rank in addition to his proficiency rating. And regardless of the level of his preparedness, he is usually immediately assigned to command a crew. It is extremely rare that an incompetent sergeant is assigned to a private position (with retention of rank).

We propose that everyone receive a proficiency rating according to the level of training and be discharged into the reserve as privates. We will attempt to make sense of this below. Alternative (non-military) service lasts longer than military service, up to two years.

Let us go to voluntary service under contract. Servicemen who have gone through the first stage and received a

military specialty are assigned to positions that require their proficiency rating, with the corresponding pay and benefits. They are given military rank according to an establishment. Acceptance of civilians who have performed alternative service is also not ruled out, but usually for private positions not requiring special training. It is advisable to conduct the training for performing the duties for each position directly in the unit. It is better to put service on a contract basis under the General Staff. The latter will be sort of a customer with respect to the Ministry of Defense.

Let us assume that by the time the contract is drawn up there will not be enough positions requiring the corresponding proficiency rating of servicemen. In such a case, those who have completed service in the first stage may be assigned (certainly with their consent) as privates with payment of compensation for use other than as intended and with a commitment by command authorities to move them in accordance with their training specialty at the first opportunity.

Such are the overall tenets of the variant being proposed. Now about its implementation. One can assume with a high degree of probability that, taking into account the difference in the periods for performing military and alternative service, the aura of romantic appeal, the prospects, the system of benefits, and other factors, most young people will strive to perform military service. A well thought-out system of compulsory tests will make it possible to select the most suitable contingent. In our view, it is important that alternative service be chosen not only for pacifist and other reasons. Other factors should also be taken into account, for example, the level of mental and (or) physical development. However, this does not mean that the path of military service will be closed forever to dropouts. It is advisable to remove rigid limits on the time periods for performing military service and make them more flexible. In particular, it is not at all mandatory to go into the army immediately upon reaching draft age. The law may specify that citizens are to perform service in the first stage between the ages of 18 and 26 at their own discretion. Such an approach, first of all, will enable a young man who has not undergone testing for some reason to eliminate gaps in his preparation. Second, it gets rid of the need to create a cumbersome and inefficient system of draft deferments.

The variant being proposed will also help solve a number of other problems. For example, service at the first level can create in a short time trained reserves, which is one of the most important requirements of military doctrine. At the same time, highly skilled officer cadres will be retained, "overflowing" into the broad network of training subunits.

Another thing. Manpower acquisition based on strict testing will force young people to pay more attention to general educational and physical preparation. Finally, such a disgraceful phenomenon as "dedovshchina" [hazing of new conscripts by conscripts with more seniority] will disappear quickly.

In conclusion, we would note that the tenets set forth in this article give merely an overall picture of the proposed variant of the system of manpower acquisition and personnel training for troops in the new political, economic,

and social conditions. During the course of debate, they may be developed in greater detail by the author.

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Draftee Opinions on Professional Service

93UM0119C Moscow VOYENNNYY VESTNIK
in Russian No 5-6, May-Jun 92 pp 30-31

[Article by Lt Col N. Pechen: "Portrait of a Draftee"]

[Text] While politicians argue about what kind of army we should have, call-ups to active military service are being held in the country, as before, in the spring and fall. For some reason, the people who will have to don the soldier's uniform are least interested in their (the politicians') opinion about the future of the armed forces. In general, few people are pondering: What is today's inductee like? What concerns and bothers him? And the main thing, does he want to serve the fatherland, as they said in olden times, not out of fear, but out of conscience? And how should he serve: under contract or, as before, for the idea? Military sociologists have also tried to find the answers to all these questions.

The study was conducted from September 1991 through January 1992, inclusively. More than 1,000 people were surveyed in a number of military districts and cities of the Russian Federation by associates of the Center for Military, Sociological, Psychological, and Legal Research. The sociological research showed that the general political situation in the country and the social processes taking place in society directly influence the mood of young people. In particular, anti-army moods have become widespread among young people. Suffice it to say that compared to 1975, the interest of today's draftees and young soldiers in serving has declined sevenfold. What is more, the number of those among them who consider military service an obligation has tripled.

One also cannot help but note such an alarming trend in the mood of young people as indifference toward fulfilling their constitutional duty to protect the fatherland. Compared to 1975, their number has increased more than sixfold. Ten years ago, 70 percent of the lads surveyed on the eve of the call-up expressed the opinion that this was an honored duty and highly praised the prestige of military service, particularly service of an officer. Today, only one out of every five surveyed feels this way.

In this regard, it is interesting to trace the dynamics of young men's attitudes towards active military service over the last 16 years. In 1975, 77.6 percent of those surveyed showed a great interest in service and an understanding of the need and importance of fulfilling military duty, 6.3 percent did so in 1986, 11.6 in 1990, and 11.2 in 1991. In other words, the fact is that military service has lost its attractiveness for the vast majority of young people, as has the very idea of the need for armed protection of the homeland. In the opinion of sociologists, one of the reasons for this has been the change in priorities in youth policy and the state system, as well as the lack of spirituality of modern society, where revolutionary romanticism is giving way to a pragmatic approach to life. The situation is made even worse by the rapid differentiation of the population by income levels. Material factors are becoming the determining factors.

Special attention in this military-sociological research was given to attitudes of soldiers and sergeants towards a possible proposal to continue service under contract.

It turned out that 47 percent of all soldiers and sergeants surveyed were willing to accept this proposal. By comparison, I would note that in 1990 this figure was more than 50 percent. Of those figures, 20 and 25 percent were soldiers, respectively, and 27 percent were sergeants. It is interesting that 83 percent of the servicemen from the last call-up favored a mixed principle of manpower acquisition for the armed forces.

All those expressing a desire to serve under contract can be divided into several categories. By social affiliation: those from blue-collar workers comprise 75 percent, and those from peasants and white-collar workers each comprised 12 percent. By education: 44 percent had completed special vocational-technical schools, 35 percent had graduated from schools, 15 percent had completed tekhnikums, and about 7 percent of the servicemen had a partial secondary education.

What served as the motive for signing a contract?

It turned out that for 48 percent of those surveyed, the main reason was the opportunity for financial security for themselves and their family. This indicates that servicemen continue to see the army as a reliable source of income and social guarantees.

For 20 percent of the soldiers and sergeants in the army, in their opinion, they are given a splendid opportunity to obtain a specialty that will be able to provide them with a well-paying job in civilian life.

But there is a reason they say that man does not live by bread alone. It turned out that there also were a fairly large number of romanticists who saw military service under contract not only as a source of income but also as an excellent opportunity to test one's steadfastness in difficult conditions (36 percent) and also to see the country and expand one's outlook (16 percent).

Nineteen percent of those surveyed link hopes for further professional growth and advancement with the service. Others hope in this way to rid themselves of the many rigors which compulsory-service personnel experience (7 percent). Only 20 percent of the respondents cited the desire to serve the fatherland as the main reason...

Compared to the results of research conducted in 1989-1990, the demands of soldiers and sergeants for terms of service under contract have increased considerably today. Whereas in 1989 about 70 percent of compulsory-service personnel agreed to serve, receiving pay and allowances in the amount of 350 rubles [R], now that is out of the question.

I will take the liberty of citing data received by army sociologists at one unit of the Airborne Troops. It turned out that already in 1990, at a salary of R500 to R800, 81 percent of the sergeants surveyed were willing to conclude a contract with the military department. Eleven percent of the paratroopers would like to receive pay and allowances of R900 to R1000. And only eight percent of the compulsory-service personnel would be satisfied with R1100-R1500. Then, trying to forecast the trend of development

of this process taking into account the possible correlation, sociologists warned: as the economic crisis in our country increases, these figures increase. As we can see, the forecast, made by them long before the first increase in prices, proved to be completely correct.

But this is just one side of the problem. There is also another. At that time military sociologists were asking: Will there be among young people those who wish to become professional soldiers and sergeants? Judging from the previous results, there will not be very many.

However, let us get back to the motives that may make compulsory-service personnel sign a contract. In addition to high pay, for 82 percent of soldiers and sergeants, housing is an essential condition, although only 19 percent of those surveyed put forth this demand in 1989.

Servicemen with families demand a separate apartment (81 percent), and bachelors demand a separate room in the dormitory.

More than 80 percent of the respondents cite dining in a separate dining hall for payment as one of the conditions.

So, we were able to see for ourselves that the numbers of young people and compulsory-service personnel wishing to serve in the army, specifically under contract, are becoming fewer, and their contract terms are becoming increasingly stricter. A question arises: Is a single state able in the near future to allocate the necessary appropriations to pay privates and sergeants as professionals? This is not to mention pay and allowances for the officer corps in the Army and Navy.

As we can see, there are many questions. But they can be solved provided there is one mandatory condition—a healthy economy. Otherwise, talk about a professional army manned on a volunteer basis will remain only talk, and the military leadership, as before, will advocate the mixed principle of manpower acquisition for the armed forces.

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Aid for Ex-Officers Becoming Farmers Listed

93UM0173A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 25 Nov 92 p 5

[Article under the rubric "Official Chronicle": "The Officers Will Become Farmers"]

[Text] In order to improve the terms and conditions for setting up and developing peasant (individual) farms, the government of the Russian Federation has passed a special decree in accordance with the decree passed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation on 9 March 1992, "On Measures to Assist Officers, Warrant Officers and Extended-Duty Military Personnel Released Into the Reserve as a Result of the Reduction of the Armed Forces in Setting up Peasant (Individual) Farms." It acknowledges the expediency of participation in the practical implementation of programs of social protection for servicemen released into the reserve due to the reduction of the armed forces and workers of enterprises, associations and organizations of the defense branches of industry laid off as a result of conversion by the Sozidaniye joint-stock company established by the

Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the main command element of the CIS Joint Armed Forces and the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs in cooperation with the State Committee of Russia for Anti-monopoly Policy and Support of New Economic Structures.

The Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, with Central Bank participation, is instructed to consider extending credits on special terms to the Sozidaniye company for the construction of housing, service buildings, facilities for the social infrastructure, enterprises for processing farm products, repairing and servicing agricultural equipment, and other enterprises.

The ministries of communication and defense will provide the joint-stock company and its branches with the necessary communication facilities by requisition. The Committee for Social Support for Servicemen, together with the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the Ministry of Economics and the Ministry of Finance, are to arrange for the allocation of a certain portion of the extra-budgetary funds designated for the financing of state programs for the social protection and the provision of living conditions for military personnel released from the military service, and to assign to Sozidaniye funds to cover the purchase at residual value of military equipment suitable for use on the peasant (individual) farms of military personnel.

Russia's Sozidaniye joint-stock company will be based in Moscow. The executive agencies of republics within the Russian Federation, krais, oblasts, autonomous formations and St. Petersburg should provide for housing its subdivisions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will help workers with the Sozidaniye joint-stock company arrange relations with foreign firms.

Interview With Russian Cossack Ataman Martynov

93UM0174B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 Nov 92 pp 1-2

[Interview with Cossack Ataman Aleksandr Gavrilovich Martynov by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Yuriy Rubtsov: "A Cossack Without Duty Is Not a Cossack"]

[Text]

Calling Card

Aleksandr Gavrilovich Martynov was born in 1942 in the village of Gnilovskaya, on the Don, to a Cossack family. After compulsory service in the army, he graduated from Rostov Institute of the National Economy and later from the Institute of Management in Moscow. He is a candidate of economic sciences. In recent years, he has been working as director of a motor vehicle combine. Since 1990, he has been Ataman of the Union of Russian Cossacks.

[Rubtsov] Aleksandr Gavrilovich, meeting with you has turned out to be a difficult matter. In recent days, your secretary has responded to all of my phone calls with: "Martynov is at the Security Council." If it isn't a secret, what need brought the Ataman of the Union of Cossacks to such an authoritative organ?

[Martynov] This need is to serve Russia. You know as well as I the situation that has developed with the draft. Public

opinion is already not condemning draft evaders but, say, the Christian-Democratic Union is guaranteeing legal protection to deserters and is setting up mess halls for them. For many young people, performing the sacred duty for their people has become shameful. And, in the background of this, the Cossacks are expressing their readiness to serve for life and to be in the active reserve. Therefore, it's not surprising that the Security Council has been expressing interest and is thinking about how to organize this healthy beginning and to use it with the maximum impact for Russia's benefit.

[Rubtsov] It's no secret that some people are afraid of the revival of the Cossacks...

[Martynov] It frightens those people for whom a strong, united Russia is not to their liking. So the Cossacks are not hiding the fact that they will always stand against those people who fish in the murky water of interethnic conflicts and force against individuals. The peoples of Russia expect from the Cossacks what made up the glory of our ancestors—reliable protection of the foundations of Russian statehood. A Cossack without duty is simply unthinkable.

[Rubtsov] It is difficult not to agree with that assertion, while considering the centuries old history of the Cossacks as a military service class. But how is it possible to realize it in practice?

[Martynov] First of all through the revival of Cossack military service.

[Rubtsov] This thesis obviously requires clarification. Yes, a Cossack is traditionally a patriot, defender of the Fatherland, skilled, mobile, well-trained, and disciplined. But we all must consider the enormous changes of recent decades.

[Martynov] Who is arguing: according to social structure, psychology and whatever other factors you'd like to consider, present-day Cossacks are already not the same Cossacks, by way of illustration, at those at the beginning of the century. But much that we can and must take with us into Russia's future has been preserved. It has appeared that the wars and repressions should not have left a stone standing of our spiritual system and of our culture. But, no. The warrior Cossacks and the Cossack's ability to survive and endure under the most unfavorable conditions have had an impact. Take that same military service: visit any village or farm—and you will note a special passion among the overwhelming majority of Cossack youth. Here's the confirmation for you: as an experiment, subunits of Cossacks have been formed in regiments that bear the name of the Don and Kuban Cossacks. And what has been the result: discipline, cohesion and success in combat training is higher among our representatives.

The Union of Cossacks is assuming responsibility for pre-conscription training. The former defense-sports work has essentially resumed. The results are on hand—we've nevertheless managed to place in the ranks draft evaders, deserters and those who were totally unprepared for the difficulties of military service. We need to remedy the situation which is what we are striving to do. The Don, Kuban and other Cossack hordes and their friendly associations of people are creating pre-conscription training camps. The training program consists of history, the laws

of war, regulations, and training on horseback... And you must mandatorily work on the land.

[Rubtsov] And where will Cossack youth be sent to serve?

[Martynov] Locally, we are working with and will work with the military commissariats. The Union's position is clear: we needed to form full-fledged units from Cossacks.

[Rubtsov] As you know, there is a Ministry of Defense Collegium decision on that score...

[Martynov] But there are enough questions for now. In the Regiment imeni Don Cossacks, for example, the regimental commander, seeing that Cossacks serve better than the rest, diluted them up among various subunits to "rise spirits".

As Ataman of the Union of Cossacks, I am stating: We oppose scattering our people throughout separate units and subunits. We need to form purely Cossack units.

[Rubtsov] Isn't it true that what was easy to carry out in the cavalry may be impossible in a modern army?

[Martynov] We need to do this and not frighten each other with difficulties. I assure you that the modern Kuban, Transbaykal, Ussuriysk and Don Cossack can do more than ride a horse. We will be capable—naturally with the good will of the army leadership—of forming both motorized rifle, tank and airborne regiments. And another thing: we need conscripts from the same areas to go to these units. It is our old tradition for a son to find his father's name in the regimental book 20 years later and for countrymen to monitor a soldier's performance to see that he does not ruin the family name.

[Rubtsov] In that case, how will it be with command cadres at those units?

[Martynov] They must also be Cossacks. It is advisable to train them in separate groups at military schools and academies. We will recommend them to Cossack units but not at ordinary units.

The Union is also concerned about the social protection of soldiers who are entering the reserve. They will be allotted land from the reserve wedge so that a man does not depend on whether or not some mayor will give him a residence permit. And we will help him build a house at favorable terms.

Of course, there are still many problems here. But the creation of Cossack units is advantageous for the Russian Army and therefore it is in our common interests to remove existing obstacles. We have sufficiently close contacts with our curators at the General Staff and some of the atamans and I have even been issued officer's hats on behalf of Minister of Defense P. Grachev, as they say, as a sign of military cooperation. But we still need to progress further: there is a need to create a special directorate in the Ministry of Defense which would be involved with the issues of Cossack military service. For example, I learned from Security Minister V. Barannikov that the border guards are ready to take that step. The time has also come for the army.

[Rubtsov] Aleksandr Gavrilovich, during the conflict in the Dniester Republic, yes and later, when combat operations began in Abkhazia, the mass media noted the quite

widespread participation of Cossacks in these events. At that time, accusations of creating illegal armed formations were directed at the Union of Cossacks. Is there some sort of basis for these accusations?

[Martynov] The procuracy was involved with that issue. There were no illegal acts on our part. We did not form detachments, we did not draft people to participate in those events and we did not send them to the "hot spots". However, we recognize the right of every man, and Cossacks are no exception here, to protect themselves, their loved ones, and fellow tribesmen who have been cast to the whims of fate. People went there voluntarily.

They often cast the following as an accusation: you, they say, went there to defend the Russians. In our view, that is also not a crime. The Cossacks have always viewed themselves as an integral part of the Russian people and naturally they will always defend their blood brothers.

[Rubtsov] Let's return to the Union of Cossacks. Bearing in mind the broad circle of issues with which you must be involved, their level, and the socio-political acuteness, from the sidelines it is difficult to determine what this is—a party, or a social or political organization?

[Martynov] The Union of Cossacks is a social organization that was created in 1990 by initiative from below. Our tasks are the revival of the Cossacks while considering the Cossacks' many centuries of experience of self-rule and democracy, and the preservation of our cultural, everyday life, military and family traditions.

The Large Circle that took place last year at Stavropol, to which all Cossack hosts and nearly 70 friendly associations of people sent their representatives, confirmed the status of our Union and my powers as ataman. As you certainly already understand, we are not confining ourselves to the circle of, I would express it this way, folklore-everyday life issues. We are attempting to make the problem of the revival of the Cossacks a major issue. A number of documents, first of all, the Russian Supreme Soviet Decree "On the Rehabilitation of the Cossacks" have been adopted at the state level with our participation. Now the main thing is not to permit good decisions to go to waste.

Of course, right now life is such that any social structure is inevitably becoming politicized. Frankly speaking, the gaze of many parties and movements is turning to us. They see that the Cossacks are an influential and promising force and they would like to acquire a worthy image for themselves and to increase their strength at the Cossacks' expense. We are not succumbing to these ruses. You see for yourself that the people are tired of projects, programs, rallies and appeals. Some defend socialism and some prefer capitalism. We are advocating a worthy life and the return of the land to its real owner. The bitterness in society can only lead to a civil war and who better than a Cossack knows what that war will entail.

[Rubtsov] Then the activity of the Union of Cossacks is reduced to carrying out the most important task of reviving Cossack military service, isn't that so?

[Martynov] Of course, a Cossack always was a toiler, he loved his land and he knew how to work it. It's not in vain that I have heard since childhood: "A Cossack on a horse is also a Cossack on the threshing floor". The majority of

our grandfathers and great grandfathers lived well because they did not know laziness and they skillfully managed their affairs. The return of that skillful and zealous farmer to the land is the Union's most important goal. And a cavalry saber will not be unsheathed without extreme need.

Staffing Problems Deriving From Breakup of Armed Forces

93UM0174A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Nov 92 p 2

[Article by MVO [Moscow Military District] Cadre Directorate Chief Major-General Valentin Kurnyshov, under the rubric: "Military Structural Development: The Cadre Issue": "The Constant Flow of Fates"]

[Text] There are postulates in personnel work—incidentally, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA periodically reminds us about them—which will appear to be so obvious that it hardly appears necessary to reflect on them. During any assignment, promotion or transfer of an officer, even during his release into the reserve, commanders, their assistants for personnel, and personnel organ workers are called upon first of all to remember and be concerned about the combat readiness of the army as a whole and of a specific subunit in particular. I cannot and I will never place this thesis in doubt. It was and will remain correct for all times. But we think that it is necessary to broaden and deepen the ideas about the combat readiness of the affected troops. But then again, it can be said in another way: we need to move these ideas closer to real life and to those difficult problems that face the Russian Army today.

No matter how complicated it is for us today, we will ultimately definitely arrive at the conclusion: The man, the officer, must certainly be in the forefront. It is about him—the lieutenant, captain, or colonel—that we must be primarily concerned about. Everything else, sacred and on high, will take care of itself. If that place in ranks that corresponds to the level of their knowledge, experience, professionalism, and devotion to service has been found for the majority of officers (you can only dream about each one) and that coincides with their aspirations, if an officer has been provided for in an everyday sense within the realm of possibility, and if he does not sense any infringements of his rights and clearly sees service and life prospects.

The telephone still grows cold on the desk after the conversation with the young and energetic chief who recently occupied this high post. He requested the selection of several officers who are capable of really handling the matter and who have both the experience and the will. "But your staff is manned." I object: "You need to drive them off as soon as possible," I decisively speak into the telephone. "Many officers have lost interest in service and the matter is being weighed down." "To our common chagrin, there are those officers—But interest in service does not flag without reason. And don't we need a second dispersal soon after the first?"

The beginning of our dialogue developed like that or approximately like that. Today it is easier than ever to renew the officer corps and to replace some people with other people. In our Moscow Military District, 2,572

officers have arrived on transfer and have been added to the rolls. Another approximately 1,500 officers will arrive in the near future. All of them are not in authorized positions, they are at the disposal of some commanders or other, and naturally they have the choice of any positions. There is a shortage of officers here, except in the positions of platoon commander. But, as my interlocutor suggested, some are being released (nearly run off) with noise in order to assign others to their posts without changing anything in duty conditions—that hardly means that they are concerned about combat readiness and about reviving that same interest in service. Here it is much more preferable to be guided by the conclusions of the certification boards, to manifest humaneness and decency, and to also be concerned about those officers whose time has come to depart the ranks and about their successors.

Here is a real life situation. Major Igor Yakovenko, a training battery commander, submitted a request for a transfer to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. He was transferred to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense through a Russian Federation Ministry of Defense order. However, it turned out that the post to which they intended to assign the officer is subject to reduction. Yakovenko submitted a repeat request to leave him in the ranks of the Russian Army. How do you assess, how do you regard this agitation (and, I am certain, spiritual torment) of a conscientious, professionally trained soldier? The petition on repealing the paragraph of the order affecting the major's assignment to Ukraine stirred up the military district training center command authorities where the major served. And it seems to me that in the process they were guided by a concern about the fate of a specific man.

How can that occur at times? In Ukraine—believe me, it is a question not at all about politics—they immediately write the appropriate order for any officer who has expressed a desire to serve in Russia, and specifically in the Moscow Military District. And the officer, who has devoted both years and health to the service, will arrive precisely in the capitol in order to arrange his future here and will seek, as they say, his fortune. Nearly 900 of these orders, which have not been coordinated with anyone beforehand and for which nothing has been determined, have passed through my hands. Incidentally, there are among the reassigned officers those who have taken the oath of allegiance to Ukraine.

Where can you find a position for these people when there are already officers in the military district who have been in unauthorized positions for even more than two years and who are losing the right to a salary? How do you treat officers who have taken the new oath? Force them to retake an oath for the third time? I am certain: that is unacceptable and inadmissible. Over there, in foreign countries, agreeable commanders manifest a sort of efficiency and concern about people but, it turns out that there is none right here, in Moscow Military District. "Bureaucrats in uniform", as the publicists express it, refuse to even place them on the rolls: it is hopeless.

But the problem, the complexity of which we should not diminish, is resolvable with a rational approach, good relations, and priorities of humaneness. We are also accepting quite a few officers from Belarus. But we are

finding the opportunity to come to an agreement beforehand on each transfer in order to not compel a man to uselessly expend both time and enormous—isn't that really so—financial resources.

As we know, humaneness is manifested in different ways. Obviously not everyone knows that the conditions of release into the reserve are more advantageous for an officer and his family on the territory of Russia in accordance with its laws than in Ukraine where other legal standards are in force. So: officers from the Western Group of Forces (that are under Russian jurisdiction) who desire to live in Ukraine after release into the reserve are coming to Russia to be released. Many officers are coming to our military district. After completion of the documents and the signing of the order, they are departing for Ukraine. With the additional five-fold increase of salary that will not be excessive in their new lives. I think that all of this is humane. And therefore also just. Yes, right now we are living in different states and we are depending on different legal systems. But I am convinced that there should be a single moral space in our states.

There is one other factor to which I would like to direct attention. In my opinion, right now we are obliged to change our attitude toward officers who have decided to separate from the service based on their own desires. The juridical standards in this sense have been more or less defined. We only have to define the moral standards. We should not create a situation of general condemnation and commander's ostracism around an officer who desires, in accordance with his, now legal, right to be released into the reserve based on his desire. You can't forcibly make someone perform his duty. Only strict but sympathetic and just commanders can instill and reinforce a love for it. The lieutenant was lucky with his commander—he will not be afflicted by the torment of not having an apartment. The captain was lucky with his commander—he will not walk around with an expression of ecumenical sorrow on his face, while moving up in rank. He will understand: right now this is a too difficult time for the army.

Junior officers are the future of the Russian Army. These are not eloquent words, not banality. I regard with sadness the nearly daily submissions for release of platoon, company and battery commanders. I want to say many things: "Son! Have you thought about everything? Won't you reassess your zeal and wisdom at 25?"

Previously, we invited all officers who had decided to be released based on their own desire for a conversation at military district headquarters. One of the military council members devoted attention to each officer. Today, there isn't any such opportunity. The number of officers who have become disappointed in service has increased. Temporary duty expenditures have drastically increased. Now military council members drive out to sites, divisions and garrisons and, while resolving many other issues, invite those officers who have sent a request for release to sit down and talk. I have had numerous opportunities to be a witness and a participant of conversations between officers and Military District Commander Colonel-General Leontiy Kuznetsov, his First Deputy Lieutenant-General Igor Puzanov, and Deputy for Personnel Lieutenant-General Aleksandr Gorbachev and many other leaders. It sometimes happens that a junior officer will withdraw his

request after such a conversation. And who knows: maybe, years later, he himself will have the opportunity to save junior officers from rash decisions that have been dictated by momentary difficulties.

Every day I make changes to the consolidated personnel movement table. While penciling in some figure, I experience satisfaction: yet another officer's fate has been determined. While penciling in another, I admit: the situation remains acute, and the situation will not be alleviated tomorrow or even the day after tomorrow. But it is important not to lose a single man in this constant flow and to preserve everything that is the best and everything valuable for the army and to do everything possible to alleviate the fates of those officers who are leaving its ranks—either based on years of service, due to reduction, state of health, or based upon their desire. It seems to me that the spiritual state of Russia's young army is also developing in this process, its democratic traditions are being affirmed, and an attractive image of the reviving officer corps is forming.

'Russian Unity' Urges Army Officers To Disobey Orders

93UM0208A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 27 Nov 92 p 8

[Article by Maxim Aleksandrov: "Russian Unity News Conference—Opposition Urges Military Not To Obey Orders"]

[Text] The parliamentary bloc Russian Unity, which is in opposition to the government, urged the commanders of the various arms of the Armed Forces and the Moscow Garrison, starting on 1 December of 1992, not to obey the orders of the Ministry of Defense of the country.

In personal messages sent to each of the military commanders, the opposition asserts that, starting on 1 December, the existence of the present government will become illegal. "This government," declared the signers of the message, Mikhail Astafyev, Ilya Konstantinov, and Gennadiy Sayenko, "was not ratified by the Supreme Soviet, but was formed by the president in accordance with additional powers that were given to him, and which expire on 1 December." Therefore, according to their words, the execution of orders of such a government after this date will be a crime for which those who are guilty will be held responsible.

The organizers of the news conference also shared their information concerning government intentions to bring pressure on the delegates at the forthcoming congress with the help of several thousand Kuzbass [Kuznets coal basin] miners who are being brought quickly to the capital by special train. These miners, in the opinion of the opposition, will be employed to disperse a rally on Manezh Square on 30 November that has been banned by the authorities, and generally for the organization of "excesses" which it is convenient to use as a pretext for the declaration of a state of emergency in Moscow.

The leaders of the opposition acquainted the attendees at the news conference with the drafts of a resolution that they submitted at the session of the parliament on Yegor Gaydar's report concerning planned governmental measures to improve the economic situation in the country in

the next four months. The bloc thinks that the present government will not solve any problems, and it proposes that the president submit the candidacy of a new premier for ratification by the parliament. Commenting on this document, Vladimir Isakov, the leader of the bloc, noted the "softness" of its wording, which is calculated to attract the votes of the "sensible part of the democrats." However, one of the factions of the bloc, Civil Society, in addition, submitted its own special draft for the attention of the parliament, in which it indicates that the main culprit of all of the troubles is none other than the president, who should be dismissed and called to account.

CIS: POLICY

Opposition to Grachev on Abolition of Student Deferments

93UM0149A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Nov 92
Morning Edition p 3

[Article by Valeriy Vyzhutovich, IZVESTIYA: "Academic Alert: Russian Minister of Defense Proposes To Renew Exchange of Student Cards for Military Ones"]

[Text] Moscow, St. Petersburg, Tomsk and other university centers of Russia are laying claim to the vacancy of rebellious alma maters following Chisinau and Kiev, which just had the acute, agonizing experience of massive student unrest. A letter from Russian Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev addressed to acting premier Yegor Gaydar promises to make them a place of large-scale conflicts. In the document, entitled "On the Situation of Draft Resources and Russian Federation Armed Forces Manpower Acquisition of First-Term Personnel," the minister of defense proposes the following:

"Abolish draft deferments for students of day (on-campus) universities, which would allow calling up to an additional 100,000 persons annually into the Armed Forces. Simultaneously with this also abolish draft deferments for work in a number of sectors of the national economy..."

"Do not take up the question of expanding the existing list of deferments (to sons of farmers, single mothers and so on) for the near term (up to the year 2000).

"Eliminate military chairs in civilian universities..."

"Revise the statute on medical examinations for persons being called up for military service..."

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA reported that a draft Russian presidential edict was attached to the letter. This means the minister's proposals may become a real directive subject to unconditional execution any day now. True, a number of elite universities were named (ten Moscow and three St. Petersburg) which are promised a safeguard, but all the rest having no general's distinctions in the system of Russian higher education will be ordered to join formation. Inasmuch as the Army leadership resolutely will not allow idle conversations in formation, I wish to have time to express myself before law-abiding boys, having exchanged student cards for military ones, are thundering their boots over the parade field and others, insolent and recalcitrant, protestingly pour into the streets.

Women in black again. Mournful, motionless as sculptures, they appear in the center of Moscow, stand beneath

black banners and hold in their hands portraits of sons in funereal frames. And against the background of already traditional posters and slogans demanding an end to nonregulation relations, a faded slogan that had seemingly disappeared from circulation forever again begins fluttering: "No call-up of students into the Army!"

Everything all over again! As if there had not been the concerted public attack on that senseless procedure where from 1984 through 1989 education begun in the university continued in the barracks and often ended there (seven percent of the first call-up did not return to the auditoriums). As if there had not been the lengthy, difficult battle in the Union parliament before Colonel A. Tsalko, Lieutenant Colonel V. Yerokhin, Major V. Lopatin and other reformers in military and civilian ranks, having overcome the "strength of materials" with truly student determination, managed to achieve draft deferment for boys who had entered day departments of universities. How happy we were over this victory of common sense over stereotypes of defense awareness; how society sighed in relief, having commanded: "Students, At ease!"

Not two years went by and in July 1991 the democratic press had to repulse a counteroffensive by the General Staff lobby in the Union Supreme Soviet. According to the draft law "On Universal Military Obligation and Military Service" prepared by parliamentary hawks, deferment from call-up into the Army was no longer due students. At that time rectors and professors of the country's largest universities turned to the public through ARGUMENTY I FAKTY with the appeal "Save the Homeland's Intellect!" Ya. Zasurskiy, dean of the Moscow State University Journalism Faculty, persuasively proved all kinds of harm and ruin from placing students under arms. Doctor of Philosophical Sciences N. Keyzerov and the author of these lines came out in IZVESTIYA with articles warning against rash, foolhardy draft statutes. LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS, OGONEK—it seems not one liberal publication left the attempt on students' freedom from the military oath unevaluated.

Well, who then knew that the command "Private Lomonosov, two paces forward!" was not the last. That this was only the beginning of a redistribution of forces of everyone without exception into the combat formations of Yazov, Pugov and Kryuchkov. Was it chance that specifically only on 21 August, the day of victory over the conspirators (and not a day earlier!) the USSR Ministry of Defense Press Center disseminated the "surrender document": "Letters continue to come to the USSR Ministry of Defense from people's deputies, citizens and the student public on the question of student call-up for first-term military service. The USSR Law On Universal Military Obligation under which students are granted deferment from the draft presently is in force. The Law is being complied with."

Since then it has been a year that the former USSR (now Russian) Armed Forces seemingly have not experienced a clinical, pressing requirement for student reinforcements. And then the trumpet calls! Perhaps, as Makashov and Prokhanov suggest, the homeland really is threatened by "forces of world imperialism"? Not at all. Not one country of the world community plans to fight us. Today the threat

to Russia's security rather is hidden inside its borders; not even hidden—a fire is blazing in the North Caucasus. But any build-up in numerical strength of troops, any augmentation of military might can only cause harm. Even so, with the imperious intonations of some parliamentary decisions and speeches Moscow already is arousing suspicions and hostility of Russian autonomies dangerous for the integrity of the Federation.

No, the principal danger for Russia is not "intrigues" of external enemies, but economic vegetation, social degradation, and destruction of social and human ties. And so national security is not so much a military problem now as an economic, political, ecological and humanitarian one... A problem of stability of culture, gaps in science, and curbing of savage crime...

Just how is it possible to prepare a law or edict regulating the procedure for call-up to military service when the Supreme Soviet has not yet adopted a concept of national security? What is reasonable sufficiency in organizing national defense? Reasonable for whom?

As long as there is no legislatively embodied public awareness of national security interests, the military and any other department will interpret these interests according to their own understanding and to their own benefit.

When General of the Army Yazov was confirmed in the post of minister of defense, he declared with a soldier's directness that the Army cannot get by without students! I do not know what statements General Grachev made earlier on this score, but the enthusiasm of his recent address to the government leaves no doubts: assurance of national security continues to reduce to building up military muscles. And as before, in demanding all possible sacrifices from society, the military department does not wish to be refused in anything.

Why can the Army not get by without students? The call-up plan is going well. According to data which the editors have, more than half of draftees now receive deferment to continue studies. The number of kinds of deferments rose sevenfold this year compared with 1989. This is only within the law. With respect to illegal evasion of service, the number of deserters was 17,800 in spring. Only nine out of every 100 draftees in Moscow set off to serve. In North Caucasus republics it is even fewer; there they are establishing their own Cossack units, paying no attention to military commissariat allocations. According to Ministry of Defense estimates, even troops being withdrawn from Eastern Europe do not compensate for the shortage of privates.

And therefore students should be put in uniform? But the authors of the draft chose easy pickings for themselves. Just as there is the urban assault force in place of a radical land reform making the peasant the proprietor of the land and harvest, so there is a student call-up instead of military reform creating conditions for volunteer contract service.

Russian Academy of Education President A. Petrovskiy writes today in IZVESTIYA: "Although it probably will solve certain current Army problems, at the same time the student call-up will substantially undermine the country's intellectual potential. This will occur not only in the distant future, but even in the near future."

What is this? inquire organizers of the draft campaign. Students becoming a privileged caste? It turns out that workers and peasants have to serve, but give students a deferment? Social stratification is the result! No, they assure us, no one has set the goal of undermining public education; it is a question of one thing—strengthening the Army with competent specialists.

Well, the Army really does need competent soldiers capable of handling serious equipment. But society has just as much need for real physicists, mathematicians and humanitarians... In the five years of student call-up the country's intellectual potential was dealt a colossal blow. This is a misfortune even from the standpoint of defense interests. The outcome of combat operations today is determined not by the numerical strength of privates, but above all by modern equipment. Therefore those who will create it tomorrow do not march in formation in a single civilized country; they study. Then why, tell me, is it *universal* military obligation for us?

Civic duty? It can be fulfilled not only by reporting to the induction center in response to a notice, but also by voluntary contract which the student, worker, or anybody is capable of concluding if they desire. True, this requires different organizational work and the ability to skillfully attract people to Army service and persuasively prove its benefits and advantages, not the customary habit of counting heads.

In the opinion of Major Lopatin, one of the active, consistent military reformers, it is possible to make a transition to a professional army over 4-5 years in the following sequence: transfer NCO's and technical specialists from among first-term servicemen to a professional status; complete the transfer of the most prestigious and technically equipped branches of armed forces and combat arms to a professional basis. A mixed method of Armed Forces manpower acquisition will be used in the transition period, providing for a combination of volunteer contract service (up to 5 years) and a draft.

The possibility of shifting to contract Army service was considered in the government collegium with the participation of the Russian president on 3 November. It was decided that half of the personnel will be called up and half will be hired for substantial pay by the year 2000.

Repeating again and again: military reform is needed. It has not yet begun. Meanwhile, a step already has been taken to preempt it in the form of the draft edict on student call-up into the Army. It is not a step forward, but backward to the bastions of defense consciousness.

CIS: STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

History of SLBM Developments in 1950s

934P0025A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Nov 92 p 5

[Article by Rear Adm (Ret) Viktor Dygalo, candidate of naval sciences: "Sea-Launched Ballistic: The First Launchings"]

[Text] The events to be discussed here assumed their place in their historical "niche" long ago. The confrontation between the USSR and the USA, separated by an ocean,

determined the desire of the two superpowers to utilize the vast expanses of water for mutual nuclear deterrence. In 1955 the USSR successfully tested the first sea-launched ballistic missiles. At that time the Americans were following the path of designing cruise missiles. Rear Admiral (Retired) Viktor Dygalo, the author of several books on the navy, was a direct participant of the missile launchings that established the foundation then for new naval conceptions.

In July-August 1955 the submarine "B-62," which was under my command, crossed by the Northern Sea Route from Murmansk Oblast to a permanent station on Kamchatka as part of a special-purpose expedition. However, the submarine's combat service in this formation was unexpectedly interrupted. An order to go to Vladivostok to join a brigade of ships under construction and repair was received in late October 1955. As for what brought this decision on, I did not receive a sensible answer.

Upon his arrival, brigade commander Captain 1st Rank Petr Ivanovich Vosmak told me, without revealing all of the details prematurely, that the submarine was there to undergo modernization as a missile weapon system. Special pains were taken to impress upon me the strict secrecy of the project. The submarine was placed in Dalzavod's drydock. It was obscured from view in the direction of the sea by large floating canvas-covered panels. Few at the plant knew what we were doing. Preparations for work were made during the day, and assembly was conducted at night. Modernization entailed removing four groups of storage batteries from the fourth compartment and replacing them with two vertical shafts containing launchers for R-11-FM single-stage ballistic missiles. The main missile launch control instruments were located in the central post (third compartment) and in the fourth compartment. The plant was not the only entity that participated in the modernization project. A large number of specialists from defense enterprises and design offices of missile building industry participated as well. Considering the extremely poor equipment availability in Far Eastern industry back then, the labor of these people certainly became a real act of heroism.

The project to modernize the submarine was conducted out of the design office of Nikolay Nikitich Isanin, a prominent scientist in shipbuilding, a twice-awarded Hero of Socialist Labor and the chief designer of many classes of warships. He was appointed technical director of the entire project. Development of a launcher that could launch a missile from a submarine traveling on the surface was assigned to the design office under Yevgeniy Georgiyevich Rudyak. This collective had to solve the problem of launching a ballistic missile with regard for rolling of the ship. F. Abramov was the actual author of the project (unfortunately his patronymical is not to be found in either memory or documents). The task was complicated by the fact that the missile had to be launched by its own engines. For this purpose the launch stand was raised to the upper section of the shaft. Rough aiming of the missile in azimuth was accomplished by turning the stand.

The extremely complicated scientific task of designing the control system was carried out by a collective under the guidance of Nikolay Alekseyevich Pilyugin, an associate of S. P. Korolev. In early 1955 the first launchings of the ballistic missile to be supplied to the navy were carried out

at the Kapustin Yar test range. A little later its first launchings from a launcher installed in a mock-up of a submarine conning tower were carried out there. In September of the same year the world's first launching of a ballistic missile from the submarine "B-67" of the Northern Fleet under the command of Captain 2d Rank Fedor Ivanovich Kozlov (Captain Lieutenant Semen Fedorovich Bondin, commander of the missile department) was carried out. An R-11-FM missile with a range of up to 200 kilometers (it was then called a "surprise short-range" missile owing to its relatively short range and the impossibility of deflecting the blow) was fated to carry out a historical mission—to lay the foundation for establishment of Soviet submarine nuclear missile systems. This missile was designed through the joint effort of two outstanding scientists—missileman S. P. Korolev and ship builder N. N. Isanin.

The new equipment was studied—successfully I might emphasize—in the missile department of our submarine (commander, Captain Lieutenant Albert Vasilyevich Bardin) in parallel with learning its practical application. The gunnery experience Captain 2d Rank Kozlov's crew acquired in the Northern Fleet doubtlessly helped us in many ways to solve these complex problems. Construction of a test range proceeded in parallel with mastering the equipment and the rules of fire. The main objective of the test range was to prepare and issue missiles to submarines, and to conduct test launchings. I as the commander was provided considerable assistance in preparing for these launchings by Vice Admiral Veniamin Andreyevich Sychev, chief of the sea-launched missile and artillery armament directorate. It must be said that considering the complexity of the latest missile weapon systems and the possibility submarines have for carrying out operational and tactical missions (and in the future, strategic) independently, fleet submarine forces and naval submarine forces (which existed until 1961) were established in 1956 as part of the navy's organizational structure. Submarines of the Pacific Fleet were under the command of an experienced, energetic submariner, Lev Petrovich Khiyaynen. It was under his leadership that the hard work of polishing missile launch organization at sea was started. The first missile was launched from our submarine on 6 September 1958 at 1232 Khabarovsk time, out of the forward shaft, to a range of 150 kilometers. On that same day, at 1618, a second missile launched from the aft shaft reached its destination successfully. Moreover the amount by which the missile missed the aiming point was minimal by even today's yardsticks.

But the main test of the entire crew of the submarine "B-62" still lay ahead. In late September 1959 Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev visited China in connection with the 10th anniversary of the People's Republic of China, and from there he went to Maritime Kray. On 4 October 1959 his IL-18 aircraft landed at the airport in Vladivostok. It stands to reason that the arrival of the head of party and government was illuminated then in detail in the press. Except for one episode that has a bearing upon our discussion here.

In the evening of 4 October I was ordered to begin loading two missiles onto the submarine and to be ready to launch, for which purpose a target area had to be organized on the

water, with a large artillery target in its center (that is, at the aiming point). It became clear that they were intending to demonstrate the new weapon to Khrushchev. Anyone who has even casual knowledge of what it takes to receive and load missiles, to prepare for missile launchings and to carry them out, will of course understand how much work we had to do in a short time. We worked without sleep or rest, and it was not until 0800 on 6 October that the submarine "B-62" finally moored itself to the largest pier in the bay. From 0800 to 0900 preliminary calculations of the fire control data were carried out, the real time system was checked, two helicopters were transferred to the target area, and coastal theodolite stations were deployed to track the missile's warhead. In the morning of 6 October Khrushchev sailed into the bay aboard a destroyer under the command of Captain Lieutenant Mikhail Grigoryevich Putintsev (now a retired rear admiral), accompanied by naval commander-in-chief Admiral Sergey Georgiyevich Gorshkov, Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Vitaliy Alekseyevich Fokin and other officials. A large diagram showing the submarine and missiles in cross section was posted on the pier where the submarine was moored. I reported the basic data of the submarine and the missile and its combat potentials when equipped with a nuclear warhead to the premier upon his arrival. Nikita Sergeyevich listened to me, and then he asked the following of the fleet commander:

"What is your schedule for the rest of day?" "Right now, combat training. Lunch at 1300," the commander replied. The time was 10:30.

"Well, all right. We'll set the launching for 1300 so as not to disturb the daily routine. And then we'll eat."

The crew had 2 hours and 30 minutes left. Of this amount, 1 hour was required to move at full speed to the submerging point, and then 1 hour and 30 minutes were left to maneuver to the firing course. But the problem was that because of imperfections in the course indication system, according to the Rocket Launching Regulations the firing course had to be maintained for not less than 4 hours without changing course, speed and running depth. I thought that some one of my chiefs would tell this to Nikita Sergeyevich, and that the launching would be postponed. But no one did this, and I then realized that there was nothing left to do but answer "Yes sir!" But our mood was spoiled: Both I and the commander of the gunnery department knew that the outcome of the launching might be quite unexpected. A decision was made after a short meeting: to carry out the first part of the assignment to the letter. The missile had to be launched at 1300, by the clock.

It was with a heavy heart that I gave the following command at the appointed time: "Permission to launch granted." Captain Lieutenant Bardinov pressed the launch button. A light signal on the console indicating that the missile was away lit up. In that same instant the missile's engine could be heard thundering over the smooth ocean surface. While the submarine was performing a "crash dive" I was able to persuade myself from watching the contrail through the periscope that the missile was on the calculated bearing. Khrushchev watched the launching from aboard the destroyer.

After surfacing, I saw from signal flags on the destroyer that the flagship was pleased with the actions of the submarine. Upon returning to our assigned pier in Vladivostok, we learned of an improbability of missile launchings: After separating from the missile, the nose section traveled the prescribed range of 180 km in freefall on a ballistic trajectory, striking the target and reducing it to splinters.

I was told that Nikita Sergeyevich was overjoyed by the result of the launching, and gave orders to award the submarine commander—that is, me—an early promotion, and to extend his gratefulness to the crew. The premier himself gave me the shoulder boards.

As far as I know, this was the first and last direct demonstration of the might of submarine ballistic missile weapons to the leader of the state.

FROM THE EDITOR. At the time that this article was being prepared for publication we received a telephone call from Captain 1st Rank (Retired) Fedor Ivanovich Kozlov. After graduating from the All-Union Naval Academy imeni Frunze he served in the Northern Fleet as the commander of the submarine "B-67," from which the first ballistic missile was launched. Fedor Ivanovich related that Sergey Pavlovich Korolev and Nikolay Nikitich Isanin were aboard the submarine at the time of the launching. In the final stage of the testing Korolev assumed a position in the conning tower at the commander's periscope, and gave commands that were relayed by the submarine commander. Immediately after receiving the report from the target area (it was on land) that deviation of the warhead from the aiming point was within normal limits, Sergey Pavlovich and Nikolay Nikitich sent a telegram to the leaders of the party and state on the successful testing of a new naval weapon.

To judge those distant events from the standpoint of the logic of the present warming of the international "climate" is probably not the historically correct thing to do: We have no need to rewrite the past. But we believe that there are generous lessons to be learned for future history. And one of them is that in those days, the state would not allow anyone to conduct a dialogue with it from a position of strength.

CIS: GROUND TROOPS

BMPs -1, -2, -3 Profiled

93UM0182B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 27 Nov 92 p 2

[Article by Major Aleksandr Yegorov and Colonel Lev Pavlov: "Armor for the Infantry"]

[Text] In the early 1960's an infantry fighting vehicle, the BMP-1, was created through efforts of a team of designers headed by Pavel Isakov. This is a fast, highly maneuverable armored vehicle armed with the 2A28 Grom 73-mm smoothbore gun, coaxial 7.62-mm PKT Kalashnikov tank machinegun and Malyutka ATGM system. The spacious assault compartment fitted with gun ports and vision devices permitted assault troopers to conduct massed fire without leaving the vehicle.

The BMP-1 was the new word in the realm of building fighting vehicles of that class and purpose. At that time not one army in the world had similar equipment.

Soon after the BMP-1 became operational, the functions of head enterprise for developing IFV's were transferred to the Kurgan Machinebuilding Plant, where the "1" was modernized as the BMP-2.

Changes basically affected the set of armament. The Malyutka ATGM system was replaced for the more modern Konkurs antitank system. After lengthy comparative tests the Grom gun gave way to the new 2A42 30-mm automatic gun stabilized in two planes, with a double-belt feed, and capable of engaging even helicopters. The turret was changed. While only the gunner-operator was in it in the BMP-1, the commander also was located in the turret of the "2." Observation of the battlefield and control of the onboard weapon operator and the assault force were simplified for him.

Even today the BMP-2 is one of the best IFV's. Interest in the "2" continues to be high in the world arms market.

And finally, the BMP-3.

This is a qualitatively new vehicle (the chief designer is A. Blagonravov), about some of whose features we already told last year ("BMP-3," KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 12 February 1991).

Just where does the novelty of the "3" lie? In practically everything: configuration, chassis, weapon system. A more powerful engine has been installed in it. A hydromechanical transmission with power take-off to water-jet propellers has been used for the first time in domestic armored equipment (tracked propulsion is used for moving over the water in the BMP-1 and BMP-2).

Configuration. The vehicle consists of the following:

- control compartment located in the hull front section, where the driver is accommodated, and two assault trooper-machinegunners on both sides of him;
- fighting compartment, located in the hull mid-section (the commander, gunner-operator and main set of armament are accommodated here), under whose rotating floor the 2A70 gun unit of fire is stowed in the loading mechanism conveyor, and in addition to special equipment and the command and control system, communications equipment is installed at the commander's workstation: R-173 radio and R-173P receiver;
- assault compartment, fitted with seven seats, two individual and five common, at the engine bulkhead. Air vents for the assault troopers, boxes for food and for spare parts, tools and accessories, and gun ports for firing personal weapons are provided in the compartment;
- engine-transmission compartment, located in the vehicle rear section and separated from the assault compartment by heat and sound insulating bulkheads.

Armament system: 2A70 100-mm gun-launcher (ammunition: ZUOF17 round with 30F32 HE-fragmentation projectile, ZUBK10-3 round with 9M117 guided missile), 2A72 30-mm automatic gun and PKT machinegun. All this is installed in the turret in one unit. In addition, there are two PKT machineguns installed in the front hull

section in autonomous mounts, two PK Kalashnikov machineguns in stowage, six AK-74 assault rifles, and a 26-mm flare gun.

The fire control system (sight-guidance device, sight for firing against airborne and ground targets, combination vision device, electrical two-plane stabilizer, ballistic computer and so on) as well as vision and orientation devices (a prismatic device with fiber-optic system of displaying the mark is used for the first time for machineguns in autonomous mounts) support effective fire from the weapon unit against ground and airborne targets.

The BMP-3 chassis is interesting in its versatility. It also can be used as a base for specialized vehicles—command, maintenance, recovery and so on.

In July of last year the vehicle underwent serious tests in the Kara-Kum Desert, where it demonstrated survivability and adaptation to high temperatures. The vehicle withstood the 40-degree heat specified by the preliminary specifications, and design changes made after the tests permitted guaranteeing normal BMP-3 operation even with a temperature of plus 55 degrees. The latest BMP model did not end up in the Kara-Kum Desert by chance. Plant workers are preparing it for operation under special conditions: the United Arab Emirates purchased the vehicle from us after it was tested in stiff competition with western analogues.

Comparative BMP Specifications and Performance Characteristics

	BMP-1	BMP-2	BMP-3
Full combat weight, tonnes	13.0+2%	14.0+2%	18.7+2%
Combat team	10	10	10
Crew	3	3	3
Mounted force	8	7	7(plus two additional places)
Maximum speed, km/hr			
Highway	65	65	70
Afloat	7	7	10
Highway range, km	550-600	550-600	600
Engine	Liquid-cooled four-stroke diesel		
Make	UTD-20	UTD-20	UTD-29M
Number of cylinders	6	6	10
Cylinder arrangement	V at 120° angle		With 144° included angle
Maximum output, hp	300—5%	300—5%	500

Ambushes: Experience from Afghanistan

93UM0119E Moscow VOYENNOY VESTNIK
in Russian No 5-6, May-Jun 92 pp 62-64

[Article by Capt A. Dubchinskiy, under the heading "Afghanistan—Combat Experience To Add to One's Arsenal": "Ambushes: Combat Examples"]

[Text] **Actions of Patrols when Moving up to an Ambush Site.** In November 1982, a 38-man reconnaissance team commanded by Captain A. Markovtsev was moving up from the Bagram Intersection (vicinity of the 10th Post) in the direction of the mountains towards an ambush site. Each scout's personal gear and equipment included 10 magazines for an assault rifle, two F-1 grenades, and the same number of illuminating flare cartridges. They took 15 pieces of ammunition for each GP-25 barrel-mounted grenade launcher.

The point was moving in front at a distance of 15-20 meters. A machinegunner was at the head of the main body, followed by the reconnaissance team leader and then the rest of the scouts. The deputy platoon commander brought up the rear of the column. The distance between scouts ensured visibility ahead of the next guy. The leader's commands were relayed along the line in a whisper. Visual signals were also used. For example, a

sweep of the hand downward meant "lie (sit) down," and the raised hand meant "stop, cease movement."

The strong headwind aided the noiseless movement of the scouts. Near the designated site of the ambush the patrol detected up to 30 rebels armed with assault rifles and grenade launchers. It was impossible to pass by unnoticed. On the leader's command, the group went to the ground and prepared for battle. But the Dushmans, having detected us, merely sat down. A whistle sounded from their direction, and the members of the patrol answered in kind. After this the rebels got up and calmly went their way. The commander of the reconnaissance team ordered not to open fire on them.

In our view, he made the right decision in this episode. First, the forces were roughly equal, and the terrain was open. In the event of a clash, heavy losses could not have been avoided. Second, the reconnaissance team's main mission was to organize an ambush, and fighting would have frightened off the expected caravan.

Organizing and Conducting an Ambush. In May 1983, information was received at the headquarters of a separate reconnaissance battalion that a caravan with lazurite (about \$2 million worth)—the Dushmans' payment for weapons being purchased in Pakistan—was to pass in the vicinity of Bagram Valley. The caravan was guarded by up

to 100 men. It was to cross the valley at night at great speed, expecting to take cover in the mountains before dawn.

The exact date was unknown; therefore, battalion subunits went out on ambush several nights in a row. They used GAZ-66 vehicles with canopies to deliver the reconnaissance teams to the ambush site. They went over different routes at 5-minute intervals. They traveled in normal configuration up to the populated area of Bagram—with headlights on, and then turned them off in the valley.

At the foot of the mountains, the reconnaissance teams dismounted and after a communications check began moving toward the ambush site. The commanders also brought the companies to the routes the caravan was likely following. A total of three paths were covered.

Only 10 minutes after taking up positions, observers of the 2d Company, which was commanded by Senior Lieutenant N. Shakalov, reported movement of an armed group of six people. It was determined that this was an enemy patrol. The rebels were moving at short intervals and an accelerated pace. The security detail (about 100 men) followed 30 meters behind the patrol with a distance of 2-3 paces between men.

There were 24 men in the ambush, 15 of whom have no combat experience. After letting the security detail pass, they opened fire on the rear of the security detail and directly on the caravan. The Dushmans quickly retreated and went to the ground. The scouts expended almost all their ammunition in the fighting and requested assistance. Other reconnaissance teams arrived after several minutes. A little later, an armored group from the permanent deployment garrisoning location approached, blinded the enemy with searchlights with the filters removed, and brought down heavy fire on them with guns and machine-guns.

About 40 rebels were destroyed in the fighting. We captured cameras, two American-made radios, topographic maps, weapons, and ammunition. All the lazurite was transferred to the Afghan authorities.

In this example, it makes sense to substantiate the reconnaissance team commander's concept. If the scouts would have first opened fire on the security detail, accomplishment of the primary mission would have been in question. The officer's decision to concentrate efforts on capturing the caravan also helped to defeat the band.

In the opinion of the senior command authorities, the operation of the separate reconnaissance battalion in the vicinity of Gagamunda became a successfully developed and conducted ambush.

Reconnaissance teams were dropped by helicopter in the vicinity of Surubi (20 km from the ambush site). An armored group (BTR-70) had arrived at the landing area earlier under the guise of protecting a passing transport column. Some of the personnel were hidden inside the armored transport vehicles [BTR's]. Toward evening, the scouts moved to the vicinity of Gagamunda to the sentry posts situated along the road from Kabul to Jalalabad.

The reconnaissance teams went out on ambush two nights in a row, but without results. First, the rebels had noticed

the scouts' arrival at the posts, and they were afraid of going over to active operations. Second, the area was not studied sufficiently, and they initially were unable to reach the ambush site undetected.

After a meeting with the company commanders, the division chief of staff, S. Kandalin, decided to organize an ambush by first feigning the departure of the scouts from the occupied positions for winter quarters.

On one of the days, in the afternoon the BTR's approached Post No 2a. An assault reconnaissance company (Senior Lieutenant G. Kireyev, commander) openly mounted the armored vehicles and was delivered to Post No 1, where the rest of the teams were located. Fifteen minutes before nightfall, the scouts noiselessly through the lower side hatches took up their places in the BTR's again, and the column moved in the direction of Post No 2a at a speed of 25-30 km/hr. On the approach to a small tunnel, near which the caravan's route ran, the BTR's slowed down to 10 km/hr, which looked like a natural reaction by the drivers to the obstacle.


Already in the tunnel, the scouts dismounted on the move and positioned themselves along the walls. With the onset of darkness, the forward patrol reached the ambush site. It detected an active exchange of light signals from both sides of the road (at night the rebels made extensive use of kerosene lamps for this). The lanterns blinked continuously for quite a long time.

During this time the main body of the reconnaissance team took up positions and prepared firing data. Soon a loud noise was heard that was created by the caravan moving along a gravel-covered path. It became clear that the rebels were trying to rush across an open sector between the mountains.

The team opened fire and launched illumination flares in the direction of the caravan. It turned out that about 15 meters ahead, a small embankment was half covering the Dushmans. The company commander kept his cool and gave the command: "Charge—advance!" The scouts jumped out to the embankment and continued to destroy the fleeing enemy with point-blank fire. Only a small part of the security detail managed to get away and head off in the direction of the mountains, but explosions were soon heard—the Dushmans had run into the minefield set up earlier by the sappers. The result of the ambush was the capture of two DShK machineguns, an 82-mm mortar, ammunition for them, five Kalashnikov assault rifles, and 10 rifles. About 30 rebels were killed. Our side had no losses.

Proper selection of the location for an ambush plays a significant role in its success. When operating in the mountains, it is advisable to occupy the dominating heights and absolutely necessary to organize all-round observation. Combat experience attests to this.

Thus, in June 1983, an assault reconnaissance company was tasked to seal off one of the villages from the direction of the mountains. Under the guise of a column with ammunition, several KamAZ vehicles with scouts concealed under canopies came out of the permanent deployment garrisoning location under the protection of two BTR's.



Movement of columns was usually stopped after 1800 hours in Afghanistan. Therefore, as was the custom, the column stopped near Post No 10 at the Bagram Intersection to remain overnight. The vehicles were parked with the tailboards pointed in the direction opposite the mountains. At 0300 hours, the scouts dismounted, and the reconnaissance team began moving out in their own directions.

On the approach to the village, it became clear from the shouts and noise that the rebels had detected the subunits that were advancing from the front. There was only one thing left to do—leave along the ravine to the mountains. The scouts ran toward the nearest dominating heights and quickly took up positions. Here the observers detected an enemy group of about 50 men.

Having had time to occupy a number of heights, the reconnaissance teams had an advantage over the enemy and were able to take advantage of it splendidly. Half of the band was destroyed in the very first minutes of fighting. The rest of the Dushmans were finished off by teams under the command of Lieutenant Sh. Berekaliyev and Senior Lieutenant G. Kireyev by attacking the enemy from above. Unfortunately, two soldiers from the assault regiment attacking the village from the front were killed in the fighting, and Lieutenant Berekaliyev was wounded. The rebel losses proved to be far greater—46 killed. We captured 35 assault rifles, four grenade launchers, five rifles, and two PKM machineguns.

These episodes of ambush operations, in my view, indicate that the key to success lies in concealment of their organization, noiseless movement to the designated site, intensified all-round observation, and proper selection of positions. The tactical competence of subunit commanders,

particularly platoon and company commanders, and their determination to carry out the assigned mission are also quite important.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that the soldiers and sergeants bore the main burden of the fighting. And they showed their very best side. In a foreign country with a strange climate, difficult terrain, and a contradictory political situation, our soldiers performed their duty with honor and remained loyal to the oath. It is the lot of politicians to judge the underlying cause of some or other events. It is the task of military men to act decisively and effectively where ordered by the command. I hope that this article offered for the readers' attention will be perceived from precisely that viewpoint.

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Airborne Assault Forces in Mobile Defense

93UM0156A Moscow VOYENNY VESTNIK
in Russian No 3-4, Mar-Apr 92 pp 62-64

[Article by Candidate of Military Sciences Colonel V. Musiyenko: "Airborne Assault Forces in Mobile Defense"]

[Text] Last year's magazine articles on the problems of mobile defense certainly cause interest and not only theoretical. However, it turned out that the issues of utilizing tactical airborne assault forces (TakVD) were avoided in those articles. And we would like to fill that gap.

In the postwar years (especially from the mid-1970's), military theory and practice concentrated attention on the employment of the latter on offense. They planned to land a large part of them using a parachute airborne operation.

Essentially, only right now have all of the preconditions been created to develop the theory for employing assault forces in defense, first of all in mobile defense. Let's enumerate some of them.

First of all, airborne assault divisions and units have been formed and they have combat and transport-assault helicopters, combat assault vehicles and other vehicles with adequately high specifications in their inventory. Second, the techniques for conducting mobile defense by combined arms units and divisions have been studied in theory and have been mastered in practice (another question is—have they been mastered to an adequate degree?). Finally, in accordance with the views on offense in the armies of the developed countries, a multitude of mobile defended targets, the destruction of which by conventional weapons appears to be problematical, have appeared in the attackers' combat formation. Therefore, today mobile defense, where the factor of time and the effective utilization of the results of the effective engagement of the enemy play a key role, is inconceivable without the employment of TakVD.

While defining the sphere of their operations, we must consider that the enemy may disrupt the deliberate maneuver of units and divisions, especially in the initial period of war. And we will have to task assault forces with missions upon which the outcome of the entire defensive engagement (operation) depends. Calculations and exercise experience demonstrate: it is advisable to include no less than a reinforced battalion in a TakVD. Smaller units are hardly capable of carrying out those functions that are objectively necessary in mobile defense.

While proceeding from the assessment of the capabilities of army aviation, and also from the number of subunits and units that have been trained for use as an assault force, it is legitimate to assert that they will most frequently operate in a zone 30-60 kilometers ahead of the forward edge of the defense. It is here that the attackers' important targets are concentrated—division command and control facilities, reconnaissance-strike systems command and control centers, communications hubs, fire control centers, etc. Furthermore, at that distance, besides army and frontal aviation, missile troops and artillery, first of all from temporary firing positions (position areas) that have been moved ahead, can support the assault force's engagement.

The composition of a TakVD normally includes airborne assault (paratroopers) or motorized rifle subunits without heavy weapons and equipment. Operating in helicopters, they acquire a most important quality—airmobile maneuverability and they are capable of carrying out the combat mission in 1.5-2 hours. You can compare the technique for their employment with a strike at a painful point in hand-to-hand combat—the potentially stronger enemy "is turned off" for a time and loses the initiative.

In a favorable situation, they envision airborne assault troop (commando-assault) subunit operations with the goal of the consistent destruction of several targets. They are conducted based on the diagram: airlift to the designated area; search ("final" reconnaissance) and destruction of the target; maneuver toward the new target; and, return through the front line to the territory controlled by our own troops.

Undoubtedly, the conditions for employment of assault forces on the approaches to the defense will be the most complicated. According to calculations, the probability of overcoming PVO [air defense] is nearly 0.5. Losses of army aviation may reach 20 percent or more. And to achieve success, it is important to painstakingly select the moment for the landing near the planned target and to comprehensively support TakVD operations at all stages.

Airborne assault forces carry out a vast circle of tasks in the tactical and close operational zones of the defense as the direction of the enemy main strike is revealed. In a short period of time, the airborne assault units and subunits and PTUR [antitank guided missile] subunits that compose a mobile echelon are capable of carrying out a maneuver, rapidly increasing the density of troops and the depth of the defense on threatened axes, and closing breaches that have been formed. The use of trained motorized rifle subunits is not excluded in the struggle for the main defense zone. They are transported (airlifted) to the designated areas by helicopters, especially if the enemy is preventing combined arms units and subunits from reaching an important line. Transportation by combined methods is possible when assault force subunits with light weapons travel to the area on helicopters and the ground based echelon travels there under its own power.

TakVD's are tasked with the seizure and retention of favorable lines and sectors of terrain, covering flanks, destruction of enemy groups that have broken through, and with reinforcement of first or second echelon units. As a rule, two teams are formed in a subunit: airborne assault and ground based (armor). The former consists of airborne assault and motorized rifle subunits with light weapons, portable antitank guided missiles and PZRK [portable surface-to-air missile systems] (that are airlifted by MI-8 helicopters), a 120 mm mortar battery, a "Konkurs" antitank platoon, and other subunits (they are loaded onto MI-6 and MI-26 helicopters).

The ground based (armor) group consists of heavy combat vehicles, both organic and reinforced subunits (tanks, SAU [self-propelled artillery], and PTRK [antitank missile systems]). In the process, the driver-mechanics and gun loader-operators in organic BMP's [armored personnel vehicles] (BMD's [airborne fighting vehicles] and BTR [armored transport vehicles]) are left under the leadership of the minimally required number of commanders.

Tasks carried out by troops in a defensive engagement (operation).	Tasks carried out by TakVD. Required number of assault troops (in battalion strength).
Destroy the enemy on the approaches to the defense.	Seize (destroy) targets on the approaches to the defense. (2-3).
Hold occupied lines (areas) in the tactical zone of the defense.	Seize and hold important lines (areas). (1-2).
Defeat the enemy that has penetrated.	Block (defeat) assault forces and airmobile teams that have broken through or infiltrated. (3-4).
Conduct counterattacks and counterthrusts.	Seize and hold favorable lines. (1-2).
Tasks that suddenly arise.	Reserve. (1-2).
Total required:	9-14 TakVD.

Based on exercise experience and calculations, 30-40 minutes is required to airlift the air assaulted team 40-50 kilometers using helicopters. The ground based team arrives at that same area about two hours later or sometimes longer. As a result, defining tasks that can actually be carried out by both teams and the organization of coordination between them acquires a special significance. The air assaulted team first of all must totally utilize aviation's fire and maneuver capabilities. Operating in pairs, combat helicopters attack the advancing enemy (the enemy that has broken through), opening fire (launching missiles) on the move or from ambushes. Transport-assault helicopters fly to the designated landing zones at extremely low altitude and, after dropping off the assault force, continuously support its engagement. Once it has reached the designated area, the ground based (armor) team, acting as a powerful reserve, can deploy according to its own subunits or be (totally or partially) subordinate to the battalion commander.

The TakVD's combat capabilities are assessed according to the criteria of the damage inflicted to the enemy and the composition of the formation which the assault force is capable of defeating. For example, in defense, a motorized rifle battalion in BMP's is capable of putting 30 armored targets out of commission with one combat load and an air assault battalion—more than 50. While considering support from artillery and helicopters, the latter can destroy 75-100 armored targets, 2-3 artillery batteries, the attacking brigade's command post, and defeat 2-3 motorized rifle companies during 4-6 hours of a defensive engagement.

In the defense, the airborne assault force's combat formation is structured, depending on the assigned task, in one or two echelons with the allocation of the most mobile subunits to the reserve. They centrally utilize artillery and other attached men and equipment. If the enemy has been insufficiently suppressed and is offering resistance in an area that has been designated to be seized and held, assault force subunits destroy it with an attack from 2-3 directions prior to shifting to the defense and seize the indicated area (line). We think that these conditions will be most typical.

We need to note that our army has definite combat experience in the employment of airborne assault forces in a situation that is suited to the conditions of conducting mobile defense that is unique in its nature. So, for example, a ground assault landing of the 5th Airborne Assault Corps (consisting of the 10th and 201st airborne assault brigades) was conducted in the area of Orel-Mtsensk in October 1941. At that time, an aircraft transportation group managed to airlift more than 6,000 airborne assault troops with their weapons and materiel reserves nearly 500 kilometers in 80 PS-84 and TB-3 aircraft. The landing occurred at an airfield that was under enemy fire. The corps, jointly with 4th Tank Brigade that was operating in the area of Mtsensk, occupied the assigned lines and stopped the Germans who were attacking Tula.

The techniques that we have reviewed for employing TakVD's on the approaches to the defense and in combat for its main zone permit us to note the required number of them depending on the tasks being carried out. Let's assume that the troops have received the task to destroy

the enemy during deployment and shift to the offense and then to destroy the enemy in the tactical zone of the defense and to restore the situation using a counterattack. While assessing the probable nature of the attackers' operations, the quantity and composition of its targets that are subject to being seized (destroyed) by the TakVD, we can determine that no less than 2-3 airborne assault forces in battalion strength are required on the approaches to the defense alone. The quantity, composition, and combat tasks of the TakVD are assessed in the same way during other stages of the defensive engagement (See the table).

In conclusion, we would like to remind you that, besides the tasks set forth above, airborne assault units are capable of blocking and destroying airmobile tactical groups and similar enemy assault forces in our rear area more rapidly than other units and subunits and, when necessary, they can support a counterattack. But that is a topic for a separate conversation.

The carefully thought out employment of tactical airborne assault forces during the course of a defensive engagement (operation)—let's note in conclusion—permit not only the seizure (destruction) of individual enemy targets but also compensation for the inadequate fire capabilities of conventional weapons and for the limited nature of maneuver of combined arms subunits. It is obvious that TakVD's in helicopters substantially increase both the stability of the mobile defense and also its aggressiveness and that it is becoming a powerful weapon in the hands of the combined arms commander.

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Withdrawal of 7th Guards Airborne Division from Lithuania

93UM0176B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 18 Nov 92 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondents Captain 2nd Rank Valeriy Gromak and Captain 3rd Rank Vladimir Maryukha, Kaunas—Jonava—Moscow: "The Assault Troops Are Departing Lithuania—And Right Now It's Important to Maintain Their Combat Capability"]

[Text] It seems that everyone is admitting this: The VDV [Airborne Troops] are the elite of the Russian Army. Many officers in the airborne troops have undergone the strict field academy of Afghanistan. No matter how you currently assess that war, you can't take away the combat experience of the lads who were awarded orders and medals. All of that also pertains to the 7th Guards Airborne Division and to the 242nd VDV Training Center that are deployed at Kaunas and Yonava.

Let's add to that the fact that it is in Lithuania that practically all the models of the latest airborne combat equipment underwent the test of military service. And what a fine training facility and military garrisons there are here! You only need to look at these things one more time in order to admit: when the airborne troops withdraw, we will not soon manage to create such garrisons at their new deployment locations.

As we all know, a schedule for the withdrawal of our troops from Lithuania was signed on 8 September during the Russian-Lithuanian negotiations. The withdrawal must be

completed by 31 August 1993. This totally applies to the Airborne Troops. And even the Russian Federation President's 29 October Directive "On Coordinating and Normalizing the Negotiating Process with the Latvian Republic, the Lithuanian Republic, and the Estonian Republic", where the Cessation of the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic states has been proposed until the signing of the appropriate interstate agreements practically does not change the situation for Lithuania. Documents have already been signed with Lithuania and the withdrawal schedule has been approved. And Russia does not intend to unilaterally rescind them. Therefore, the day when the last airborne troop will leave Lithuania is also known. The first rail consist from the 7th Guards, as Airborne Troops Deputy Commander Lieutenant-General Osvaldas Pikauskas reported to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, has already arrived in Naro-Fominsk and a second rail consist is following it. The airborne troops are leaving Lithuania—we need to comply with the withdrawal schedule.

"Nearly 1,200 families reside in our garrison," says Colonel Valeriy Yevtukhovich, chief of the training center for training junior specialists. "Absolutely everyone has been provided with separate apartments. But we have not been permitted to privatize them—the entire garrison will be transferred to the Lithuanian Ministry of Defense. We are leaving everything: apartment buildings, a new school, kindergartens, a Pioneers' Club, a hotel, and a Voyentorg [military exchange] store... And there is also the training facility at which we trained conscripts in 180 specialties for the Airborne Troops."

The training center's firing ranges and moving target gunnery ranges are also silent today. The air field and the parachute jumping area permit us to train up to 10,000 men simultaneously. But right now the center hasn't trained a single specialist—the local authorities are not permitting conscripts into Lithuania. Temporarily assigned center specialists are organizing the training process directly at the combat regiments but naturally in the process the quality of training is decreasing.

Things are a bit better at 7th Division. As Guards Division Commander Colonel Grigoriy Kalabukhov told us, here they are performing parachute jumps and they are conducting training—the combat training plan is 75% fulfilled, despite the withdrawal that has begun. And that is while division manning leaves much to be desired. But there will be practically no compulsory service soldiers or sergeants in the subunits by spring. Nearly 250 rail flat cars will be required to redeploy each regiment, that's 4-5 rail consists which we need to load as soon as possible. Officers, who have quite a few everyday life problems besides service problems, will have to sit behind the controls of tanks and BMD's.

Of course, the material damage is great. But how do you assess the moral damage? Is the least of the problems for the airborne troops the fact that their final date is 31 August 1993 or that the withdrawal periods were caused by past miscalculations? Therefore, obviously the main thing right now—is to find the most acceptable solutions for the fate of each serviceman in the approved, adequate compensation for Russian expenditures for the equipment left behind.

Judging by the recent statement of Vitautis Landsbergis who is concerned about our decision to cease the troop withdrawal, Lithuania is also seeking these solutions. And this permits us to hope that Russia will be able to withdraw its troops on time. In this regard, the Russian President's directive, as Lieutenant-General Pikauskas stressed in the conversation, has become an extremely necessary moral support for the units being withdrawn and showed that they have not been forgotten and they are needed by the Russians. This delay is needed if only to finally determine where the airborne regiments will be deployed and where to create the new training facility for the airborne troops training center in order to lay even a small foundation for the resolution of the guards' social problems and to provide time to the diplomats for coordinating the status of troops until the end of their withdrawal.

Otherwise just about no one will serve in the officer posts in those same airborne divisions being withdrawn from Lithuania. Units are being withdrawn to sites that have not been prepared and, as has already happened many times, requests for release into the reserve will begin to rain down. This can also occur earlier because, for example, an "assault force" in the form of a commission to inspect physical training was rushed in instead of extremely needed work to rally the troops and moral support and concern about the future of each specific officer. Compulsory service airborne troops have remained here only to perform details and guard duty and therefore a rumor circulated throughout the garrison here: they will immediately release into the reserve officers who have not passed their tests. Certain officers did not wait for that outcome—they immediately wrote their release requests themselves.

And yet the airborne troops who have been sent to an unenviable place due to past miscalculations, as we have become convinced with our own eyes, place Russia's interests ahead of their own. Right now the main thing is to maintain the combat capability of the units being withdrawn. At the regiment of Guards Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Kozyukov which we managed to visit, at the military garrison which they must leave, repairs were being conducted that are urgently needed to ensure normal combat training. Even the insignificant numbers of airborne troops that remain are maintaining their assigned territory in ideal order. But they are carrying out their combat training tasks along with these housekeeping chores. The only thing they haven't managed to conduct are battalion tactical exercises due to the restrictions that have been stipulated in the agreement signed in September between Lithuania and Russia. The rest of the combat training plan has been fulfilled.

"We have to bring everything with us, right down to nails," Deputy Division Commander for Guards Personnel Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Sannikov told us. "Therefore, we need to determine beforehand what, in what manner, and how to withdraw. We also need to be concerned about whether or not it is advisable or possible to withdraw something or if it is worthwhile to leave it behind. For example, we are thinking about transferring to the Russian school in Kaunas the library books of the Garrison Officers' Club that has already been nationalized by the Lithuanians (and that is more than 100,000 volumes). We

would also not like to simply leave behind the memorials which, judging by the experience of other republics, will be destroyed...

They say that each transfer is equal to two fires. The transfer of such masses of people which make up the VDV units in Lithuania is similar, in our view, to a gigantic forest fire. You can't predict or knock down the swoop of the future "flame" of both human passions and awkward political decisions. But the airborne guard must be withdrawn from Lithuania with the fewest possible losses. All of Russia must simply be interested in that. We will not be able to revive the Russian army without this elite. It is still not too late for our diplomats and military to coordinate more acceptable terms for the troop withdrawal, even in that same period of time. Coordinate it with the calculation to not lose Russia's prestige and to provide for the personal interests of the servicemen.

Problems Associated With Destruction of Surplus Armor

93UM0230A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Dec 92 p 4

[Article by Aleksandr Dolgikh: "The Scientists Choose Explosions"]

[Text]

Russia Begins Salvaging Surplus Armor Under the Agreement on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

This fact was attested at a tank repair plant 30 kilometers from Moscow by foreign inspectors headed by Col Wolfgang Perplis of the Bundeswehr.

Twenty-five BTR-60PB armored personnel carriers are lined up in the assembly area. Five vehicles are readied for dismantling. A gas torch flares up....

In order to register an armored personnel carrier as having been put out of commission, it is enough to cut away the mounts for the front reduction gears. Naturally, however, this is only the beginning of the dismemberment. It is a complicated and fairly expensive operation.

Tanks are even more difficult. We had never previously performed in-depth research into technologies for salvaging armored equipment. There was no special need. Written-off tanks, infantry combat vehicles and armored personnel carriers were dismembered with a gas cutting-torch. The signing of the aforementioned treaty has altered the situation, however. Russia will now have to destroy 15,000 pieces of armored equipment within a fairly short time. We will need hundreds, if not thousands, of gas cutting-torches and spend large amounts to haul the gas canisters to where they will be used. In addition, gas cutting is far from the best dismantling method from the ecological standpoint.

Back in July the Russian Federation's Department of Ammunition and Special Chemicals held a meeting at which was discussed a joint proposal from the Inteleks scientific production association and the Main Armor Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation for using explosives for dismembering armored equipment. This technology not only promises a considerable saving of time and money but is also justified from the

ecological standpoint. Judge for yourself. Cutting up 1 tonne of steel with gas produces harmful emissions equal to 750 kilograms of carbon monoxide, while performing the job with explosives produces only 5.

It was decided to conduct a series of experiments at one of the testing grounds of scientific research institutes of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense. The results were encouraging, even though the problem proved to be more difficult than previously assumed. Even identical tanks were outfitted with different armor arrangements at different times, after all.

One can still assert that it is more economical to dismember tanks which have outlived their usefulness with explosives than with other methods. It too could not be called a cheap method, however. From 100 to 250 kilograms of explosives is used to blow up one tank, depending upon the type of tank and the size of the pieces desired. Trotyl-hexogen is fairly expensive, but it can be obtained from salvaged obsolete ammunition. It is possible to use active land mines, shaped-charge shells and so forth.

A team of five men can dismember a tank in 2-3 hours. The job is performed in a special detonation area. What are the costs? At today's prices it costs from 20,000 to 30,000 rubles.

Someone will ask the natural question: Would it not be better to sell the tanks whole for scrap metal? Particularly since it would not be difficult to find buyers abroad. No, it would not be better. Graded pieces of metal bring considerably more money than an intact tank or armored personnel carrier. Furthermore, our own industry needs scrap metal.

And so, the experiments conducted at the testing ground and the research performed by the scientists promise an advantage for the state.

CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Weapons-Theft Attacks on PVO Units Increase

93UM0182D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 27 Nov 92 p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Aleksandr Ivanov from Air Defense Forces Main Staff: "Sentry Was Seriously Wounded, But Defended Weapons Depot"]

[Text] Around a hundred armed attacks were made on Air Defense Forces units and subunits in 1992 to seize weapons and ammunition. Our correspondent was informed of this by Colonel Yuriy Volosatov, senior officer of a department of the Air Defense Forces Main Staff.

While attacks previously were made basically in "hot spots," now this often also occurs on the territory of Russia. There are more and more persons willing to profit from military property and acquire weapons. Thus, on the night of 26 November a group of unidentified persons attempted to break into weapon and ammunition depots not far from Astrakhan. Sentry Private V. Mashkov did battle with them. Mashkov was seriously wounded from the exchange of fire which ensued, but the criminals did not succeed in seizing weapons.

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Specifications of Large ASW Ship 'Admiral Isakov'

93UM0187A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Nov 92 p 2

[Article by Aleksandr Pilipchuk and Vasilii Fatigarov:
"Ocean-going Submarine Chasers"]

[Text] The first hull of a new series slid down the ways in Leningrad in 1970—the Admiral Isakov large antisubmarine warfare [ASW] ship, created in the design collective under the supervision of Professor Vladimir Yukhin (Vasilii Anikiiyev, chief designer of the project). From 1970 through 1978 the Navy received 10 of the large ASW ships designed to ensure combat stability of Soviet nuclear-powered missile-armed submarines. The main peculiarity of these ocean-going submarine chasers became the antisubmarine missile system—a new generation of weapons in combating submarines (at the same time, it was installed on Bditelnyy-class escort ships, which were discussed in issue No 227 of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA).

In the early 1980s, one of the authors of these lines participated in a two-week exercise of ships and aviation of the Northern Fleet for search and destruction of "enemy" nuclear-powered submarines aboard the large ASW ship Marshal Timoshenko. At that time the ship's sonar operators established and maintained contact with a foreign nuclear-powered submarine for an extended period of time.

In 1972, the Nikolayev shipbuilders turned over to the Black Sea Fleet a gas-turbine version of the large ASW ship (chief designer Aleksandr Perkov). The use of a gas-turbine main propulsion unit instead of a boiler-turbine unit made it possible to achieve a greater range and maneuverability. In addition, improved attack weapons were installed on this series. The first ship was given the name "Nikolayev."

Tactical and Technical Elements of the Admiral Isakov (Nikolayev) Large ASW Ships

1. Displacement	
—standard	over 5,500 tonnes (over 6,500)
—loaded	about 7,500 tonnes (over 8,500)
2. Dimensions (in meters)	
—extreme length	about 160 (over 170)
—extreme beam	over 15 (about 18)
—average draft at normal displacement	about 5.3
3. Top speed	over 30 knots (about 60 km/hr)
—endurance speed	about 20 knots (over 30 km/hr)
4. Endurance range	over 5,500 miles (over 9,000 km)
	over 6,600 miles (over 11,800 km)
5. Armament:	
a) antisubmarine and antitorpedo:	missile system consisting of eight missiles in two quad-canisters;

	two 533-mm five-tube torpedo launchers;
	two 12-barrel rocket-propelled depth charge launchers;
b) antiaircraft:	two twin-mount missile launchers;
	four 57-mm (four 76-mm) twin-barreled automatic guns;
	four 30-mm six-barreled automatic guns;
c) sonar and acoustic:	sonar for detecting submarines;
	sonar for underwater communications and identification;
d) aviation:	equipped with a landing pad and hangar for use of a Ka-25 ship-based helicopter.

Today, six ships of both designs together with more modern large ASW ships, such as the large ASW ship Admiral Vinogradov, which is not located in the Persian Gulf, remain in service. These include three which are part of the joint Black Sea Fleet.

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Economic Problems of Aviation Support Services

93UM0151A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 4 Nov 92 p 2

[Article by I. Chernyak: "Held Captive Near St. Petersburg: Russian Military Pilots Are Not Trained to Repel Ground Attacks"]

[Text] The rather old bus has been carrying us through Bryansk Oblast for the third hour. The dense forest on both sides of the road is replaced from time to time by small, neglected villages; then kitchen-gardens, fields and grazing cows flash by the window; then comes the forest again...

The aircraft appear unexpectedly. Snow-white and majestic, they tower above a concrete fence as if above the fence of a children's playground.

This is one of the Military Transport Aviation airfields. "Ruslans," "Anteys" and IL's fly from here out of the Bryansk forests throughout the world from Tiraspol and Dushanbe to the United States, South Africa and Australia. But although the airfield is international, as it were, there is no luxurious air terminal, no hotels, and no duty-free shops. There is a two-story headquarters, dormitory, several five-story buildings for pilots and their families (some built back before the war), and barracks. About a twenty-minute walk away there is a store in the settlement with crackers and canned foods on the dusty counter.

...Military Transport Aviation was created in the early 1930's "for accomplishing ground force maneuvers" or, to put it more simply, for airlifting airborne assault forces, equipment and ammunition into the enemy rear. Military aircraft began to make peaceful trips as well beginning in 1968. Just a few years ago we were told proudly at Military Transport Aviation headquarters about airlifting some kind of enormously heavy cranes with which they almost

could have gotten into the "Guinness Book of Records," about involvement in building oil and gas pipelines in Western Siberia, flights to the Arctic, "fruit" runs from Central Asia, and assistance to Chernobyl and Leninakan.

Times change. In recent years Military Transport Aviation has been forced to return to its initial purpose, but exactly in reverse. More and more often crews have to evacuate "assault forces," equipment, food and other cargoes inserted at one time into countries of Eastern Europe and CIS republics—what they allow to be taken of course. At the same time they evacuate refugees and servicemen's families with bags and baggage. They fly to all the "hot-spots," often under extreme conditions, they come under fire and struggle, but they disentangle what was cooked up by politicians.

Not long ago, for example, three crews evacuated the embassy from Afghanistan. How much hubbub there was: heroes! Yes, heroes—there were many chances of not returning after Hikmatyar's warning that his Mujaheddin would shoot down all aircraft over Kabul. But I personally do not understand one thing: Why did no one remember whose fault it was that the pilots had to take a risk?

Everyone returned from Kabul. True, one aircraft was lost and another that was heavily damaged flew to the border with difficulty. Two pilots and two airborne troopers were wounded. The others thanked their lucky stars and watched the embassy personnel disembarking from the aircraft onto the flying field of Chkalovskiy military airfield with boxes of odds and ends, suitcases of clothes, dogs, and cages with little parrots—they left nothing for the enemy. "And he carried this parrot even under fire."

At Military Transport Aviation headquarters I was asked not to write about this: "You will only harm our people." The fact is that two pilots were recommended for Hero Stars for that operation, but the recommendations became lost somewhere in the bureaucrats' offices. But I do not think the appearance of an Award Edict somehow is connected with whether or not people in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will take offense or not.

...What don't they carry? Palms from Algeria to the Arab Emirates, humanitarian aid from Russia to Sarajevo, the Bolshoy Theater with all props from Moscow to New York, and Pink Floyd with gear in the reverse direction... The USSR, whose flag is depicted on Military Transport Aviation aircraft, has not existed for a long while, which means Russia's military pilots have neither status nor identifying markings. There is neither a legal basis for flights nor intergovernment agreements. But they fly. Until the first serious accident? By the way, Military Transport Aviation also serves the country's first persons.

One of the flight interpreters recalled: "I remember one foreign visit by the Gorbachevs. Even the Emir of Bahrain probably would have envied the pomposity with which it was surrounded. Our Il-76's lugged 12 "member-carriers" with security, communications and servants. They were greeted accordingly: flowers, fanfares, champagne... But the fairy tale soon ended and the prosaic side began right after the return. The cavalcade of aircraft landed in the Far East, and there it was like taking a cold shower: no fuel. They still scraped together a little kerosene for the general secretary and his wife, but we were immediately forgotten.

We were sent to one of the military airfields, where local officers who had lost all hope of flying out on leave decided to take the aircraft by storm: "We can no longer stand to rot in this taiga!" But security struck a bargain with them, saying this was the president's liner...

The pilots can tell a great deal. About how they evacuated rulers who had lost power—from Vezirov and Motalibov to Honecker—to Moscow. And about the numerous "former ones" and "present ones" who evacuated property by aircraft from Angola, Afghanistan and the Western Group of Forces. One pilot joked: "But the especially talkative ones become deputies or journalists. Our job is small, though: there is an order and we fly; I only give interviews to my wife at home."

...Nikolay Ryzhmanov, commander of the Military Transport Aviation regiment, was planning to go to the garden. He grinned: "Imagine an American colonel pulling radishes from a vegetable bed after duty." (Many have kitchen-gardens here and they are guarded by armed patrol: people steal, as they do everywhere.)

"Almost everyone in my regiment went through Afghanistan, has orders and medals and a first class rating, has flown thousands of hours, but receives some kind of pittance, and then two months late. But why go that far afield? After all promotions I now am owed a good 12,000," says the commander. "It is enough to make you cry or laugh: I know a director of a small asphalt plant who has 40,000 and has long been inviting me to come as an engineer: I will give you 30,000, and you will twiddle your thumbs.' I cannot call all this anything but humiliation of servicemen. I am not even speaking about the fact that there are 400 homeless families on post and no prospects... While previously the paid transport movements permitted solving at least some of the problems—retaining personnel, reducing social tension in collectives—now even they are becoming torture."

The military's complaints about pay which barely exceeds that of a yardman, about living in temporary dwellings, about innumerable prohibitions—all this, alas, already has become customary. By the way, the problems are the very same as for the whole country, but lately Military Transport Aviation pilots have had their own specific problems added.

"Prices for hotels and for food at airfields are growing; just hold on to your hat," said the pilots. "You yourself know about our per diem allowance. And so we have to sleep right in the plane and eat dry rations on TDY. Well, we cannot become accustomed to it, but they have simply begun to extort cash at airfields throughout the CIS—for taking off, for landing, for parking, for fuel. Not long ago we were carrying a helicopter regiment's property from Germany. We sat in Pulkovo 13 days and the airport demanded one and a half million in cash. Dozens of officers in various Military Transport Aviation subunits are forced to drop all their work and stand on their heads, the telephones get red-hot, and finally they find a solution. Then a new phone call comes in; it is the same situation in Omsk, then in Novosibirsk..."

"At least they are not robbing you."

"They already are getting us even in the air. You are returning, for example, with humanitarian aid, flying over Georgia, and the controller says to you from the ground: 'Land, dear boy.' But everything is ok with me, I have enough fuel.' Land, I tell you.' On the ground a pack of unshaven fighters drives up: 'Divide it!' Once we were carrying meat from Australia, landed in Tashkent for refuelling and got stuck. Well, our Uzbek friends did not release anything, and that was that. We will give you kerosene, but be brotherly, commander, ours want to eat, too.' Then black Volgas drove right to the aircraft one after the other with some kind of important people sitting in state. Two boxes in the trunk for this one, two for this one, and this one is more important, three for him,' instructs the airport commandant. The commander implored: 'Comrades, you will put me in trouble with the law.' What do you need, brother? A paper? Here are ten papers for you with seals. Fill them out yourself, and also take a couple of quintals for yourself.' And so write that genuine air piracy which we are incapable of fighting is beginning in the CIS."

But the worst is yet to come, so to speak. At Military Transport Aviation headquarters I was informed of details of the recent disappearance of an IL-76 military transport which was flying to Russia from Angola. "Despite the assigned mission the aircraft was forced to land in Melitopol, after which it was privatized' by the Ukrainian side and the crew was handed train tickets to Moscow: Fly in again, boys."

Military Transport Aviation Chief of Staff Lieutenant General of Aviation S. Suslov only sighed at my request to comment on the conditions under which it is necessary to work:

"What is there to comment on? It is a hopeless situation. With the USSR's disintegration we essentially were deprived of a number of airfields in the republics—that is first. Deprived of aircraft plants, including the most important ones in Tashkent and Kiev, which also means spare parts, whose reserves are melting away every day—second. The most acute problems arise in air traffic control. And what is happening with fuel? The businessmen besiege us: give us containers for storing that same kerosene. They have it in bulk, but state structures do not have any even for withdrawing forces. Around 200 aircraft went over to Ukraine, Belarus and Uzbekistan and with them also some of the flight personnel... But the scope of missions is constantly growing."

"Just where is the solution?"

"The system which was very bad, but was regulated, today has been razed to the ground both in management as well as support. How to restore it is more a question for politicians. We of course hope the government will turn to us. But if despite all appeals of the Ministry of Defense the government commission does not give us the 100 million we earned for transporting humanitarian aid, money we earned honestly, then we simply have nowhere else to go. There are not even government documents regulating these shipments..."

The situation is not much better with flights abroad. Until recently Military Transport Aviation aircraft constantly operated in seven countries—Afghanistan, Vietnam, Syria, Angola, Ethiopia, Madagascar and Mozambique. Now our

military presence there has been eliminated, fraternal assistance is a thing of the past, and putting cooperation on a commercial basis in those same volumes is not working for now. But the market does not tolerate a void, and our place is being taken by others.

"Imagine a terminal near which dozens of taxis are clustered," said the Military Transport Aviation pilots, giving me an example. "Suddenly a rather new one drives up. It is well if they don't puncture the tires. And if they allow it to carry off a ragged bum to some hole where not one respecting driver would go, that is generally fine, but don't expect more. It is also approximately the very same in the world aviation market."

Here is one other feature: our military pilots work much more cheaply than world prices under a number of contracts which still were successfully concluded.

"And how do we know these prices?" a Military Transport Aviation head answered the question with a question. "Commerce in Russia now is shrouded in the darkness of secrecy. Once I struck up a conversation with a former pilot of ours who now works in another organization, and he asked: Why do you take so little from the firm? Ours fleece for twice as much, and the ones they fleece still are satisfied.' I called in the financiers—they only shrug their shoulders. Perhaps there must be some kind of center, if only in that same Aeroflot, which would give out basic information, even if it is not free?"

...For a number of reasons I did not mention much of what the military pilots told me in confidential conversations. But even so, the conclusion is not a cheerful one: the former USSR's Air Force, one of the most powerful in the world, an Air Force of which we were proud and not without reason, is experiencing far from the best of times. The situation cannot be corrected only through efforts of the military, no matter how intelligent they are. It is understandable that the government of Russia now has no time for that, but still it will be necessary to solve the problems of aviation sometime. True, the further off that time is, the more difficult it will be.

Additional Pay for Service in Severe Climates

93UM0188B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 21 Nov 92 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Additions to Salaries"]

[Text] In accordance with the Edict of the President of the Russian Federation on Urgent Measures for Social and Economic Development of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug of Perm Oblast, the minister of defense of the Russian Federation has issued Order No 227 of 14 November 1992.

This document, in particular, directs, beginning 1 July 1992 to officers, warrant officers, and extended-service personnel serving on the territory of Gaynskiy, Kosinskiy, and Kochevskiy rayons of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug of Perm Oblast, additional pay for continuous service in these areas in percentage of pay for appointment (without an increase in salary for service in corresponding remote areas and in areas with severe climate conditions) and pay for military rank in the following amounts: 10 percent after the first year of continuous service in these

areas with an increase of 10 percent for each subsequent year, not to exceed 50 percent.

According to the order, the term of continuous service for servicemen for payment of the additional pay will be computed from the date of their transfer to the rolls of the military unit or arrival as part of the military unit (subunit) at the permanent deployment garrisoning location, but no earlier than 1 July 1992.

A rayon salary coefficient in the amount of 1.2 has also been established for civilian personnel of military units, institutions, enterprises, and organizations of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation located in the above-mentioned rayons.

Stories, Commentary on Problems of AWOLs

93UM0190A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Nov 92 p 2

[Article by Lt Col Ivan Sergeyev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "How To Stop Deserters?"]

[Text] At the holding area for servicemen who have gone absent without leave [AWOL], which has been created at the Moscow Military Commandant's Office (Lefortovskiy Barracks), one can encounter a wide variety of people—from an ordinary deserter to an "ideological fighter" (for the rights of the person in military uniform).

The leave looked better to Private S. Kandaurov than participating in mineclearing. In any event, that is what his commanders said. He waited for it for two months and decided to move to his homeland, without leave. And he believes it is stupid to die at the age of 19 years—he served in the 14th Army in the Dniester region.

Private S. Khlyzov also served there. After six months he discovered he had flat feet. He was waiting for certification by a board. He did not wait and decided to go without permission to Chelyabinsk, from where he was inducted. Moscow, the patrol, the commandant's office...

Muscovite Private A. Vinokurov, who had served one and a half years in Ulan-Ude, was brought to the holding area by his parents. Prior to this he had put on weight from good food and caught up on his sleep for a month and a half at his parent's home. It is an understandable case—he wishes to be discharged from Moscow and better—from the holding area.

Then there is Junior Sergeant B. Lepeshkin, who after one and a half years of service in Siberia was brought home to his native Moscow suburbs by his mother—it seemed to her that he had become very thin. There were no special fears that they might put him in prison for such a thing: they say, we are not the first to do this... Now the Lepeshkins are waiting for an assignment to the immediate Moscow area.

For the sake of objectivity, it must be noted that not all 60 people located at the holding area at the present time went AWOL for the same reasons. Many soldiers were in a hurry to join their own army, without waiting for an organized relocation. There are many others who flee from the moral and physical overloads, the daily unsettled state and disorderliness in organization of service. This fact makes one think. In the less than one and a half years that the holding

area has existed, 2,242 servicemen have passed through it. Eleven people have been criminally convicted for desertion and crimes committed during their flight. This is only 0.5 percent of the total number of servicemen evading military service who have passed through the holding area. If I may say so, such impunity is also a sort of incentive for lovers of "free migration."

The following figures also say a lot: 480 of the total number who have passed through the holding area have met military medical boards of Moscow hospitals. They found that one-third should not have been inducted into the army at all. (I would like to call this fact to the attention of the military medical boards at the military commissariats right now, when the next scheduled call-up is under way.) The remaining two-thirds contracted illnesses during performance of service.

A few words about the holding area itself. Until recently, its staff consisted of two people—the chief and his deputy. The inexhaustible flow of deserters forced the district command to add two platoon commanders and a paramedic, whose duties include an initial medical examination and escorting those in need of treatment to medical facilities.

This unusual subunit has enough problems.

"I do not even have the ability to notify units that we have their deserter; I have no funds for sending a telegram. And the telephone I have is not for long-distance, and I have none for direct communications with the district headquarters," the deputy chief of the holding area, Captain V. Kalkayev, complained to me. "In general, it wouldn't be bad if the General Staff were to assume responsibility for notifying the military units about the deserters; it is easier for them to do this."

Some more information for thought. As Captain Kalkayev informed me, the holding area and its charges do not feel any real help either from the President's Committee for Servicemen Affairs, from the Main Directorate for Work with Personnel, or from the staff of the assistant to the commander of the Moscow Military District for working with personnel... Only the representatives of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers are actively working with the deserters.

At the request of the editorial staff, Colonel of Justice Anatoliy Korotkov, chief of the Directorate of Supervision of Execution of Laws by Bodies of Inquiry, Preliminary Investigation and Operational-Investigation Work of the Main Directorate of the General Procuracy of the Russian Federation, comments on the situation:

"In nine months of this year, evasion of military service, AWOLs, and desertion accounted for more than half of all general criminal offenses committed by servicemen, and among military crimes they account for nearly 90 percent. True, one must admit that this year, compared to last, there were 7.2 percent fewer evasions of military service in the Russian Army. But, on the whole, the situation remains alarming.

"If you take the individual branches of the armed forces, the picture looks like this: in 1992, evasion of military service increased by 40.9 percent in the Strategic Rocket Forces, 78 percent in the Air Defense Forces, 52 percent in

the Air Force, 35.4 percent in the Railroad Troops, and 31-fold in the Civil Defense Forces...

"What can we do in this situation? First and foremost, we must speed up the passage of laws on the legal status and social guarantees of servicemen and the procedure of performing military service. We must provide alternative service for individuals with religious convictions, those with limited fitness for military service for reasons of health, those with a criminal record, and possibly for other categories. When selecting candidates to perform service, provide for a two-stage procedure of medical selection process: at local bodies of administration and at military units. This is necessary in order to avoid instances of inducting people who are not fully healthy.

"In addition, I believe that the time a person is illegally away from the unit and under arrest should not count towards the term of service. The damage associated with investigation of a deserter should be reimbursed at his expense.

"In my view, we must give the commander of a formation the right to make a decision, with observance of all legal norms of inquiry and investigation and, of course with authorization of the procuracy, to send offenders to a disciplinary battalion for up to six months. In any case, if the state plans to remain a state, it should not tolerate this 'Brown movement' any longer in its army."

Call for Bids on Military Housing Construction

93UM0188A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Nov 92 p 4

[Unattributed article: "Construction of Housing for Servicemen"]

[Text] The customer—the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation—through the "Tekhnoeksport" VVO and "Vneshstroyimport" VVO invites all firms (organizations) to take part in the pre-qualification selection for further participation in bidding for construction of housing compounds for servicemen in Russia on a turnkey basis, including infrastructure (cultural and communal facilities, external and internal engineering systems, and provision of all proper amenities).

Financing of construction is being accomplished by the Federal Republic of Germany through the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, Frankfurt-on-Main.

Sixth section of the program:

1. Kostroma: about 546 apartments; ready for occupancy December 1993.
2. Kubinka: about 1,035 apartments; ready for occupancy August 1994.
3. Tver: about 1,928 apartments; ready for occupancy June 1994.
4. Vyazma-Bryanskaya: about 1,012 apartments; ready for occupancy March 1994.
5. Morozovsk: about 775 apartments; ready for occupancy March 1994.

Terms of pre-qualification:

—annual turnover (over the last three years) of at least 500 million FRG marks (for organizations of states of the former USSR, equivalent turnover in local currency); confirmation of solvency and, in the event of receipt of the order, a bank guarantee (minimum of 10 percent of amount of contract) from a first class banking institution; at least five years of experience in civil and housing construction abroad or in the USSR, knowledge of construction standards and rules in effect on the territory of Russia;

—participation of enterprises from new federal lands of Germany is mandatory (subcontractor contract or member of consortium).

Participation of Russian construction (planning) organizations and/or suppliers is recommended.

Information and detailed data for presenters can be obtained presently at the following address:

VVO "Tekhnoeksport"
113324 Moscow,
Ovchinnikovskaya naberezhnaya, 18/1
Tel: 220-17-82, 220-18-04
Telex: 411338 vote
Telefax: 230-20-80

VVO "Vneshstroyimport"
103009 Moscow,
Tverskoy bulvar, 6
Tel: 290-06-84, 290-00-80
Telex: 411434 swst su
Telefax: 291-79-61

Consulting Consortium
c/o Dorsh Konsalt
P.O. Box 21 02 43
8000 Munich 21
Tel: 089/5797-739
Telex: 5212 862 dors d
Telefax: 089/5797-699

The customer reserves the right to consider as qualified, for bids on the following compounds within the framework of the program, firms and/or consortia which will be qualified on the basis of requirements of this pre-qualification.

Qualification materials of firms are to be submitted by 12:00 on 10 December 1992 to CWU at the following address: CWU Moscow, bulvar generala Karbysheva, 10.

Acquisition of bidding documents by firms that have gone through pre-qualification is scheduled in December 1992.

Submitted documents will not be returned.

Maritime Kray Governor's Decree on Housing

93UM0182C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 27 Nov 92 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Vladimir Shirokov under rubric "From Our Information Bureau": "Primorye Authorities Come to the Help of Servicemen"]

[Text] On 24 November Vladimir Kuznetsov, head of the Maritime Kray administration, adopted the decree "On

Providing Living Space to Servicemen, Persons Discharged From Military Service, and Members of Their Families." This document obligates the administration of cities and rayons of the kray to take all necessary steps to assign living space to servicemen and persons discharged from military service. The decree states that local authorities together with the command element of posts and military units must

take steps to receive, accommodate, set aside lands for, and settle troops being withdrawn from Eastern Europe, Mongolia and Baltic and Transcaucasus states. Our correspondent, Vladimir Shirokov, reported that heads of administrations are instructed to assist servicemen in placing their children in schools, accommodating them in children's preschool establishments, and finding jobs for wives.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Turkmenistan Parliament Approves Cooperation Agreement With Russia

93UM0207B Ashgabat TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 17 Oct 92 p 13

[Article by B. Valiyev under rubric "Cooperation":
"Brotherhood in Arms: It Is the Most Likely Within the
Framework of Turkmen-Russian Relations"]

[Text] The military cooperation of Turkmenistan and Russia holds a special place in development of interstate bilateral relations, and ratification by the republic Mejlis on 30 September of the Treaty on Joint Measures between the two countries in connection with establishment of the Turkmenistan Armed Forces logically concluded the process of a search for mutually acceptable solutions in the sphere of army problems made urgent by disintegration of the former USSR.

If one looks back, it can be said that the idea of joint efforts by Turkmenistan and Russia in the military area did not originate all at once. The breakup of the Turkestan Military District which followed Uzbekistan's announcement of the establishment of its own army predetermined the search for a solution to the crisis. It seemed to have been found at one meeting of CIS leaders in Bishkek, where Saparmurat Niyazov announced the intention to form a separate 52nd Army from all units stationed in the republic and to include it in the CIS General Purpose Forces, but it became clear at the very next meeting in Tashkent that the existence of such Commonwealth forces was very problematical.

With consideration of these circumstances, the Government of Turkmenistan concentrated on accelerating the adoption of an agreement with the Russian Federation which would fix Russia's role as guarantor of the republic's security. By the way, Turkmenistan had one other option in reserve. Following its neighbors' example, it could have announced an immediate transfer to its own jurisdiction of all military units and formations stationed from the Amudarya to the Caspian, but such a step by a state small in population hardly would have guaranteed reliable protection of its sovereignty against possible outside aggression. In the words of Valeriy Otchertsov, deputy chairman of the republic Cabinet of Ministers, in the best case Turkmenistan could have a small formation capable of stopping invasion of some kind of force elements. In other critical situations it would be possible to rely only on the help of the world community or a collective security entity, but the latter contradicts the principle of positive neutrality which has become a cornerstone of Turkmenistan's foreign policy course.

Based on this the government made the only correct move, specifically in the direction of a bilateral Turkmen-Russian treaty on establishing the Turkmenistan Armed Forces. As already reported in the press, it is determined by the military policy and defensive doctrine professed by both sides. It has special articles on mutual security which interpret an attack on one party as aggression against both parties to the agreement. In addition, the document obligates each signatory to refrain from actions aimed against the partner, and not to present its own territory for use in

preparing actions of violence against it. The package of military agreements signed in Moscow on 31 July included an agreement on organizing financial support of military units, which envisages five-year participation financing of the Turkmen Armed Forces and receipt of cash necessary for this from Russia. At that same time the parties specified principles of material-technical, trade and everyday support of the Turkmenistan Armed Forces and of the Russian Federation Air Defense Forces and Air Force on republic territory and established a legal status and guarantees for servicemen and their families.

The latter appears especially important for preserving the situation of political stability and confidence among officers of the national army. Today officers serving in Turkmenistan under contract can be both its own citizens as well as citizens of Russia. Inasmuch as personnel are called up from both sides, each one swears an oath of allegiance to the state of which he is a citizen. According to the agreement, Russian officers are guaranteed a transfer, if they desire, to any region of Russia after five years of service in Turkmenistan.

The real concern shown for the officer corps was properly received. According to data of the Turkmenistan Ministry of Defense, as of today there are no destabilizing factors in the military environment having a negative effect on combat readiness and the moral climate. The existence of a Turkmenistan Armed Forces joint command envisaged by the concept of mutual defense for the transition period reinforces the strategic balance. It presumes that a command will not be given to employ troops without the consent of the Turkmenistan Ministry of Defense. At the same time, it provides that Russia too will not be drawn into any regional conflict through troops of joint subordination.

Obviously it is superfluous to repeat that maintaining a balance of interests is extremely advantageous to both sides and that Turkmenistan has no unilateral advantages here. By adhering to the concluded agreements, the Russian Federation obtains not only the aforementioned opportunity to preserve its own interests in the region, but also is relieved of expenditures for forming a line of defense along southern borders of the Federation. In addition, uneasiness disappears with respect to the avalanche-like return of the officer corps; Russia also for now has neither the funds nor the capacities to receive them.

The Turkmen-Russian agreements on military problems in close border countries resounded as a real confirmation of prospects for the Turkmen leadership's course toward strengthening an alternative to forming rigid multilateral structures with the framework of the CIS collective security concept. The latter idea has increasingly fewer proponents despite its stepped-up publicity, because principles of collective security and collective responsibility are coming into contradiction more and more often with the country's national interests. In this case any government must make a choice, and it is easy to predict that if it wishes to retain the people's trust, this choice will not be made in favor of CIS innovations. But Turkmen-Russian military cooperation already insures against such surprises.

Latvian-Russian Protocol on Troop Withdrawal
93UN0342B Riga AP-MP in Latvian 30 Oct 92 p 1

[Minutes of meetings signed by S. Zotovs, Leader of Delegation from the Russian Federation, and J. Dinevics, Leader of Delegation from the Republic of Latvia: "Minutes From the Meetings of the National Delegations from the Russian Federation and the Republic of Latvia on the Question of the Withdrawal of Former USSR Armed Forces Under the Jurisdiction of the Russian Federation from the Territory of the Republic of Latvia."]

[Text] Moscow, October 23, and 24, 1992.

1. As per prior agreement, talks between the national delegations from the Russian Federation and the Republic of Latvia took place in Moscow on October 23 and 24 of this year.

2. The delegation from the Republic of Latvia was led by the national minister, J. Dinevics.

The Russian Federation delegation—by S. Zotovs, extraordinary and authorized envoy.

3. The questions discussed were related to the total withdrawal of the former USSR Armed Forces under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, which are dislocated in the territory of the Republic of Latvia, from the latter territory, as well as various problems in economic relations.

4. In discussing the projected agreement for the withdrawal of military forces, both sides were in agreement on various positions, but were unsuccessful in overcoming their differences of opinion on the main questions.

5. Latvia's side reconfirmed their position, with respect to the necessity of completing the total withdrawal of military forces by 1993, without any preconditions, whatsoever.

Latvia's side expects a withdrawal of all military forces, including those involved with the radar station in Skrunda, although the terms for this disbandment could be determined in a separate agreement. Russia's side did not deny the possibility of a withdrawal of military forces in 1994, provided that the questions included in the August 6th proposal package are resolved.

6. Russia's side once again affirmed the particularly serious nature of its stand on normalizing the legal status of that segment of inhabitants that are not ethnic Latvians, including former military persons. The basis of the views on Russia's side is that the agreement on the withdrawal of military forces cannot affect the legal rights of such persons, primarily with respect to their material rights and places of residence.

7. Both sides confirmed their main positions on the question of real estate rights.

The view of Latvia's side is that all real estate, which is under the control of the Russian Federation's Armed Forces stationed in the Republic of Latvia, is the property of the Republic of Latvia.

The view of Russia's side is that the Russian Federation, as heir to the rights of the former USSR, retains state property rights on the property of the Armed Forces under the

jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, which is found in the territory of the Republic of Latvia.

Both sides were in agreement on finding a solution with respect to the Defense Ministry's military enterprises, anticipating the assurance of their formal functioning, and retaining the personnel employed by the aforementioned enterprises.

8. The Russian delegation proposed that, in order to expedite and systematize the process of the withdrawal of military forces, projected agreements between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Latvia, drawn up by experts from both sides, be submitted to the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Latvia, on the following:

—the procedure for crossing the border of the Republic of Latvia by persons belonging to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;

—the procedure for the utilization of territorial waters, harbors and harbor installations by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;

—with respect to the rail shipment of military cargo of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the territory of the Republic of Latvia during the period of withdrawal from Latvian territory, and the procedure for providing compensation for these shipments;

—the procedure for insuring the retirement benefits of former USSR military personnel and their family members;

—the procedure for carrying out customs formalities in the time period during the withdrawal of former USSR Armed Forces and Military Border Guard Forces.

9. Russia's side voiced a protest in regard to the provisional regulation adopted on the procedure in which the Armed Forces under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation are to relocate within the territory of the Republic of Latvia, and to cross the Republic of Latvia's national border. This document is in contradiction to the earlier agreement, accepted on the national delegation level, which anticipated restraint from taking one-sided, uncoordinated actions. The Russian delegation informed the Latvian side that, because of this, the North Western military forces group and Baltic fleet command will be unable to comply.

The Latvian side based its arguments on the fact that, since no basic agreements regarding military force withdrawal have been concluded, the authorities of the Republic of Latvia are forced to regulate the conditions under which Russia's military forces remain in Latvian territory.

Latvia's side expressed concern regarding the fact that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are continuing to violate the sea and air space borders of the Republic of Latvia, Russian aircraft and warships stage training sessions on shooting within Latvian territory, and Armed Forces staff personnel are being brought in without coordination with the proper authorities in the Republic of Latvia.

Russia's side brought up the question on the illegally levied duty on fuel oil by the Latvian side, with is being brought in for the use of the temporarily dislocated Baltic fleet forces.

10. Both sides defined the main questions, for which it has not been possible to come to an agreement, and which require political solutions:

- terms for the withdrawal of military forces;
- real estate rights;
- strategical objectives;
- the rights of a segment of former military personnel and their family members, including their material rights and places of residence.

11. The delegations agreed to hold their next regular round of discussions around mid-November of this year.

S. Zotovs, Leader of Delegation from the Russian Federation.

J. Dinevics, Leader of Delegation from the Republic of Latvia

Figures for Russian Troops in Baltic Cited

93UN0375D Tallinn THE BALTIC INDEPENDENT
in English 30 Oct-5 Nov 92 p 14

[Article by Pilar Wolfsteller: "Russia Gives Troop Figures"]

[Text] In an unexpectedly precise estimate of the difficulty of withdrawing ex-Soviet troops from the Baltic, a Russian delegate told an international conference in Tallinn on October 26-28 that Russia will require housing for 34,211 officers costing over 47 billion roubles.

Mr Simon Lunn, deputy secretary of the North Atlantic Assembly, quoted figures from Boris Bolshakov, deputy chairman of the Russian parliament's committee on defence and security at the end of the three day seminar held in Tallinn. However, after the conference it remained unclear whether the figure was the number of officers only, or if it included dependents as well.

The numbers came in response to questioning by Western countries at the seminar, "Stability in the Baltic Region," the fourth to be held. Russia also asked for aid of any kind to help build the flats.

Vello Saatpalu, Chairman of the Estonian Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, expressed frustration at Russia's foot dragging on the issue of the withdrawal of troops from Estonia's territory.

"I understand the problems of Russia very well, but we can't help them. Why should we? It's their problem. In 1940 when they came in they found places to stay in one day. Now it's difficult for us to understand why they can't find homes for their officers and families in their own country," he said.

Jose Lello, a parliamentarian from Portugal and vice president of the North Atlantic Assembly, said that the seminars on the Baltic States are designed to bring all sides together to start a dialogue. "We're not trying to be referees, but it's good to provide a forum."

In addition to discussing the withdrawal of troops from the region, members of the 20 delegations from both NATO and the former Warsaw Pact visited the Tondi barracks of a Russian unit in Tallinn. Moscow denied them a visit to the Paldiski nuclear base on the northern coast.

Ceslovas Stankevicius, vice-president of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, linked the fate of Russian soldiers to that of Lithuanians who were deported to Russia during the Soviet regime. "Lithuania sees this as a bilateral matter," he said. "Russia is currently in violation of the rights of many Lithuanian families who were unjustly deported."

If Lithuania will be required to give Russia some compensation for the removal of its soldiers from Lithuanian soil, he added, "then it's not Russia, but rather Lithuania who will need assistance."

Weekly Report on Russian Troop Activities in Baltics

93UN0375B Tallinn THE BALTIC INDEPENDENT
in English 30 Oct-5 Nov 92 p 3

[Compiled by Lya Oll: "Troop Watch"]

[Text]

- Russian air force planes continued unauthorised flights in Lithuanian airspace: 15 flights were registered on October 19, twelve on October 20, eleven on October 21, twenty-six on October 23.
- Lithuanian border guards denied entrance to a group of Russian army generals and colonels who tried to cross the border from Latvia to Lithuania at Joniskis; the men, presumably from military unit No 41582, had no entry permits and refused to show their IDs and threatened to "bring the Lithuanians to order" (October 15).
- Lithuanian police detained three Russian army soldiers from military unit No 49689 in Samara, Russia, who stole three TV sets from a freight train at the Radviliskis railway station, central Lithuania (October 20).
- A group of Russian army officers from the coastal defence division in Klaipeda announced on Russian television that they will not leave Lithuania until adequate housing is provided for them in their new postings (October 25).
- Between October 19 and 26, Russian air force planes carried out 23 unsanctioned flights in Latvian airspace.
- A two-day round of Latvian Russian talks on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Latvia ended inconclusively on October 24; contrary to claims by the Russian delegation leader Sergey Zotov, no agreement was reached on the Skrunda ballistic missile early warning radar station which Russia wants to keep after the rest of the troops are withdrawn.
- The Russian navy communications unit No 31181 handed over its premises in Viimsi manor (October 26); local authorities have decided to restore the manor, which used to belong to the prominent Estonian army leader General Laidoner, and turn it into an Estonian War of Independence museum.

- Russian border guards turned over the Kasmu post on Estonia's northern coast (October 26).
- The Estonian delegation proposed setting up a special commission to study the safety of the nuclear reactors at the Russian naval base in Paldiski, northern Estonia, at the meeting of the nuclear safety work group of the Council of the Baltic Sea Countries in Helsinki (October 28).

Zotov, Dinevics Assess Troop Withdrawal Negotiations

*93UN0354A Riga DIYENA in Russian 27 Oct 92
pp 1, 8*

[Article by Iveta Bojare and Atis Klmovic: "Conflict of Interests in Russian-Latvian Relations; S. Zotov's Assessment of Results of Negotiations Differs from J. Dinevics"]

[Text] Riga, 25 October—At a press conference after the latest round of talks in Moscow, the leaders of the two delegations, S. Zotov and J. Dinevics, said that the successful continuation of the intergovernmental talks between Russia and Latvia on the withdrawal of the army from Latvia will require a meeting of the leaders of the two countries—President B. Yeltsin and Chairman A. Gorbunovs of the Latvian Republic Supreme Council. After the two sides have reached an agreement on certain concepts, J. Dinevics said, the experts will be able to work much more successfully. At this time, said Deputy I. Berzins, a member of the Latvian delegation, there is a clear conflict of Latvian and Russian interests in the talks: No compromises have been reached on matters of fundamental importance. "We cannot even say that we have made any progress, but because any talks are better than open warfare, the talks with Russia obviously have to be continued," I. Berzins said at the press conference on Saturday.

The Russian Supreme Soviet's request for the release of a former officer of the special forces, "Russian citizen S. Parfenov, in view of the insufficient evidence of his guilt," was described by I. Berzins in a reserved tone as illogical: "I find it rather odd that the Russian Supreme Soviet would assume the prerogatives of the Latvian court." It is this court, the deputy said, that should pass sentence on a person accused of a crime.

Dinevics feels that the talks are being held up by Russia's internal problems and the incertitude of its government structures. The final protocol of the talks records the different positions of Latvia and Russia on the dates and terms of withdrawal (Latvia feels that the withdrawal should be completed by the end of next year, but Russia wants to complete the process in 1994). With a view to its own strategic interests, Russia is insisting that three of its military installations remain in Latvia—in Skrunda, Liepaja, and Ventspils. This is unacceptable to Latvia. In J. Dinevics' words, the only possibility is a separate agreement on the radar in Skrunda. If the last Russian soldier leaves Latvia by the end of the coming year, Latvia could make an exception for Skrunda and extend the period of presence there by representatives of the Russian Army. The two sides have different views on the future disposition of army property and on ways of solving the

social problems of servicemen. Russia feels that all of the property at the army's disposal belongs to Russia, but Latvia has expressed the opposite opinion. At the press conference, S. Zotov reported that the Russian Government and President B. Yeltsin would not sign troop withdrawal agreements that would jeopardize the legal status of officers and their right to housing and property rights. The eastern neighbor has proposed terms that are unacceptable to Latvia for the privatization of the living quarters of servicemen, a solution to the citizenship issue that would favor these servicemen, and the possibility of inactivating some military units within the territory of Latvia. Although J. Dinevics agrees that Latvia could help Russia solve the social problems of the military units withdrawn from its territory, he said that the Latvian side would reject all compromises providing for the long-term settlement of Russian servicemen in Latvia. His views on social problems are completely different. In order to assist in their resolution, J. Dinevics, the leader of the Latvian delegation, will make a formal request in Tokyo, I. Berzins reported, to set aside part of the promised aid to the former republics of the USSR for precisely these purposes.

In spite of these differences of opinion between Latvia and Russia, which were recorded in the final protocol, on the day of the talks S. Zotov told a BNS correspondent that he was satisfied with the acceptable agreement that had supposedly been reached at the time of the meeting on the main issues.

According to the BNS report, S. Zotov stated that Latvia had agreed to Russia's use of the radar in Skrunda after the withdrawal of the army, that reserve officers would have a chance to keep their apartments in Latvia and apply for Latvian citizenship, and that all officers wishing to leave would receive compensation. "This is a lie," J. Dinevics said at an NFL [Latvian People's Front] congress after his return from Moscow. The head of the Latvian delegation did not deny that all of these matters had been discussed, but he stated that Latvia had not relented on any point of importance to the Latvian Republic. This was confirmed at today's press conference by I. Berzins, who explained that the BNS report reflected only Russia's point of view. "S. Zotov said exactly what the report says," the head of the Latvian BNS bureau, R. Bikse, said in an attempt to clear up the misunderstanding. The journalist had been unable to learn the views of the Latvian delegation and this is why the report was onesided. "This misunderstanding could benefit those who want the talks to be delayed," said I. Berzins, adding that there was no reason to doubt J. Dinevics' firmness as the head of the delegation.

Weekly Report on Russian Troop Activities in Baltics

*93UN0375C Tallinn THE BALTIC INDEPENDENT
in English 13-19 Nov 92 p 3*

[Compiled by Lya Oll: "Troop Watch"]

[Text]

- Russian army Commander-in-Chief Yevgeny Shaposhnikov said the military withdrawal from the Baltic States should not be pushed because it could have explosive consequences for both Russia and the Baltic States; he also criticised appeals by Baltic governments to NATO

and the CSCE on the issue, as well as the holding of referendums on it (November 4).

- Russian air force planes continued unauthorized flights in Lithuanian airspace: eight flights were registered on November 2, four on November 3, twenty-two on November 4, twenty-three on November 5, six on November 7, and eight on November 8; between April 27 and September 27, Lithuanian officials have recorded 1,321 violations of the use of Lithuanian airspace by Russian air force planes, 18 of these endangered civilian flights.
- The 306th Independent Maintenance Battalion (unit 30139) of the Russian army was withdrawn from Siauliai; premises of army unit 20657 were handed over to Lithuanian officials (November 1-6). A total of 151 railway wagons with 78 units of military equipment and 19 transport vehicles were withdrawn from Lithuania during that period.
- A column of 21 Russian army trucks and a bus heading for Riga were turned back at the Latvian-Lithuanian border because they did not have the necessary documentation for entering Latvia (November 2).
- Russian air force planes repeatedly violated Latvian airspace: two unsanctioned flights were reported on November 2, one on November 3, five on November 5, two on November 2, and one on November 9; on November 3 an unspecified number of training flights were reported in the Daugavpils area between 11 am and 6 pm.
- A Russian army train with artillery equipment from army unit 42708 in the Russian town of Serpukhov crossed the Latvian border illegally and was detained by Latvian authorities in Riga (November 8); the equipment was meant for the maintenance unit based in Riga.
- Russian troops from unit 2294 tried to take ten Kalashnikov submachine guns AK-74 to Russia without proper permits and were detained by Estonian border guards (October 27).

14th Army To Clear Mines Along Dniester

93UM0184A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Nov 92 p 3

[Unattributed article: "From Chisinau: Tanks of the Russian 14th Army Will Participate in Clearing Mines on Banks of the Dniester"]

[Text] Up to now, all the mines on the banks of the Dniester have not been cleared. Two more people fell victim to them last week. This fact has finally prompted the authorities of Moldova to follow the recommendations of the trilateral joint commission: the republic's military department has asked the Ministry of Defense of Russia for permission to use tanks of the Russian 14th Army to clear mines from the remaining dangerous territory. As was reported to an RIA correspondent at the joint control commission from the Dniester region, the Ministry of Defense of the Dniester Moldavian Republic has made a similar request of Russia.

Russian Troops Begin Withdrawal From Chechen Positions

93UM0180A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Nov 92 p 1

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents Vladimir Maryukha and Aleksey Petrov: "Implementation of the Protocol on the Separation of Forces Has Begun"]

[Text] Subunits of an airborne regiment and the group of military personnel disarmed and arrested by security troops of the president of Chechia on 15 November, have begun withdrawing from positions occupied on the outskirts of Sernovodsk and the village of Ossinovskaya. This is in accordance with an agreement reached on the withdrawal of troops from the line of confrontation between Russian and Chechen subunits. The press center of the head of the interim administration of North Ossetia and Ingushetia reports that these actions became possible following the return by the Chechen side of weapons captured from the airborne troops on 15 November and Dzhorzhar Dudayev's authorization of a delegation of the Chechen Republic to sign the Protocol on the Separation of Forces. This ended the incident.

The troop withdrawal is being monitored by two combined commissions of Russia and Chechia. The Chechen formations have withdrawn 1.5 kilometers into their interior instead of the 3 kilometers specified in the protocol. In addition, according to information from operational sources, their armaments have been supplemented with two Grad launchers.

An extremely tense situation continues in the rayon itself. On the night of 16 November a mobile group of internal troops shelled the area near the village of Tarskoye, on 17 November grenades were again launched at the commandant's office in Nazran, and toward morning the firing of automatic weapons was recorded. A total of 45 people were detained and firearms, ammunition and Molotov cocktails were confiscated.

At the same time one can observe a spontaneous return of Ingush refugees to abandoned homes in Prigorodnyy Rayon, which North Ossetia, the leaders of public movements and people's deputies thoroughly oppose. At a meeting with Yuriy Yarov, deputy chairman of the Russian parliament, for example, the Ossetian deputies stated that peaceful dialog is impossible until the leaders of the Ingush extremists who incited their people to go against Ossetia are punished.

Another obstacle to a settlement of the conflict is the matter of hostages, not yet totally resolved. The search for them is complicated by the fact that many hostages are being held in private homes and there are no precise figures on the number of citizens captured by either side. The absence of Ingush representatives in the combined group for organizing the work, finding and removing refugees has brought its functioning to a halt, and thousands of Ossets and Ingush who are without homes need it.

UKRAINE

Morozov, Defense Industry Representatives Meet

*93UM0160E Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
23 Oct 92 p 1*

[Article by Press Service of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense: "At the Ministry of Defense: Defense Problems Discussed"]

[Text] A meeting was held on 21 October of this year between the minister of defense of Ukraine, Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov, and general designers of military equipment and representatives of the defense industry of Ukraine. They discussed issues associated with the state of our defense industry today.

Such a meeting was long overdue. Therefore, both the Ministry of Defense and representatives of the enterprises manufacturing armament and military equipment for the Armed Forces of Ukraine prepared for the meeting in advance. Representatives of defense enterprises shared the problems that they have to solve. There was a constructive and interesting conversation about the prospects of development of the defense industry, which must be used most efficiently in the interests of independent Ukraine. During the meeting, they expressed the need to determine the state military technology policy.

People's deputies of Ukraine participated in the meeting.

Morozov Discusses Military Doctrine Preparation with Deputies

*93UM0160D Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
23 Oct 92 p 1*

[Article by Lt Col Vasily Bilan: "Dialogues for the Benefit of Defense: Ukraine's Minister of Defense Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov Held a Number of Working Consultations in the Context of Preparing To Submit the Draft Military Doctrine of Ukraine to the Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] Ukraine has been building its own armed forces for a little less than a year. And all this time it has been without a fundamental political reference document—military doctrine. It is not because there has not been any time for it, but because it has proven to be very difficult to draw up. A draft has been submitted to the Commission for Defense and State Security of the Supreme Soviet four times, after which finishing touches have been put on it again and again. It has also been reviewed at the Defense Council. The President of Ukraine has instructed the minister of defense to report on the draft military doctrine at a session of parliament.

The other day the minister of defense of Ukraine held a number of consultations with a large group of people's deputies and representatives of the defense industry.

Disrupting the chronology of these consultations, we will note that both meetings were principled and candid, and after each there were grounds for further contacts.

Thus, the meeting with the people's deputies showed that interest in the draft law is equally great literally in all parliamentary commissions. During the course of the extended dialogue, numerous questions were cleared up that had arisen during reading of this document. Not all of

them were eliminated, and the polemics on some of them is sure to continue in the session hall—it was so difficult to take into consideration all aspects of the current military-political situation in a document several pages long.

Is it worth (and can we) achieving a single opinion over the doctrine tenet that Ukraine consider nuclear war impermissible. Although the most weighty arguments have been formulated to justify such a principled position of our state—"since it would have catastrophic consequences for all of mankind"—not everyone yet approves of a nuclear-free status of Ukraine, since strategic weapons will be located on its territory for a long time yet (seven years).

Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov had to answer many questions from the people's deputies, including ones such as: Will Ukraine, with its nuclear-free status, be able to repel a possible strike by an enemy who has a nuclear component? Are the Yalta and Dagomys accords a torpedo? What kind of morale should our army have? Why did we hand over tactical nuclear weapons to another state for nothing? When will orders from the Ministry of Defense be made in the Ukrainian language?

The conversation with defense industry representatives centered around only one section of the draft military doctrine—military technology aspects, but was accompanied by a search for specific ways to establish and develop our own military industry. It was very important for the minister of defense and other representatives of the military department to hear the opinions of the industrial workers, who for a long time now have been sending alarm signals due to the severing of economic ties, the lack of orders, financing, and so forth. And they were heard.

Representatives of various defense industry sectors—missiles, air defense, tanks, aviation, naval—gave detailed reports and proposals on ways to implement the military technology aspects of the military doctrine. It turns out that without Ukraine, the super-powerful Energiya would not have been taken off, there would not have been cruise missiles... Our state holds leading positions on several priority programs!... Therefore, the conversation was truly at a state level: On the one hand, are the potentialities of Ukraine being fully realized? On the other, will Ukraine be able to realize its potentialities? How, on what kind of base, and with what material-technical and financial expenditures can we ensure execution of political decisions formulated in the draft military doctrine?

The problems in the various sectors are nearly identical: no money, no state orders, numerous machinations on the way to cooperation. Hence the similarity in the proposals, if not the requirements: transfer the military budget into a single set of hands, the Ministry of Defense in particular, which would finance not the organization, as is done now, but specific priority programs. Everything that concerns defense should be put on state orders. Without military-scientific accompaniment, the process of designing and producing weapons and military equipment for defense needs is doomed. Do not destroy the existing training and test-range base, but use it as efficiently as possible. We need to cooperate with Russia—we are equally interested in Russia as Russia is interested in us. Take the "AWACS," for example, Russia cannot develop it without us, and it is greatly needed. Our defense workers have their own

mutual interests in their neighbor. True, they may sound different: we must not lock ourselves in on only one. We must look for partners in other places, too, and back up our interests. Our defense should not depend on the political climate between two states.

The problem of personnel, wages, and placement of the production base...

Summing up the results of this meeting, the minister of defense candidly admitted that he was enriched considerably by the exchange with people who are doing so much and, undoubtedly, will do more to ensure the defense capability of independent Ukraine. The dialogue will continue...

Morozov Press Conference on Army Status, Doctrine

*93UM0160C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
7 Oct 92 p 1*

[Article by Maj Gennadiy Klyuchikov: "We Must Strengthen Defense: Ukraine's Minister of Defense Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov Held a Press Conference for Ukrainian and Foreign Journalists"]

[Text] Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov briefly characterized the basic directions of the activities of the Ministry of Defense during the past period.

At this time, the withdrawal of compulsory-service personnel who are citizens of Ukraine from Moldova, countries of the Transcaucasus, and other hot spots is practically complete. About 50 percent of the officers and their family members have been transferred from these regions. The process of returning servicemen who are citizens of Ukraine from other former republics of the USSR is also proceeding in a stable manner. More than 1,000 officers have already been transferred from the armies of CIS countries and assigned to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

At the same time, the Armed Forces are being reduced by discharging into the reserve servicemen who have served the established time periods. In accordance with the Law of Ukraine on Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Their Family Members, the first ones being discharged are those officers who have been provided apartments. Thus, the process of reducing the Armed Forces of Ukraine is closely linked to the problems of social protection of servicemen.

Despite the overall reduction in the personnel strength of the Army, construction detachments are being reinforced and deployed. During the three quarters of this year, military construction workers turned over about 10,000 apartments. Through share participation in construction by local state administrations, enterprises, and organizations, it is planned to receive about 4,500 apartments for servicemen in 1992. With active participation by Ministry of Defense experts, a draft state program for providing servicemen with housing has been drawn up and is now under consideration by Cabinet of Ministers.

In order to increase social protection of servicemen, the Ministry of Defense is striving for a significant decrease in the minimum term of service and actively organizing retraining into civilian specialties for officers scheduled to be discharged into the reserve.

All these measures will make it possible not only to change numerically the composition of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, bringing them to a level typical for developed countries of Europe, but also to achieve qualitative changes in the Army. There is a good reason that four of the five meetings of the Collegium of the Ministry of Defense were devoted to improving the structure of the Armed Forces and implementing decrees of the Supreme Soviet.

Work is being conducted purposefully to establish interstate ties with the armies of developed countries of Europe and the world. Ukraine's first military attache to the United States was recently appointed. A group of military attaches is being trained for work in other countries.

One important direction of the activities of the Ministry of Defense is also fighting military crime and increasing control of the storage of weapons, equipment, and other military property.

Work is continuing to disclose the avenues of theft of weapons and equipment. A thorough investigation has been conducted of the recent case of a sale of weapons in Shepetovka. Existing loopholes in the orders of the former USSR Ministry of Defense that permitted the sale of weapons to hunting and sports societies resulted in a loss of weapons without coordinating with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. However, all illegally sold weapons are bound to be found and returned to the depots. Those guilty of relaxing control over the safety of the weapons have already been punished.

Unfortunately, the illegal sales of military property have not stopped in the Black Sea Fleet. The Ministry of Defense has turned over to the procuracy materials on several such cases. The procurator general has directed that an investigation be conducted. Criminal charges will be brought against those responsible, the sale contracts will be considered invalid, and the military property will be returned.

Answering journalists' questions, Colonel-General Morozov briefed them on the progress of drawing up a Ukrainian military doctrine. Ministry of Defense specialists participated in working on the military technology portion of the doctrine. It has been reviewed several times at meetings of the Supreme Soviet Commission on Questions of Defense and State Security and has now been passed to the Supreme Soviet for consideration. The military doctrine is defensive in nature and proceeds from the fact that Ukraine does not have territorial claims on any neighboring state. We are decisively against resolving any issues from a position of strength. All international problems will be resolved only on principles of good neighbor relations and cooperation on the basis of equality.

One of the questions concerned how much Ukraine's military-industrial complex is satisfying the needs of the Ministry of Defense. Konstantin Petrovich [Morozov] responded that it is not a question of where to get weapons and equipment, but where to get the necessary funds for this. Our defense industry is meeting the needs of the Ministry of Defense for the majority of positions of required military equipment and property. In those same

cases when there is no closed cycle in production, the issue is resolved by establishing economic ties with CIS countries.

At the beginning of the year, certain difficulties arose in connection with the acute shortage of fuel. The number of training sorties were reduced in some flying units, which adversely affected the level of combat training of flying personnel. However, now we have managed to solve this problem by concluding international agreements with states of the Transcaucasus region, Russia, and Belarus.

At the conclusion of the press conference, the minister of defense told journalists how our soldiers are standing duty as part of the UN forces in Sarajevo. A Ukrainian battalion is under fire, but there are no losses. Together with a French battalion, it is performing its assigned tasks. The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine satisfied in full a request for delivery of needed equipment received from the battalion.

Col-Gen Bizhan on Bishkek Summit Results

*93UM0160B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
15 Oct 92 p 1*

[Article by Maj Valeriy Korol: "Ukraine Is Observing the Agreement, and Often Unilaterally"]

[Text] A press conference was held by the first deputy minister of defense of Ukraine, Colonel-General Ivan Bizhan. It was devoted to the results of the meeting of the heads of state of the CIS at Bishkek and the recent events in the Black Sea Fleet.

As was already reported in the press, a number of questions of military cooperation were examined at the meeting of heads of state and government of the CIS at Bishkek, in particular, on CIS states' observance of the Treaty Between the United States and the USSR on the Elimination of Medium- and Short-Range Missiles, the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, and on the creation of a joint consultative commission on disarmament.

Ukraine has signed the agreements on observing the treaties between the USSR and USA, thereby reaffirming that it is a legal successor of the former Union.

The summit meeting also examined questions of a concept of military security of CIS states and propositions about the main command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. They also heard data about strategic forces and about principles of organizing the navies of Russia and Ukraine on the basis of the Black Sea Fleet.

Ukraine has not signed any documents on these issues.

Actually, Colonel-General I. Bizhan said, the CIS Joint Armed Forces as such do not exist, and it is not known whether they will be created at all. What we have is only the joint command of these forces, which, you will agree, is not the same thing.

There also are not unified strategic forces of the CIS states, although the agreement on such was signed on 30 December of last year in Moscow.

Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, also admitted the

lack of unified strategic forces when he gave a report on this issue at the conference in Bishkek.

Whose fault is it that the strategic forces were not created? As Colonel-General I. Bizhan, first deputy minister of defense of Ukraine, believes, it is primarily Marshal Shaposhnikov who is at fault. Ivan Vasilyevich [Bizhan] reminded the journalists present at the press conference that, according to the December agreement, the strategic forces were to be created by each state specifying a list of units, formations, and large strategic formations which would be part of these forces.

In January 1992, Ukraine prepared such a list, including on it all the nuclear weapons located on its territory. But the list presented did not satisfy the commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces and his staff. It was suggested to Ukraine to include on the list, in addition to everything else, motorized rifle units, all aviation, the Black Sea Fleet, air forces, depots, bases, and even military sanatoria and rest homes(!).

Quite naturally, Ukraine decisively rejected such suggestions.

It took more than six months before, finally, in Bishkek Marshal Shaposhnikov proposed including as part of the strategic forces only the complex of nuclear weapons, which in fact is what Ukraine had proposed at the beginning of the year.

In connection with the resubordination of the former Headquarters of the Strategic Missile Forces to Russia and the retirement of the commander, General of the Army Maksimov, the leaders of the CIS states participating in the conference in Bishkek made the decision to subordinate the nuclear strategic forces to Marshal Shaposhnikov.

Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov then and there made the proposal about subordinating all nuclear strategic forces, including those located in Ukraine, to Russia, since only Russia, the Marshal said, according to the Lisbon Protocol and other agreements, is the sole legal successor of the former Union.

There are no understandings on this account, said Colonel-General I. Bizhan, in a single document on strategic forces of Russia. Therefore, the situation with strategic nuclear arms remains as before.

The Belarus delegation believed that the Yalta Accords between Ukraine and Russia violate the Treaty on Strategic Forces of 30 December 1991 and considered the Black Sea Fleet strategic.

But the Black Sea Fleet, noted Colonel-General I. Bizhan, was never part of the strategic forces. Moreover, at a conference of CIS heads of state on 16 January 1992, it was determined that the composition of strategic forces includes the Navy, except for that portion which will be part of the naval forces of Ukraine and Russia. And only two sides must solve this problem—Ukraine and Russia.

Speaking at the conference, Russian President Boris Yeltsin emphasized that the Yalta Treaty does not violate agreements adopted earlier on strategic forces and assured that its provisions will be observed.

We should remember that Boris Nikolayevich [Yeltsin] made his statement on 9 October. But on 10 October, the

next day, the Ministry of Defense of Russia issued a directive to prepare nine warships for a cruise to the shores of Abkhazia, without requesting Ukraine's consent in doing so.

Despite the repeated demands by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine to postpone implementation of the decision until coordination of the matter between the two states at the highest level, the ships left for Abkhazia. Admiral I. Kasatonov personally supervised the action.

The Black Sea Fleet is subordinate to two presidents, Colonel-General I. Bizhan again reminded. But in violation of the treaty, the Russian side, as before, is trying to command the fleet. The existing situation following the Yalta Accords suggests unambiguous conclusions.

Ukraine is ready to fulfill its obligations, but insists on the same approach by all parties concerned.

At the conclusion of the press conference, Colonel-General I. Bizhan answered numerous questions from journalists.

Minimal Sufficiency, Flexible Service Proposed as Armed Forces Goals

*93UM0128A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
22 Oct 92 p 2*

[Article by Colonel Viktor Vakolyuk, professor, and Lieutenant-Colonel Yevgeniy Trusov in the "Point of View" column: "Military Security and Construction of Ukraine's Armed Forces"; first paragraph is NARODNA ARMIYA introduction]

[Text] In the general system of assuring national security of Ukraine now in its formative stage, occupying a position of importance is military security. The latter characterizes the condition of a state associated with countering or reacting to the infliction of harm to the state's national security by means of armed aggression. However, military security is more than the presence of an armed force; it is also linked to the absence of danger, to the assurance of life without war. The emphasis here is on a level of sufficiency of a state's military potential for defense that would guarantee a reliable resistance to any type of aggression committed from without and at the same time would not constitute a threat to other states, with no possibility of conducting large-scale offensive operations.

The foreign and domestic policies of any state are formed to further its national interests, that is, to assure optimum conditions for the state's existence, which includes armed defense of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Analysis of the present interrelated and integral world and of the consequences of possible damage that could be caused the latter as a result of armed conflict bears witness to the fact that the time when military force was considered to constitute the principal argument of a policy has fallen into the Lethe. The present situation in Europe provides enormous opportunities to attain peace and stability, not by military, but by peaceful, means. In this connection, the problem of a state's defensive sufficiency assumes a position of central importance, since political and diplomatic means should be supported by a sound material foundation in the form of economic power.

The new approach to security demands that we acknowledge that large numbers of armed forces, weapons, and

combat materiel do not necessarily provide an assurance of a more stable defensive capability. If those means are magnified on the principle of "the more, the better" to the detriment of the life of the people, defensive capability could suffer a decline. More limited purposes of assuring a strategic defense could be served by Armed Forces which are smaller in number but effective and well-equipped. At play here is the operation of the law pertaining to the relationship between world stability and security of peoples on the one hand, and level of defensive sufficiency of armed forces and states on the other: the lower this level, the smaller the military danger and the more stable the peace and security of peoples.

The capabilities of the sovereign states that are members of the CIS, including Ukraine, indicate that quite a few of them intend to have -and are actively creating - armed forces which are powerful and mobile and meet the requirements posed by a reasonable and reliable sufficiency for defense. It is unfortunate that the periodical press still shows little interest in dealing with the question of the purpose of armed forces. The overwhelming majority of articles and other items are involved with the examination of the urgency of socio-economic problems of their construction. This is an important question, to be sure, but it is not one which defines the purpose of the Army and its provision with manpower. Ukraine's active and ongoing creation of the Armed Forces in no way constitutes a threat to neighboring states. The peaceful policy of Ukraine and the latter's non-nuclear status are reflected in legislation which has written into it the principle of defensive sufficiency as an attribute of the very foundation of military construction. The proposed size of the Armed Forces and the production volumes slated for the defense industry are commensurate with the degree of need assuring security of the state and people of Ukraine.

The attempt to effectuate this principle makes it possible for many European countries to regard the young Ukrainian state as a guarantor of peace and stability in Eastern Europe. Thus, Ukraine in October of 1991 presented the international community with its initiative of enlisting the aid of the U.N. to elevate the highly promising process of military potential reduction to major status, whereby it would include all types of weapons and would encompass all areas, all the countries of the world. (See POLITIKA I VREMYA, No 15, p 4). In addition to that, Ukraine was one of the first to undertake, under strict international monitoring, the implementation of practical measures relating to the elimination of weapons in accordance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces and Weapons in Europe. (See NARODNA ARMIYA, 1992, 14 August). Serving as an example of the peaceful activity in the area of settlement of international conflicts was the dispatch of a Ukrainian battalion to the former Yugoslavia as part of the U.N. forces assigned to maintain peace there.

Sovereign Ukraine possesses her own institutions of power and her own Armed Forces, whose construction has not yet been completed. This was mentioned by President L.M. Kravchuk in his relating the progress of state construction at a press conference that had been called on the eve of the first anniversary of independence. (See PRAVDA UKRAINY, 1992, 20 August). The process of constructing the Armed Forces, which constitute a most important state

institution, continues to move forward. The process is proceeding on a broad democratic basis in the form of continuous reform of the powerful military forces which came under the jurisdiction of Ukraine in January of 1992, in full compliance with the agreements relating to military issues reached between the CIS member countries.

In the final analysis, what kind of Armed Forces should Ukraine possess? Everything depends upon the personnel recruitment policy that will be employed.

The majority of military specialists in their writings on this topic are of the opinion that Ukraine's Armed Forces should be largely professionally manned and used only as intended. Military service, as far as the personnel are concerned, should constitute their life's work and serve as their true occupation. All servicemen should be obligated to undergo specialized training and testing at the state level, be afforded the opportunity of independent pursuit of their service obligations, and bear personal responsibility for the quality and efficiency of their performance.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine are being created under new political, economic, and social conditions, and in an environment of international experience in military construction. The major difficulty at play is the condition of the economy, which as yet does not permit creating a highly professional army. The manpower needs of the Armed Forces are being met by applying the Ukraine Law on Universal Military Obligation and Military Service by drafting citizens for military service on the authority of the universal military obligation. The law also makes provision for citizens to enter military service on the basis of contract or alternative (nonmilitary) service. This evidently is the optimum method for the state to fill the Armed Forces manpower requirements, even though it is not without shortcomings. Experience teaches us that the prestige of military service is insufficiently high in the eyes of society. There are many instances of youths dodging the draft and refusing to serve on Ukrainian soil. One out of three conscripts has stated that it is of no importance to him in which army he will serve. (See NARODNA ARMIYA, 1992, 23 July).

In our view, new opportunities for creating a professional army and navy will be opened up with stabilization of the political and economic relations with the states that are our nearest neighbors and upon completion of the division of property belonging to the former Soviet Armed Forces.

The system of manpower provision and training of cadres may undergo changes. It is thought that military service will consist of two phases. The first phase would be obligatory. It would consist of either military service or alternative service. The second phase would consist of contract service, one on a strictly volunteer basis. These two types of service are set down in existing Ukraine legislation dealing with military topics, whereby every citizen is obligated to perform either military service or alternative service.

It is quite clear that the duration of the military would differ from that of alternative service. Alternative service, performed outside the Armed Forces or other armed units, would essentially be as follows. Citizens of Ukraine who actually do hold religious convictions and who belong to legally recognized organizations whose teachings do not

permit the bearing of arms and serving in the Armed Forces are to perform their alternative service in state institutions, and in social service, public health, and environmental institutions and organizations, or in communal agricultural, or other organizations.

The first phase of military service would be limited to training a recruit in the acquisition of a high order of skills for duty in a branch of the service. The duration may be six to 12 months. The serviceman upon completing this training would be required to pass state qualification tests and only then be discharged into the reserve. Those servicemen who wish to continue to serve would do so under a contractual arrangement. This approach would make it possible to effect a rapid solution to the problem of creating well-trained reserves while at the same time maintaining a highly-trained officer cadre who would possess rich knowledge and experience, the kind of personnel who would at all times be an asset in a broad system of training centers.

It should be understood that there is an essential need for a well-thought-out system of rights and privileges constituting incentives for youth, after completion of the military and alternative services of the first phase, to provide encouragement to continue military service under contract. The system of incentives should be sufficiently effective so as to inspire youth to choose military service as their basic profession.

Persons most acceptable as recruits for Ukraine's Armed Forces could be selected under a special system of testing for suitability as professionals. It appears that the draft age should be made more flexible, say 18 to 20 years of age (as left to the discretion of each draftee). This would afford the potential draftee the opportunity to improve his physical and mental fitness for military service and for the testing. The approach would dispense with the ineffective system of draft deferment and remove deferment as a goal, one presently pursued in all manner possible by many men of draft age.

The method of filling the manpower needs of the Ukraine Armed Forces would compel draft-age youth to more actively pursue mental and physical fitness for military service and improve their general educational level. This system of manpower provision and cadre training would, under the new political, economic, and social conditions, make it possible to do away with a disgraceful practice we inherited from the former Soviet Armed Forces: violation of interpersonal behavior principles and hazing of recruits.

This proposed approach to the system of manpower supply and cadre training, if adopted by the Supreme Soviet, would necessitate the introduction of attendant changes into existing legislation governing military construction in Ukraine. The thinking is that this would promote the creation of a highly professional Armed Forces that would be maintained at a level of defensive sufficiency to provide military security for the state. This kind of Armed Forces would constitute a reliable guarantor of the independence and territorial integrity of the country.

Problems Impeding Army's Formation, Readiness Discussed*93UM0160A Kiev VECHERNIY KIEV in Russian
23 Oct 92 p 2*

[Article by Col (Res) Vladimir Chikalin: "The Old Overcoat No Longer Fits"]

[Text] The great Archimedes died at the hand of a conqueror because there was no warrior next to him. The first Ukrainian Republic fell because it did not have time to organize its armed protection. A little over 70 years later, history has given the people of Ukraine another chance to build an independent state. And from the very first steps toward it, creating its own army has been put at the head of the list.

Today, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are one of the largest in size after Russia. Speaking during the opening of the session of Supreme Soviet, Ukrainian President L.M. Kravchuk said that, to date, more than 100,000 officers have taken the oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine. At first glance, this is impressive. But neither the President, as commander in chief of the armed forces, nor the minister of defense are experiencing any euphoria from this indicator. They have set the task of moving from quantity to quality. This will be an absolutely new and unbelievably difficult phase of organizational development of armed protection of the state. We will have to go through everything in this phase: from creating our own military doctrine to developing combat equipment and armament, uniforms, national symbols, and a system of educating the soldier-patriot.

Having shed the overcoat of the Soviet Armed Forces, the Ukrainian Army is still experiencing a strong influence of the past experience of thinking. It does not happen that a person becomes totally different the day after taking the oath. So, one can hardly say that the 100,000 officers who have come under the banner of Ukraine all share to the end as one its ideas and policy. To confirm this, I will cite the results of a poll conducted in a few units of one of the military districts. Only 42 percent of those polled confirmed their readiness to scrupulously fulfill the requirements of the Ukrainian oath. Nearly one out of every three admitted that he had taken the oath because there is living space and no need to go somewhere. Certainly, these data cannot be considered absolute. But they also indicate that there are quite a few fellow travelers in the army today. In time, some of them may leave, and others may not withstand the tests of the new requirements. According to forecasts of the Personnel Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, up to 90,000-95,000 officers who are serving outside its boundaries are to return to Ukraine by 1995. A question arises: Will the state be able to accept all of them? But, it is also clear that, first of all, the army will accept the officers best trained and most devoted to the cause and the people of Ukraine. With their arrival a problem will arise associated with the discharge of those whom they will replace in the officer corps. It is anticipated that 80,000 officers and 20,000 warrant officers will be discharged by 1995. Already today we must think through everything so these two streams of people do not generate tension in society. A working group has been created in the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense for drawing up a state program of social adaptation of servicemen

being discharged into the reserve. You see, many of them will be getting out of uniform at a fairly young age. This will require a review of a number of laws, including on employment, in particular, to grant servicemen who have earned a pension the right to retrain and improve their skills.

There are also other problems associated with organizing the officer corps, as well as the soldier corps. The attack once made by the combined efforts of various parties, movements, and organizations against the Soviet Army is now ricocheting on the Ukrainian Army. Today, commanders at all levels are very concerned about deserters. A year ago no one assumed that the right to serve in Ukraine in one's own army, won in a difficult struggle, would not only be preserved but also aggravate this problem. The syndrome of impunity, the peak of which arrived in the final months Yazov was minister of defense, has firmly penetrated the conscience of many lads. A survey conducted in one of the large strategic formations of the Odessa Military District of inductees from the spring call-up showed that one out of every three of them is morally willing to abandon his unit. And they are doing so. Due to this, today's army continues to incur large moral and material costs. Thus, in one month this large strategic formation alone used 115 vehicles, 340 officers, and more than 1,500 soldiers and sergeants in searching for deserters.

Why are they deserting units today? The public is of the opinion that it is due to "dedovshchina" [hazing of new conscripts by conscripts with more seniority]. But the facts indicate that only one out of every five deserters cite this as the reason. The main reason is that the lads wish to serve close to home.

How can we combat this phenomenon? Most commanders and jurists believe that we must institute a rigid system of fines for breaches of military discipline. Recently, at the commandant's office of the Kiev Garrison, soldiers being held in the stockade were asked: "If you would have been fined for the offense, would you have committed it?" Nine out of 10 said: "I would not have." Incidentally, the draft Internal Service Regulations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine provides for such a disciplinary penalty on soldiers and sergeants as levying a monetary fine. I think its skillful use will largely lessen the acuteness of this problem, particularly when we have service under contract. This measure works very effectively in other armies. The other day I read an article in one of the newspapers about how two lads who had moved to Israel were trying to introduce our domestically produced "dedovshchina" in that army. As soon as officers found out about this, they fined the soldiers and immediately removed the desire to take advantage of the privileges of those with more seniority.

Today many commanders are placing a certain amount of hope in the struggle with negative phenomena on the creation of military police. Military police would spare commanders from having to organize a search for deserters and would monitor the conduct of servicemen beyond the confines of military units. The commandant's office now does this. But it is not always possible for them to do this effectively.

Today everyone—from the minister of defense to the platoon leader—is bothered by problems of organizing combat training. Two years ago, American experts made some calculations. They showed that in the event of conducting combat operations with conventional weapons for 8-9 days, the USSR Navy would lose 88 percent of its combat readiness, and the U.S. Navy would lose up to 18 percent. They also compiled similar prognoses for other combat arms. Of course, this is not a case when it is more visible from the side. The well-known military affairs expert Mikhail Skobelev derived this formula: in war, the ratio of the moral to physical element is 3:1. Today in the Ukrainian Army there has begun a revival of those moral principles which enabled the Zaporozhye Cossacks, the Sech Streltsi, and the UPA [Ukrainian Rebel Army] fighting men to win with a smaller number. But much also depends on physical elements: the quality of combat equipment and weapons, the level of competence to handle them. Today Ukrainian servicemen shoot, drive tanks, and launch missiles less frequently than their counterparts in the United States or the FRG. The shortage of fuel, ammunition, and spare parts has an effect on maintaining the combat readiness of units.

As before, an old ailment is still around—taking personnel away from combat training. In some subunits, administrative work, guard duty, and daily details “eat up” from 30 to 50 percent of the time allotted for combat training. Many commanders believe that a solution to this is to create service subunits under the combat units. They would assume all administrative concerns, thereby giving servicemen the opportunity to do their primary job—learn to fight.

Major Anvar Mikhalev, a battalion commander, once told a correspondent: “It is sort of a new army, but the old problems remain.”

Creating a new army is not just replacing the stars with tridents, switching to the Ukrainian language, and introducing national symbols. A new army also requires new approaches to instruction, education, and training of troops and a new economy.

Servicemen's Social Needs, Socio-Political Status Explored

93UM0169B Kiev *NARODNA ARMIYA* in Russian
30 Oct 92 p 1

[Article by Colonel Aleksandr Grinkevich, under the rubric: “Point of View”: “The Social Needs of Servicemen: The Problems of Their Formation and Satisfaction”]

[Text] The profound change of the country's socio-political order is a specific feature of the current time. The serious stratification of society has begun. The rapid formation of the middle class is imparting stability to those social systems. We think that professional military personnel—all of those who are serving on contract—must be part of that middle class.

The social situation of that category of citizens of Ukraine will be largely determined by how they are provided with monetary and other types of allowances. Tentatively, the initial amount of the contract salary should not be lower than 6-10 times the amount of the minimum wage that the

state has guaranteed to workers at this time. The differences in salaries by categories of cadre servicemen must be substantial. For example, junior officers must receive 2-3 times more than warrant officers and senior officers 2-3 times more than junior officers...

We are still not psychologically prepared for that “stratification” of servicemen based on material means. Therefore, the formation among people of perceptions that this situation is just and necessary for the optimal functioning of the Ukrainian Army must become one of the most important concerns.

It is also important to strive to make it more advantageous to serve conscientiously. Obviously, a serviceman who has a more zealous attitude toward service must approach the highest group in status based on his material situation.

So, social expectations must correspond to the level of training and to the quality of service, must motivate a person toward professional growth, on the one hand, and at the same time not give rise to excessive requests that obviously exceed the capabilities of the social status achieved at this moment. We need to persistently create distinctive standards for each category of servicemen, and propagandize and implement them. Analysis of the draft State Program, the social adaptation of servicemen, articles in the press, and speeches of state and army leaders indicate that the character and specific nature of the needs of the military man are not being completely taken into account during the search for ways to resolve the problems of those servicemen who have been released into the reserve or who have retired. The search for solutions to problems is frequently “frontal” in nature.

As a rule, greater attention is being devoted to the problems associated with the satisfaction of the minimal needs for housing, clothing, and food... By way of illustration, can we really seriously regard the monetary compensation for food rations that is being paid to officers and warrant officers to be fitting? It in no way compares to the actual level of required expenditures for food. Obviously, the issue of a food ration in kind would be more advisable.

In my opinion, little attention is being devoted to the satisfaction of the spiritual needs of servicemen who have been released into the reserve...

A man who has for years been compelled to “suffer for the sake of society” while proceeding from the social need to defend the Homeland, did not have the opportunity to satisfy his own artistic, ethical, and other needs. Finally, the time appears for him to show his worth but there are few opportunities to do that. We need to find the methods to help him to create these opportunities. I am certain that many problems that worry him will turn out to be weakened and will become secondary. Then social tension will subside in society as a whole.

Consequently, the matter for such a “detail” as knowledge—what needs are inherent to servicemen on contract? For the beginning, it would be good to establish what the spectrum of primary needs of servicemen is and what kind of hierarchy they have in the context of satisfaction. But we don't have any of this on the scientific level right now. A program of specific military-sociological research that is capable of providing answers to many of these questions

was already developed at the beginning of the year. In Kiev, a team of military sociologists has been selected who are ready to carry out that program and to conduct research. The concept of operations, tasks, and goals of the research were published in *NARODNA ARMIYA* but no one has needed them so far. It is a hopeless matter to attempt to blindly resolve complex problems in today's life. For example, tell me how many people who are involved in business does the country need? Perhaps, 3-7 percent of the total population. So, why have we rushed all of the officers who have been released into the reserve to study at business schools? What is this, the only field of activity where they can fulfill themselves?

Is there any scientific-research center in Ukraine which would be involved with the study of social problems of servicemen and would develop practical recommendations for the organs of government? As far as I know, no. Obviously, it would be worthwhile to think about the creation of this scientific-research center on an interdepartmental basis under the Ukrainian Government.

Defense Ministry Legal Affairs Chief on Combating Army Criminality

*93UM0169A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
5 Nov 92 p 1*

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel of Justice P. Kozyr, Chief of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Administration of Affairs Legal Section, under the rubric: "A Lawyer's Point of View": "Who Will Ensure Legality in the Army?"]

[Text] Criminality in the Ukrainian Armed Forces has become one of the most popular topics in the mass media. You can read about the exposure of the latest crook's plot everyday in the pages of the press. As a rule, these articles are of the most varied style: there is objective material that contains specific information and not altogether objective material that is similar to a fantastic tale. And unfortunately quite biased and incompetent articles will also sometimes appear.

And I will not presume to judge their quality and role in the matter of strengthening legality in the army, however, I am convinced that it is impossible to positively resolve the problem of reducing the increase of crime, and all the more so its eradication, through occasional exposés alone.

There will be neither urgent topics nor exposés in this article but some thoughts will be offered on more effective ways to combat illegality in the troops.

We know that the young Ukrainian Army inherited such "gifts" as crime, corruption, and general illegality. That is why I suggest that we take a small excursion into the very recent past before we talk about our problems today in that context.

Crime received special scope and prosperity in the former Union in the 1970's-1980's. Now we know the true causes of that phenomenon: They were the total falsity at all levels of state structures, the moral decay of society, the appearance of Mafioso clans, etc., that certainly had to have a negative impact on the army. It was during those years that such a horrible concept as "dedovshchina" [hazing of conscripts] appeared, and embezzlement of public funds,

evasion of military service and other types of crimes became massive in nature at all levels of military authority.

But not only influence from without promoted the increase of crime in the army. The fact that combating illegality and arbitrariness was practically being conducted formally was a no less serious cause. Only two ridiculously weak forces—unit commanders as investigative agencies and military procurator agencies with their helpless and hopelessly truncated staffs—opposed that evil. Judge for yourselves, how could an army commander, even if he was extremely conscientious, carry out the duties of an investigative agency if he is not capable of distinguishing the criminal code from the criminal-procedural code, if no one had ever taught him that. Yes, ultimately, that function is not characteristic of a commander. He is obliged to teach his subordinate to fight and not to put him in jail. Furthermore, the fact that the commander, that woeful investigative agency, was placed between a rock and a hard place also impacted crime fighting effectiveness. On the one hand, by law, he was obligated to file criminal law suits and conduct investigations and, on the other hand, he received the most severe punishments for these criminal cases because higher commanders needed not legality but good indicators. Well and finally it's no secret that many commanders themselves did not take the criminal code into account and frequently found themselves on the dock.

As for the other force—the military procurators of those years, what kind of effectiveness of procuratorial oversight can we talk about if each military procuracy worker, and frequently the procurator himself, continuously had 20-30 criminal cases in the process of preliminary investigation at the same time. In the process, a pen and an aging typewriter were the most "modern" equipment procuracy workers had. You couldn't find other forces capable of confronting criminality in the troops, alas, in the at one time "united and inviolable."

Now, dear reader, I invite you to return to today and to look at our young Ukrainian Army without rose-colored glasses. Is it not true that this is a painfully familiar picture? It is as similar as the Gemini twins to what was portrayed above. I don't know how this affects you, but the question arises in me: "Won't combating crime in the army on the cheap cost us dear?"

I think that it is long since time to shift from words about a military militia to its very rapid creation. The Ukrainian Minister of Defense has proposed the creation of such a structure to the Cabinet of Ministers. However, neither a positive nor a negative reaction has followed.

Nevertheless, the issue, as they say, that we are dealing with here—is dictated by life itself. And therefore I want to express my thoughts on this point. We see the military militia agencies as a strictly centralized structure in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It is more expedient to locate its subunits at garrisons and to define its servicing based on the territorial principle. The Law of Ukraine "On the Militia" could be laid at the foundation of its activities. However, the exclusion of subordination to local military administrative agencies must be a necessary condition. If its subordination strictly along the vertical is not ensured, it will ultimately be transformed into a "pocket militia".

We could mostly probably task these agencies with the duties of the investigative agency and protection of public order at units and garrisons, conduct of a preliminary investigation on a certain category of criminal cases and operational-investigatory work. The organization of patrol and sentry duty at garrisons, subordination of military motor vehicle inspection agencies and the definition of other functions could be considered part of the military militia. Today unit commanders carry out all of these tasks, the vast majority of which, as we have already noted above, are mostly not characteristic to them.

The idea of creating military militia agencies is not new. Both in the 1970's and in the 1980's, some military procurators and commanders periodically advanced it to the highest echelons of state and military authority. But at that time, many of those in power, that is, those who could carry out those proposals, were not interested in its creation because they understood that they would very soon end up being "serviced" by these agencies. Today much has changed and therefore we would like to believe that the same bitter fate will not befall this idea in our independent Ukraine.

In conclusion, I would like to note that the proposed variation of the creation of the military militia agencies does not claim to be ideal. There can be and there most likely are other opinions. But one thing is clear, we need that structure today.

Therefore, I appeal to you, dear reader, to share your thoughts on that extremely urgent problem on the pages of the newspaper. Furthermore, I would like to learn about your opinion on the name of these agencies, and more precisely "military militia" or "military police".

You can send your proposals to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Administration of Affairs Legal Section.

Maj-Gen Tolubko Argues Pro-Nuclear Weapons Position

93UN0440A Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian
10 Nov p 6, 20 Nov p 7, 21 Nov p 7 92

[Article in three installments by Major General Vladimir Borisovich Tolubko, people's deputy of Ukraine: "Concern About Security, Or Back to the Phalanx?"]

[10 Nov 92 p 6]

[Text] For Major General Vladimir Tolubko, people's deputy, the missile troops are his entire life. Vladimir Borisovich believes that the decision that Ukraine should become a nonnuclear country without missiles is a long way from being faultless. This is why he has written a series of three articles in which he expresses his viewpoint on nuclear missile weapons in Ukraine. We believe that the arguments of the experts should be brought to our readers.

The combat experience gained in past wars (and unfortunately the Ukrainian people have endured many of them) should today be regarded as invaluable capital that augments the combat might of our forces.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine should include that class of means of destruction and comprehensive support for combat actions that could in the event of aggression destroy any enemy targets with adequate reliability.

Ukraine cannot have the reputation of being a weak country. In order to avoid aggressive attacks from outside it is essential to possess the potential to respond to any threat.

One of the most important problems associated with the development of any state claiming the status of an independent state is the problem of ensuring the security of the state and its defense capability. When this problem is being resolved it is impossible to ignore world military-historical experience in the development of armed forces because an army that is unable to predict new phenomena finds itself prisoner to outworn stereotypes and will inevitably suffer defeat. The combat experience gained in past wars (and unfortunately the Ukrainian people have endured many of them) should today be regarded as invaluable capital that augments the combat might of our forces.

What has victory in wars brought? The muscles of the troops, and initially very simple but later improved weapons, combined with the military art. The first wars in world history (in the 5th and 4th centuries B.C.) showed that success in the fighting depended on the military potential of the warring parties. Strong states had strong armies, and vice versa: A strong army ensured not only the existence but also the prosperity of a country. Success in fighting depended mainly on the numerical strength of troops and the physical condition of the warriors. Each warrior in the formation of the phalanx, legion, or manipule was a master in fighting with edged weapons and was drilled in hand-to-hand combat. Use of cavalry significantly enhanced the troops' ability to maneuver, and consequently made it possible for an army to deal with more complex missions in the fighting. Gradually the victories went increasingly to armies led by the more progressive commanders who used new means to wage armed struggle. It was precisely in fighting that the military art was founded.

An army's weapons were determined by the level of development in craft production and science and technology. In the 4th through the 2nd centuries B.C., compared to other states of the time Greece and Rome had a production technology and qualitatively better weapons. Heavy spears, swords, battle axes, and daggers were used for hand-to-hand fighting; for fighting at a distance there were bows and arrows and metal spears (javelins). Combat resources were developed that were the first examples of combat equipment. Extensive use was made of war chariots and elephants in combat.

The forward-looking development of production forces and production methods opened broader opportunities to equip armies. The development of metallurgy, for example, made it possible to increase the production of edged weapons significantly, and to create the first examples of firearms. These were still primitive cannons and matchlock firearms—harquebuses. In 1521 the musket was invented and put into service with some armies; its shot could penetrate a knight's armor, and this predetermined the gradual disappearance of the tactical principle that had been employed for many centuries, in which warriors fought the warriors directly facing them.

The distinctive features of the preparations for and the conduct of wars by the Slavic fighting forces under the command of Aleksandr Nevskiy (1240-1242), Dmitriy

Donskoy (1378-1380), and Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy (1648-1654) deserve our special attention. Along with the ability to mobilize and train the popular masses to fight an invader, these figures were endowed with an even greater command talent. Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy, for example, used spears, sabers, and firearms in the wars of liberations, and the first examples of artillery weapons. The tactics for actions by the troops consisted of using columns in line of skirmish.

During the latter half of the 17th century the muskets in most of the European armies were replaced first with flintlock smoothbore longarms, and then later, in the 1840's, with percussion firearms. By the end of the 19th century all armies had switched to the rifle, including those with magazines, and other kinds of automatic firearms were being mastered. It was precisely the availability of automatic rifles and machine guns and artillery with a high rate of fire that enabled the relatively small Boer army to achieve many successes and win a victory in the war against the army with the highest prestige of the time—the British army.

The pattern is obvious: The higher the level of development of production forces in a state, the more efficient the weapons in service with its army; the more powerful the army, the more independent the policy that the country pursues in the world arena.

This circumstance has been seen in particular in the wars of the 20th century. The Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) confirmed that the outcome of war is influenced most of all by the economic potential of the belligerent. Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War demonstrated where conservatism and stagnation in military development, government shortsightedness, and a state's economic backwardness lead. The passive nature of the defense strategy, the inadequate numbers of what were then the latest automatic weapons and artillery and mortars with a high rate of fire, and the use of old-fashioned methods for troop control predetermined Russia's shameful defeat.

During World War I the means by which war was waged changed significantly. This was the result of the mass use of machine guns, artillery with a high rate of fire, tanks, and aircraft. Compared to wars of the past, the armies involved in that world war were enormous. It was precisely at that time that toxic agents—weapons of mass destruction—were used for the first time on the battlefield.

What were the lessons of World War I? First, it had become clear that a state's sovereignty and integrity depend on its military and economic potential and the level of development in weapons and combat equipment and military science. Second, the war made it clear that mistakes by politicians and diplomats, the niggardliness of officials, and the principles of the pacifists were ultimately paid for by the people and corrected by the military. Third, it became clear that it is impossible to organize armed forces on the national principle in a multinational state.

During World War II the economy, science, and military thinking were directed toward developing new kinds of tanks, aircraft, artillery systems, small-arms, and other kinds of combat equipment. Ultimately the winner was the one who, other things being equal, succeeded in developing

the most modern weapons and equipment and mobilizing and training its citizens in the military art. We were late in doing that at the time, and so the price of victory turned out to be extremely high.

The end of World War II was marked with one of the most monstrous events in the history of mankind—the detonation of atomic bombs over cities in Japan. The advent of nuclear weapons ushered in a new era in military affairs, and today they determine the face of the modern world. And it is the availability of these weapons in particular countries that plays what is by no means the least role in determining the place of that state in the world ranking.

It is common knowledge that nuclear weapons were developed during World War II in the United States mainly through the efforts of European scientists (Einstein, Bohr, Fermi, and others). The first test of this weapon took place in the United States at the Alamogordo proving ground on 16 July 1945 (the Potsdam Conference was under way at the time in conquered Germany). And only 20 days later, on 6 August 1945, an atomic bomb of what was for that time colossal power—20 kilotons—was dropped on Hiroshima, without military need or expedience. Three days later, on 9 August 1945, a second Japanese city—Nagasaki—was subjected to atomic bombing. The aftermath of the nuclear explosions was horrific. In Hiroshima, almost 130,000 of the 255,000 inhabitants were killed or wounded, and more than 50,000 of Nagasaki's population of almost 200,000 were destroyed.

Subsequently, nuclear weapons were developed and tested in the USSR (1949), Great Britain (1952), France (1960), and China (1964). Today, more than 30 states in the world are prepared scientifically and technically to produce nuclear weapons.

The latest achievements of science and technology have increased many times over the force not only of nuclear means of destruction. In fact, massive use of nuclear weapons may lead to enormous losses in a short time that in the age of conventional weapons would have been inconceivable. Even the use of conventional weapons, however, has catastrophic consequences. Recognition of this fact in and of itself is a deterrent factor and determines the interest in improving conventional means of waging war. The possibilities of these weapons today are almost limitless, as was demonstrated to the world community during the recent war in the Persian Gulf. The main distinguishing feature of that war was the fact that the very latest weapons were tested there on a large scale. For the first time, space "worked" on forces right there on the battlefield. It was space surveillance and navigational assets that largely predetermined the success of the actions both of individual soldiers and of entire divisions.

The space-based systems gave a good account of themselves in repulsing attempts made by the Iraqi side to organize mass use of tactical missiles. Within the antimissile system used by the multinational forces, the space-based early warning system developed by the Americans was actively used early on. In that war, for the first time extensive and diversified use was made of radioelectronic suppression and radioelectronic countermeasures. For the

first time the military command also made use of computer games to predict the consequences of various scenarios for the organization of battle. And finally, for the first time in the history of war one of the opposing sides made massive and intensive use of highly accurate weapons systems to destroy the enemy. In terms of its duration (38 days) the "fire phase" of the operation was many times (nine times) longer than the actions by ground forces.

As a result, Iraq's quite impressive superiority in absolute indexes over the multinational forces (45 divisions against 16, 8,300 artillery pieces against 4,085, and almost double superiority in tanks) had no effect on the final outcome of the combat actions. The Iraqi command lost in the main thing, namely, combat initiative and the combat possibilities of the troops. The conclusion drawn from this is unambiguous: The age of the "Maginot Line" is definitely a thing of the past. With today's means of waging armed struggle, the basis of military action in a conventional war (and the experience of the Persian Gulf confirmed this), is to engage in massive bombardment using highly accurate weapons, space-based acquisition and guidance, and radioelectronic suppression of the enemy in depth through his defense.

It is therefore obvious that the Armed Forces of Ukraine should include that class of means of destruction and comprehensive support for combat actions that could in the event of aggression destroy with adequate reliability (or threaten to destroy) any hardened, important enemy targets. Obviously, during the first stage this class of combat and support assets should be represented by missiles with no limitations as to range, strategic bombers armed with long-range cruise missiles, and, of course, sea-based strategic systems. In the longer term, intercontinental data acquisition, surveillance, and strike systems could be developed on this basis.

Ukraine cannot have the reputation of being a weak country. In order to avoid aggressive attacks from outside it is essential to possess the potential to respond to any threat. No one should doubt the ability of Ukraine to respond to any aggressor.

[20 Nov 92 p 7]

[Text]

II. Are the interests of Ukraine taken into account in the START-1 treaty?

In order for Ukraine to be a power to be reckoned with and dealt with as an equal in the world community, it must have nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. And this is not ambition on the part of our country's military-industrial circles. It is the interests of preserving state independence and the stability of the state into the foreseeable future that require this decision.

Within Ukraine there is now first-class missile equipment and a strategic air force, and Ukraine has at its disposal personnel who are capable of maintaining these weapons at a high professional level, and there are plants producing missile equipment using the most advanced technologies. It would be at a very minimum an extremely frivolous and premature decision to deprive ourselves of these for the sake of some political gain of the moment.

Hasty ratification by Ukraine of the START-1 treaty on the latest cutbacks in nuclear forces would place before it the need to destroy its own nuclear missile forces unilaterally.

Any declaration on Ukraine's nonnuclear status requires in-depth analysis and a well-considered approach. The Declaration on State Sovereignty, in which it is stated that Ukraine will be nonnuclear and not in any bloc, was issued at a time when Ukraine enjoyed the rights of a Union republic of the USSR. Its integrity and inviolability were guaranteed by the political, economic, and military might of the Union. Now, however, the danger exists that Ukraine will be left without up-to-date means of armed defense. And the cause of defense capability is not helped with mere words.

Events recent months in the world indicate that relying on force, and moreover on nuclear force, remains unchanged in the policies of most states. This can be seen by the nuclear force redesign and modernization programs adopted by Great Britain and France, which have an adequate nuclear potential at their disposal. Funding is also being continued for military programs and scientific research and test-and-design work done in the interests of the Defense Department of the leading nuclear power—the United States. The following question arises: "Against whom and with whom are France and England preparing to fight with nuclear weapons? Why do those state have the right to possess nuclear forces and not have to face, as Ukraine does, the question of their destruction? Is not Ukraine also a European state and a member of the United Nations since 1945?"

In Ukraine itself they are still only talking about what Ukraine should nevertheless be—a powerful nuclear state or a nuclear-free territory? Working to earn political dividends, the opponents of nuclear weapons usually cite as an example the position of a traditionally neutral country—Switzerland. But Switzerland is known not only and not even so much for its neutrality as it is for its bank vaults, in which the deposits of the richest and most influential people from dozens of countries are stored. And it is those people who largely determine the economy and policies of their own states, including military policy. Each of them applies every resource to ensure the security of their own savings. But whose savings are deposited in the banks of Ukraine? Who has changed his dollars and pounds and marks into coupons and provided Ukraine with a similar guarantee of neutrality?

The answer to this question leads unambiguously to the conclusion that in order for Ukraine to be a power to be reckoned with and dealt with as an equal in the world community it must have nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. And this is not ambition by our country's military-industrial circles. It is the interests of preserving state independence and the stability of the state into the foreseeable future that require this decision. And, moreover, not just military and political stability, but also economic stability.

At first blush nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them seem to be very costly and false for the budget of a young state. But a simple calculation of the cost of manufacturing and operating missile systems shows that the

political and economic advantages gained from nuclear missile weapons are obvious.

The cost of maintaining the strategic missile forces of the Soviet Union was some six-eight percent of the total cost of maintaining its Armed Forces. And annual costs to operate and provide combat training for general purpose forces are several times higher than similar costs to maintain strategic missile forces. If we are guided by emotion, then of course it is possible to cut up the missile systems and eliminate the nuclear weapons and receive an award for "obedience" in the form of the latest box of humanitarian aid. But, relying on powerful, modern weapons, it is possible and necessary to sit down at the negotiating table as an equal participant and obtain not humanitarian aid but major credits, buy new technology and know-how, and create our own economic base and maintain it, while not being apprehensive about threats of attack or political diktat. And that threat will always exist until a unified system of collective security has been created.

M. Gorbachev betrayed the national security of the peoples inhabiting the Soviet Union because after the liquidation of the Warsaw Pact, the voluntary unilateral withdrawal from East Europe of troops of the country that won the war, and the formation of the independent states that had formerly been part of the USSR, he did not raise in Europe the question of disbanding the NATO bloc and creating a system of collective security that would include countries both from East and West Europe. And obviously, if the United States had so desired, it could also have become a member of such an alliance.

The "good intentions" of the former leader of the USSR led to the breakdown of the Eastern bloc, but the Western bloc continues to improve itself and build up its combat might. Against whom?...

The disintegration of the USSR and the formation of the sovereign independent states led to the creation of their own armed forces on the territories of the former republics of the Soviet Union. As of today, nuclear missile forces make up part of the armed forces of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. While abandoning the ideological and political confrontation between East and West, it is very important that this be accompanied by similar changes with respect to military affairs. The conclusion of a military agreement to create a unified European system of collective security to protect the states, with the participation of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia, would make it possible hold talks to reduce the nuclear forces of all the states. Hasty ratification by Ukraine of the START-1 treaty on the latest cutbacks in nuclear forces would place before it the need to destroy its own nuclear missile forces unilaterally.

At this time, on the question of nuclear weapons we hear from the United States comparisons of Ukraine with Germany. The fallacious nature of this comparison is obvious. Germany did not develop its own nuclear potential, it merely offered its territory for American missiles. Ukraine is a different matter. Powerful ballistic rockets are manufactured in Ukrainian factories. The best Ukrainian scientific and technical personnel were involved in the development of nuclear warheads. And finally, launch silos are located on Ukrainian soil. And in accordance with the

treaty creating the CIS, everything that is on the territory of each state belongs to that state. If missiles stand in Ukraine's silos, they are its legal property. Consequently Ukraine has full legal right itself to dispose of the nuclear weapons and means to deliver them located on its own territory. A country that has proclaimed itself the successor to all the obligations of the USSR has the right to consider itself the successor in other matters also.

The complicated situation in neighboring states also insistently demands a strengthening of our country's defense capability and improved combat readiness for its armed forces. And there is yet one more argument in favor of retaining nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine. The presence of those weapons forces other states to think much more carefully about the consequences of military conflicts and not to permit adventurist actions against nuclear power. Lack of this restraining factor might lead to a situation in which the fate of Ukraine would again be decided by someone else, and it is not known whether that would be better than the previous elder brother.

The intention stated earlier of being a nonnuclear state in the future does not contradict keeping nuclear forces on the territory of Ukraine at this time. About 15 countries are now on the brink of developing their own nuclear weapons. They are spending a large part of their own state budgets for the right to possess them. At this time Ukraine needs to take nothing from anyone, nor to produce or acquire nuclear weapons. There is no need for this because it already has them, and already today we are a full-fledged nuclear power. But if we now relinquish our own nuclear potential, we will lose it forever, irreversibly. The United States will never permit us to develop our own nuclear weapons again from scratch; its military doctrine states that in the interests of its own security the United States will not permit the emergence of new nuclear states. And indeed that work would be much more costly than the cost of maintaining nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them.

Within Ukraine there is now first-class missile equipment and a strategic air force, and Ukraine has at its disposal personnel who are capable of maintaining these weapons at a high professional level, and there are plants producing missile equipment using the most advanced technologies. It would be at a minimum a very frivolous and premature decision to deprive ourselves of these for the sake of some political gain of the moment. I would not like future generations to reproach us for condemning them to live in a second-class country.

At all times the interests of national security have been of paramount importance in the activity of political leaders and governments. In order to guarantee their sovereignty and independence states have sacrificed personal aspirations, interests, and sympathies. The memory of political figures who are able to "give full throat to their own song" and move beyond personal ambition and sacrifice their own glory for the interests of the state always remains with the people. But history also has others, covered in eternal shame—the names of political figures for whom the fleeting glory and laurels of leaders were more dear than the fate and future of their own people.

Today the time has come to consider what the Ukrainian people will remember—the wisdom and farsightedness of politicians who ensured Ukraine's security and favorable prospects for economic development, or the pride of politicians that led to a decline in the country's prestige and destruction of their motherland's national security.

[21 Nov 92 p 7]

[Text]

III. Nuclear missile weapons: past, present, and future

A policy for our state in the sphere of national security is impossible without in-depth and objective analysis of the real military-political situation in the world and of the policies of the leading states, first and foremost those possessing nuclear weapons.

Disregarding the agreements reached between the United States and Russia in reducing strategic arms, the Pentagon has planned and is consistently implementing modernization of all kinds of strategic arms.

Military experts in Russia believe that the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the armed forces of the former USSR have reinforced the West's military superiority in general purpose resources. Under these conditions, strategic forces and their basis—the missile troops—remain as the last military-political force that is in a state of constant combat readiness, ensuring strategic balance in the world...

The present session of the Ukrainian Supreme Council is to consider a number of problems connected with military policy and the development of our own armed forces. It is obvious that there are no simple and unambiguous solutions in these matters, nor can there be.

At this time many different opinions are being expressed on one very complicated issue: Should the Armed Forces of Ukraine have nuclear weapons or should they not? Every opponent has many arguments, and these must be considered. But one thing is beyond dispute: A policy for our state in the sphere of national security is impossible without in-depth and objective analysis of the real military-political situation in the world and the policies of the leading states, first and foremost those possessing nuclear weapons.

For this reason it is important to analyze the views of leading politicians in the world since World War II on the role of the nuclear missile potential in ensuring national security. These were not only discussions but also practical actions by governments led by those politicians.

Let us start with France, since the size of its population is comparable to Ukraine's. At the height of the cold war the president of France, General de Gaulle, repeatedly expressed the thought that "...France's national security cannot be stable without our own nuclear weapons." These ideas did not remain just the thoughts of the president but were embodied in actual state policy to develop France's nuclear potential. And today Paris has its own land, air, and sea strike forces, capable of destroying targets at a range of up to 5,000 kilometers. Suffice it to say that the sea-based missiles alone are capable of destroying 50 million people in 30 minutes.

But perhaps as the result of the radical changes in the balance of power in Europe France has changed its attitude toward the nuclear potential? Nothing of the kind. In February this year President of France F. Mitterrand stated this: "We approve of B. Yeltsin's proposal on nuclear disarmament. We ourselves shall move in the same direction, but only after the nuclear potential of the United States and Russia have been made comparable to the French potential."

In recent years a program has been drawn up in France to improve nuclear missile weapons. In particular it has been decided to develop more powerful S-4 and S-X mobile missiles. It is planned to replace the Mirage-4 strategic bomber with 200 of the new Mirage-2000's. Single-warhead M-20 missiles aboard submarines are to be replaced with multiple-warhead M-4 missiles. This change will lead to a situation in which 16 M-4 missiles on one submarine will be the equivalent of all of France's nuclear forces at this time.

The position of political leaders in Great Britain in this problem is certainly of interest to us. Former British prime minister M. Thatcher has become the author of a theory according to which nuclear weapons are an important factor in preventing war in Europe and the world. "Nuclear weapons," M. Thatcher emphasized in a speech at the congress of British Conservatives, "will in the future also play a vitally necessary role in the cause of preventing war in Europe." And later, in 1989, she gave it to be understood that Great Britain "... cannot delay in modernizing nuclear weapons." And again: "...Countries with reliable defense avoid wars." This kind of approach was seen in the military policy of the government led by M. Thatcher.

As far as Great Britain's position on the question of reducing its own nuclear potential is concerned, Secretary of State for Defense T. King has said that the British Government undoubtedly welcomes the steps announced in Washington and Moscow, but he emphasized that at this time Great Britain does not intend to join the process of nuclear disarmament because, in his words, it possesses the absolute minimum deterrent forces. On the contrary, since it has nuclear-capable aircraft, Great Britain plans, first, to develop a nuclear cruise missile and put it into service with its air force in the years immediately ahead, and second, to add to the 150 American FB-111 fighter-bombers based on its territory another 60 of this type of nuclear-weapon delivery platform. As a result of these measures, by 1995 the number of American nuclear warheads in Great Britain will have grown from its present 775 to 1,193. Thus, Great Britain has no intention either of reducing or, even less, eliminating its nuclear weapons.

The position of France and Great Britain in the field of nuclear missile weapons has been determined largely by U.S. policy, and it still is. A quite graphic idea of the way that the American military itself understands this is offered by a statement made by General C. Powell (chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff): "U.S. national strategy continues to be based on four elements—global deterrence, forward basing of troops, a readiness to respond to crisis situations, and reorganization of the armed forces. I would like everyone to be mortally afraid of us." And here is the "Defense Directive for Fiscal Years 1994-1998": "Our

primary task is to prevent the emergence on the territory of the former Soviet Union or anywhere else a new rival representing a threat to the United States."

The U.S. arguments in favor of carrying out the task of "having everyone mortally afraid of us" are more than convincing. The basis of the United States' strategic offensive forces is that same "triad" that includes land-based missile forces, a nuclear submarine fleet, and the strategic air force.

The combat composition of the land-based missile forces includes 1,000 launchers "armed" with several modifications of the basic Minuteman and the latest MX ("Peacekeeper") missiles. The Minuteman-2 (450 of them) was put into service in 1965 and is equipped with a single 1.5-megaton warhead. The Minuteman-3 and Minuteman-ZUS (200 and 300 of them respectively) are equipped with multiple reentry vehicles having three warheads (the yield of a warhead is 0.33 megatons and 0.5 megatons respectively). Of special interest is the MX missile, put into service in 1986 and today still one of the world's most powerful missiles (maximum range 11,000 kilometers, accuracy (circular error probable) 100 meters, with multiple warheads—10, each having a yield of up to 0.6 megatons). Suffice it to say that just one of the 10 warheads on an MX missile is 30 times more powerful than the weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. MX missiles are designed deliver a preemptive or disabling nuclear strike. Today there are 50 of them in the U.S. land-based missile forces. However, whereas all 450 Minuteman-2 missiles could deliver 450 warheads in a single salvo, the 50 MX missiles could deliver 500 nuclear weapons to targets simultaneously.

The U.S. nuclear fleet numbers more than 30 submarines of two main classes—the Ohio class and the Lafayette class—and each submarine can carry 24 and 16 ballistic missile launchers respectively. Three types of missiles are in service with the nuclear submarine fleet. The oldest is the Poseidon-C3 (maximum range 4,600 kilometers, accuracy (circular error probable) 450 meters, multiple reentry vehicle with 10 warheads each with a yield of 0.05 megatons). From 1979 the Trident-1 missile was put into service; this has eight individually targeted warheads. But the yield of each one is three times greater (0.15 megatons), and accuracy is about 1.5 times better than the old generation missiles (about 300 meters). Range is about 8,000 kilometers. And finally, the latest and best missile in the Trident family, which went into service in 1989—the Trident-2. There are now 96 of them in the force composition (there are 384 Trident-1's), but in terms of combat capability each of them is comparable to an MX missile (range 9,000 kilometers, accuracy less than 100 meters target error, multiple reentry vehicle with eight warheads each yielding 0.5 megatons).

The third component of the strategic "triad" is the strategic air force—the patriarch of the U.S. nuclear potential, which has experience in the combat use of nuclear weapons. The number of aircraft in the force composition of the strategic air force changes frequently. Today it is possible to talk of approximately 100 of the latest B-1B bombers and about 150 B-52 strategic bombers with various modifications. Despite the relatively small numbers compared to the other components of the "triad" of

means to deliver nuclear weapons, the strategic air force is capable in a single sortie of carrying up to 5,500 nuclear bombs of various types.

Disregarding the agreement reached between the United States and Russia on reducing strategic arms, the Pentagon has planned and is consistently implementing a modernization of all kinds of strategic arms. The buildup of work on an antimissile defense within the framework of the Strategic Defense Initiative is cause for particular alarm because under the conditions of nuclear weapons cutbacks this will lead to an upset in the balance in favor of the United States and its allies. What do we have in mind here? There has recently been talk about developing a global antimissile defense system to protect against limited strikes and terrorists. Today in the United States preparations are under way to develop during 1994–1996 within the framework of the 1972 ABM Treaty 100 antiballistic missiles at the ICBM base at Grand Forks, and this is essentially the initial stage in developing a multilayered antiballistic-missile defense for the United States. Thus, even before the end of the period for the cutbacks in CIS strategic nuclear arms and the strategic offensive forces of the United States to the levels determined by the treaty, a start will have been made on destroying nuclear parity.

As a result of the disintegration of the USSR, new states have recently appeared on the political map of the world, and particular ones of these states have still to shape their policies in the field of the nuclear missile potential. Russia's position is particularly important for us. Leading politicians in Russia are suggesting that the role of the Strategic Rocket Forces as the main component of strategic nuclear forces should be retained. Military experts in Russia believe that the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Armed Forces of the former USSR have reinforced the superiority of the West in general purpose resources. Under these conditions strategic forces and their basis—the missile troops—remain as the last military-political force that is in a state of constant combat readiness, ensuring strategic balance in the world and Russia's security, and preventing it from being moved into the ranks of second-rate powers.

The present leaders of the nuclear states believe that their strategic nuclear forces should ensure deterrence against aggression, and also against political and economic blackmail from outside. The question involuntarily arises: So does this problem not also exist for Ukraine?

EDITORIAL COMMENT. The arguments of General V. Tolubko in favor of a nuclear future for Ukraine cannot be called unconvincing. On the other hand, however, are the United States, France, and Great Britain really trying to conquer nonnuclear Japan, Finland, and Hungary?

We invite military people, politicians, and scholars to a debate on the subject "Should Ukraine Have Nuclear Weapons?"

BELARUS

Interview With Head of Servicemen's Association
AU2511133092 Minsk SEM DNEY in Russian No 44, 26 Oct-1 Nov 92 p 10

[Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Statkevich, leader of the Belarusian Association of Servicemen (BZV),

by SEM DNEY correspondent Igor Gukovskiy: "Nikolay Statkevich: This Army Is Not Ready for Defense Around the Radius of Our Borders"—first two paragraphs are SEM DNEY introduction]

[Text] The Belarusian Association of Servicemen has been making its existence known more actively recently. The BZV goal is said to be to drive out all officers of other nationalities from the territory of Belarus. Is that true? I would like to know more about the programmatic goals of the servicemen. (A. Klimchuk, reserve officer, Minsk).

Our information: N.V. Statkevich, 36 years. Born in a village, in the Lyadno Slutsk Rayon, the son of school-teachers. Graduated from Minsk Anti-Aircraft Missile Engineering Higher School (MVIZRU) in 1978, served in the Arctic four years, later took a military postgraduate course at the same establishment. Was granted a Master's Degree and taught. Has been working on a doctoral thesis for the last two years.

[Gukovskiy] Nikolay Viktorovich, how did the association spring up?

[Statkevich] Three years ago, on the basis of autonomously self-formed groups and the Association of the Belarusian Language (TBM). At first the military in the TBM were engaged in language and history studies. But little by little, they began to raise the issue of military reform, whose time is ripe.

Let us recall 1918. At that time, the Belarusian People's Republic could not keep the situation under control and was involved in a civil war. We have analyzed the reasons and come to this conclusion: this happened because of the disintegration of the remainder of the Russian Army on our territory and the influence of external forces acting under different slogans. When it became apparent that a similar situation could recur, a group of officers got down to devising a concept for the formation of the Belarusian Armed Forces.

[Gukovskiy] What sort of concept is it?

[Statkevich] Unlike the Baltic one, it consists of two stages: first—taking over control of the Soviet Army units on the territory of Belarus, and second—mastering them and changing their allegiance. We set up a section of servicemen under the cover of the BSDG [Belarusian Social-Democratic Hromada (society)]. Later similar sections sprang up at other parties and movements—ODPB [United Democratic Party of Belarusia], BNF [Belarusian National Front]... In order not to disperse our efforts, we decided to leave the Party in the fall of 1991 and hold a constituent conference of a nonparty patriotic movement.

The August developments hastened our actions, however. Taking advantage of the gathering of all democratic movements in one place in those days, I proposed that we immediately get organized. On the morning of 20 August, we gathered together and adopted a number of resolutions, the appeal to servicemen to disobey the orders of State Emergency Committee, and the statement on the aims of the establishment of the BZV, in particular. I heard all this on the Belarusian radio in the afternoon.

[Gukovskiy] Weren't you scared? It was not clear how things would turn out.

[Statkevich] I very well imagined my fate in the event that the coup was successful. An officer's appeal to servicemen to disobey the State Emergency Committee orders would have been taken as treason, with all its consequences.

[Gukovskiy] Isn't ignoring a commander's orders treason?

[Statkevich] We considered these orders illegal, as the president was under arrest.

In the morning of 21 August, the military procurator became interested in me. But in the afternoon, the same interrogators were calling and congratulating me on "the fall of the junta".

[Gukovskiy] Is it true that you intended to drive out all non-Belarusian officers from Belarus because of their unreliability?

[Statkevich] Such measures are contained neither in the BZV documents, nor the statements of its leaders. But we declare: the Army is unreliable, because it cannot carry out the government's order to repulse a threat around the whole radius of our borders.

[Gukovskiy] What sort of threat is this?

[Statkevich] A direct attack on Belarus is scarcely probable today. But there is a wide range of other means of pressure.

The views of the Russian opposition have put us on our guard. For instance, representatives of LITERATUR-NAYA ROSSIYA, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, and NASH SOVREMENNİK spoke at MVIZRU some time ago, and did not hide the fact that in the event of the opposition's victory, Belarusian sovereignty would be done away with. This is unacceptable to us. We link the only chance to preserve and revive the Belarusian people and culture with independence. If the opposition comes to power in Russia, the slogans of a unified state will please some of our officers. Bearing this in mind, we speak of the unreliability of the Belarusian Army.

[Gukovskiy] How are you going to solve this problem?

[Statkevich] Along two lines. First—psychological educational measures, the oath of allegiance, to begin with. We have to give an officer the chance and time to think it over, without cornering him.

[Gukovskiy] I suppose there is a contradiction in what you are saying: by acknowledging that an officer must have some time to think things over, the BZV at the same time ignores the fixed date of the oath and proposes taking it several months earlier.

[Statkevich] When a decision was made to ask only soldiers to take the oath, I said: let us not push the officers. Then a month, two months, and half a year elapsed... How long can one think? People's attitudes toward an Army that hasn't taken its oath must be considered. Rumors started spreading: the time of the oath was fixed by the Defense Ministry for December, hoping that something would happen in Russia by then. In the event of external aggression the Army would not know which state to defend. An oath has two sides—psychological and legal.

[Gukovskiy] Probably not everybody will want to take that oath.

[Statkevich] Certainly, somebody will decide not to become a citizen of Belarus and will leave. In this case, an exchange of servicemen under mutually beneficial conditions is most acceptable. Let us suppose that a Russian officer wishing to leave would be transferred from Belarus to an appropriate service with similar social conditions in Russia, while a Belarusian officer—to his native country. To this end, such a data bank must be created and appropriate agreements signed with other states.

[Gukovskiy] What is the second—nonpsychological—group of measures?

[Statkevich] Cadre shuffling. We do not suggest firing all non-natives in top positions, but there must be reliable people there.

[Gukovskiy] How are you going to tell who is reliable and who is not?

[Statkevich] First, even the statutes say: every commander must know the views and convictions of his subordinates. Second, all those who abuse their position for anti-state propaganda have to leave. For instance, one of the commanders of the Antiaircraft Defense Troops calls for a military dictatorship at a meeting with officers, and another general major gathers company commanders for training and declares that a handful of mercenary politicians has destroyed a great state, but just wait—the people will soon rise and wipe them out. Naturally, such officers have to serve somewhere else.

[Gukovskiy] Suppose an officer becomes a Belarusian citizen and does not want to serve in the revived Belarusian Armed Forces and take an oath, even in the reserves. In this case he either lives in poverty or the Army, taking into account that all his merits and his total service record gives him the right to lead a normal life.

[Statkevich] We have not looked into this problem.

[Gukovskiy] You are saying the Army is unreliable and not ready for battle... Your opponents, however, claim that in order to draw such a conclusion, even on a scale of a single unit, a special commission would have to assess the elements required for battle readiness over a period of several days.

[Statkevich] I will take the liberty of quoting the words of General Major Isaychenkov without his permission: "This Army, this machine, that is frightful only on the outside, will not drive up to the border.

The Army is engaged in anything but battle readiness today. No commission is necessary to see that the Army is in a deep crisis.

Lt-Gen Sedov: Problems of Establishing Belarusian Air Force

93UM0186A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Nov 92 p 2

[Interview with Lt-Gen Avn Sergey Vasilyevich Sedov, commander of the Belarusian Air Force, by Col Valeriy Kovalev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent; place and date not given: "What Kind of an Air Force Will Belarus Have?"]

[Text] The process of creating the Armed Forces of Belarus has been going on for several months now. They will also include military aviation. Lieutenant-General of Aviation Sergey Sedov, commander of the republic's Air Force, answers our correspondent's questions.

[Kovalev] Sergey Vasilyevich, how are things going for our young Belarusian Air Force today, and how do you see it in the future?

[Sedov] We are living with the same problems and concerns as the entire Belarusian Army that is coming into being. There is much difficult work in reforming and reducing it. In the near future we will have to disband three air regiments and restructure the organization and establishment. We are eliminating aviation formations and will have only separate units.

Military aviation is costly and quite burdensome for the budget of a small republic. We have to take this into account. Still, we will strive to make the Air Force a sufficiently strong, combat-ready organism capable of carrying out the missions assigned it. The Air Force will include units of fighter, ground-attack, bomber, army, and military-transport aviation. We will not have strategic aviation.

For now it is difficult to talk in more definite terms about the appearance and composition of the future Air Force—the republic's military doctrine has not yet been approved. The composition and numerical strength of the Belarusian Armed Forces have not been determined once and for all. However, it is already clear today that we will have to proceed not so much from wishes as from realistic capabilities.

[Kovalev] What concerns you most today as commander of the Belarusian Air Force?

[Sedov] Even when there was a single Air Force, military aviation had its share of problems, particularly in recent years. Now, after its division, the situation has grown worse. Here in our country, in Belarus, not having had time yet to form organizationally, our Air Force, figuratively speaking, have been tied to the ground. And bad weather or fog has not been to blame. The shortage of material resources—fuel and spare parts—has a stronger hold on aircraft than any kind of weather. Due to this, we are flying considerably less than we should. In order to be in good form, a pilot must spend at least 70-80 hours a year in the skies. Our pilots today are getting only 40-45 hours. There are many problems with aviation equipment. True, after the July negotiations between Belarus and Russia, the ice seems to have begun to break.

The outflow of military pilots from the republic's Air Force, becoming increasingly massive in nature, also causes me concern. There is an accepted norm in aviation—to have one and a half crews for each aircraft. It was not too long ago that we had more than two. There was an excess. But recently the number of experienced pilots leaving Belarus has increased sharply. Some have already left; others are putting in their transfer applications. If this process is not stopped, soon we will not be able to scrape together one crew per aircraft and in a very short time will lose our entire "golden reserve"—flying personnel. After

all, as I already said, the best-trained pilots are leaving. And you cannot take a single step in aviation without experience.

There is also another aspect to this problem. Belarus, as we know, does not have its own flight schools. That means we have to train our pilots in other countries. Meanwhile, today it already costs 4-5 million rubles to train one lieutenant for the Air Force. And how much more do we have to spend for a young pilot to become a good pilot in 4-5 years after flight school, that is, it takes both time and considerable money to train a good aerial warrior.

[Kovalev] But, you will agree, you cannot keep people forcibly. And this would be contrary to the understandings achieved between the CIS countries. If a pilot, say, is a native of Ukraine or Russia, he has the right to leave to serve for his homeland...

[Sedov] Yes, he does. But that is just the point. It is not so much national reasons as it is social reasons that lie at the basis of the outflow of aviators from the Belarusian Air Force. Unfortunately, a firm legal basis has not yet been placed under the organizational development of the republic's armed forces. Servicemen, in essence, are in the dark regarding their future duties, rights, and social guarantees. There are all sorts of rumors going around the units—they say the army will be reduced by nearly two-thirds, officers will be discharged in bunches, and so forth. Naturally, this troubles people and often prompts them to move from Belarus. Why, say, do some military pilots want to be transferred to Ukraine? They are attracted primarily by the greater legal certainty of their status there and the more distinct prospects of service and life.

Consequently, in order to keep experienced flight personnel, we need, above all, to eliminate the causes provoking them to migrate, so to speak, from our armed forces. As soon as this is done, the number of those wishing to leave, I am convinced, will decrease immediately.

[Kovalev] Is there hope for this?

[Sedov] If there weren't, I myself would put in my retirement papers. Yes, the situation in which the republic's Air Force has now found itself is difficult, but not hopeless. Above all, I hope that "military laws" will be passed at the recently begun session of the Supreme Soviet. They will fill that very legal vacuum which, as I already noted, to a considerable extent is provoking the outflow of flying personnel.

Another painful issue will also be resolved in late December—with the oath of allegiance to Belarus. Everyone who is now hesitating and thinking about where and for whom to serve in the future will have to make a final choice. After this, it will be fully clear on whom we will be able to count in creating the republic's Air Force.

[Kovalev] What if the number of those who refuse to take the oath turns out to be too large?

[Sedov] Of course, I cannot sign for everyone, but I do not think that this number will turn out to be all that significant. There is no need for people to leave Belarus with its stable, calm atmosphere and kind, industrious people. If the causes mentioned above are eliminated, the aviators

will not begin to pack their suitcases. But if some still decide to leave, we will not put obstacles in their way and will wish them well.

In short, I hope that we will be able to keep personnel. As they say, the rest will come. We have a sufficient amount, even too much, of the most modern aviation equipment, and some will have to be reduced in accordance with the treaty on conventional arms. Already now through the Commercial Directorate of the Ministry of Defense we are selling for conversion excess aviation technical equipment, spare parts for obsolete types of aircraft, tires, and much else. We are earning money by transporting commercial cargo on Il-76 aircraft. Understandably, we cannot support ourselves in this manner, but we are taking away part of the load from the Ministry of Defense budget.

So, the problems we have talked about are not impossible. They can be solved. It is important only that not just the Air Force command authorities and the Ministry of Defense, but the entire republic be concerned about them. Then, I am confident, our Belarus will have a reliable Air Force. You see, even now at this critical period, with the many difficulties and disorder, our people are fulfilling their duty honestly and selflessly. If we show concern for them and give them what they need, they will roll up mountains.

Belarus Prepares Draft Military Doctrine

93UM0182A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Nov 92 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel Valeriy Kovalev from Minsk: "Concept of Deterrence and Aggressive Defense: Draft Belarusian Military Doctrine Prepared With Consideration of Transition Period"]

[Text] On 3 November the Belarusian Supreme Soviet adopted a draft republic military (defensive) doctrine in the first reading. Although the session was closed, information that the document did not generate special differences of opinion nevertheless appeared in the press, so the draft hardly will undergo substantial changes during finalization. It was not by chance that a proposal was made at this parliamentary session to consider it in the second reading.

Therefore even now one can speak of basic directions of military policy and Belarusian Army organizational development, since almost all drafts from the "military package"—on defense, on Republic of Belarus Armed Forces, on universal military obligation and military service, on the status of servicemen—have become law in the republic. And the draft military doctrine confirms the thesis that the republic "does not view a single state as a potential enemy, regards no people as its enemy, adheres to the principle of inviolability of borders, and builds relations with all on the basis of sovereign equality and mutual interests..."

Judging from the draft, the basic direction of military policy for the next few years is a transition to the status of a neutral, nuclear-free state. The doctrine envisages the republic following an independent course in the defense area and rejecting entry into military blocs and alliances, but it was specifically this that generated the main arguments during discussion of the draft. As it became known, during the parliamentary debates some deputies expressed

doubt as to whether or not the republic would be able to defend itself against outside aggression alone should it be required. Should it not join the collective security system being created within the framework of the CIS? Of course, objections immediately followed: the Republic of Belarus Declaration of Independence unequivocally states that Belarus will strive for a neutral status and consequently should not enter any military blocs or alliances.

Commenting on the parliamentary discussion on this subject, Mechislav Grib, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Commission on National Security, Defense and the Fight Against Crime, noted that "the problem unquestionably exists, but does not have to be resolved today." This is further confirmation that the question of involvement in the CIS collective security system has not been removed from the agenda once and for all and evidently still will be raised within the walls of the Belarusian Parliament.

Naturally problems of defense of sovereignty hold the main place in the draft. Priority in preventing war is given to political, economic and diplomatic means, not military means. Meanwhile, the draft notes, Belarus also must be ready to stand up for itself by force of arms in case all other nonmilitary measures turn out to be insufficiently effective, so most likely it intends to adhere to the principle of armed neutrality in this stage of historical development.

But it is indicative that a "deterrence" concept based on the presence of CIS strategic nuclear forces on republic territory and on the right of Belarus participation in decisionmaking on their use now figures in the draft. The question naturally arises here: How does this concept interface with the desire of Belarus for neutrality? In chatting with journalists, this same Mechislav Grib noted that the "deterrence" concept either will be adjusted or removed entirely with the withdrawal of Russian nuclear missiles, but nuclear weapons are on our soil for now and there can be no talk of total neutrality. Therefore, said the parliamentary commission chairman, one can agree with those deputies who suggested calling the draft under discussion a "transition period doctrine" and giving the Supreme Soviet the right to make necessary corrections to it.

Minister of Defense Colonel General Pavel Kozlovskiy also holds a similar viewpoint. Speaking to journalists, he also stressed that the draft doctrine was drawn up with consideration of the transition period in which Belarus finds itself. Consequently, confirmed the minister, its provisions can be changed and supplemented by the Supreme Soviet "based on the military-political situation" actually taking shape in the world, in Europe and in the CIS.

From all appearances the concept of an "aggressive defense," also contained in the document, has a long life prepared for it. It is proposed to build the Republic of Belarus Armed Forces, train them to repel possible aggression, outfit them with arms and equipment, and develop forms and methods of military operations based on this concept.

And so just what kind of army is to realize the concept of an "aggressive defense" if necessary? The draft doctrine in particular provides that the Armed Forces will consist of three branches—Ground Forces, Air Defense, and Air

Force plus combat arms units. Their makeup, numerical strength and technical outfitting must be determined "with consideration of reasonable defense sufficiency."

It is proposed that the republic army will not exceed one percent of the population of Belarus in peacetime. In the opinion of Minister of Defense Colonel General Kozlovskiy, which he expressed in the press, in two years its numerical strength will be around 75,000 persons. This, noted the general, is the minimum permissible number. But it seems there may be adjustments here, since Parliament determined that defense expenditures should not exceed 10 percent of the overall state budget. The military department will have to "fit" within this framework.

We know for example, though, that in discussing the military doctrine Deputy Zenon Poznyak, leader of the Belarusian People's Front, came out in favor of the numerical strength of Belarusian troops being no less than 100,000-110,000 persons, so arguments still are possible here.

And one other important point. Developers of the doctrine believe that inasmuch as Belarus does not consider a single state as a potential enemy, troops should be evenly distributed on republic territory. Why? So that the army can repel any attack if necessary, no matter from what direction it comes. Mobile units and permanent readiness units will be first to enter battle. They are called upon to support the deployment and commitment to combat operations of a militarily trained reserve of several hundred thousand persons. They will receive necessary arms and equipment from specially established bases and depots.

This is the military aspect, so to speak, but it is presumed that when Belarus acquires the actual status of a neutral state, aggression will be stopped above all by political means within the framework of the European collective security system. Therefore the draft doctrine confirms all the republic's international obligations for the former USSR's Armed Forces and arms and for other agreements.

As we see, the document really is designed for the transition period and changes may be made to it in the future, but legal formalization of the Republic of Belarus Armed Forces will be completed with Supreme Soviet adoption of the doctrine. Essentially this is what will become the first real embodiment of the first military doctrine of Belarus.

BALTIC STATES

Baltics Seek To Consolidate Defense, Security

93UN0375A Riga THE BALTIC OBSERVER
in English 22-28 Oct 92 p 11

[Article by Atis Lejins, head of Latvian Institute of International Affairs: "Towards A Common Security Structure"]

[Text] The Baltic states, having regained their independence, are now seeking to rebuild and consolidate their defense and security structures. However, progress is occurring painfully slowly in this field, and outside assistance is slow in coming. In fact, the Baltic countries have been recognized as equal members of the international community in all aspects, except one, i.e., the ability to

defend themselves. And as the world is structured now, military preparedness is essential for any nation's security.

An example of each country's need for an adequate defense structure can be found in Europe itself. There is a real war going on in former Yugoslavia. But if Bosnia had been better armed, Serbia would have thought twice before attacking that country.

Take another example. Even though the Cold War has ended, no Western country has reduced its armed forces to a large extent. Finland is even increasing its military potential. In this light, the efforts made by the Baltic states to augment their own inadequate defense structures are nothing out of the ordinary.

How will the Baltic states fit into the new security structures of Europe? NATO is not planning to admit any new members in the near future, but its limited assistance to the Baltic countries (mainly in the field of advice) has been extremely valuable for the Baltic states and, in my opinion, beneficial for both sides. (It will be interesting to see whether NATO sends observers to Lithuania, as President Landsbergis has asked, in order to monitor the withdrawal of Russian army troops.)

NATO is an excellent example of successful military cooperation. NATO's experience, which has united countries that were once at war with each other, could be a useful example for the Baltic states to follow in establishing closer military relations.

On June 2 of this year in Parnu, Estonia, the Defense Ministers of the Baltic states signed a treaty on military cooperation. It includes joint military maneuvers and united control of Baltic air space, sea and land borders. These grand intentions will be difficult to carry out in practice, however, if the West does not help, both with experience and equipment. Before a state can participate in international defense and security agreements as a serious partner, it requires adequate, functional military structures.

A symbolic attempt at coordination was evident at this year's August 23 parade in Riga, where the armies of the three Baltic countries took part in a joint parade, commemorating both the year that had passed since the reestablishment of independence, and the date 53 years ago when Hitler and Stalin delegated the Baltics to the Soviet sphere of interest. This was the first time in the history of the Baltic states that an all-Baltic military parade was held, and is only the first manifestation of the close military coordination that will hopefully follow.

Reestablishing national armies in conditions when there have been none for over half of a century is not proving to be easy. For the past fifty years, young men were called up in the Soviet Army and Baltic officers were taught in Soviet military schools which taught Russian military traditions. Western knowledge and training would provide alternative and useful perspectives in military matters.

The West could also help with equipment. Russia is not likely to compensate the Baltics for destroying their military structures in 1940, and the three countries themselves are too poor to purchase all of the equipment they need in several places along Latvia's eastern border, voluntary and poorly equipped Home Guards are manning the border

crossings. They should be merely a stopgap measure until professional border guards can be properly trained and equipped.

The end of the Cold War has led many Western countries to trim down their armies and navies. The Baltics would be more than grateful for some of this now surplus equipment as military aid. Countless Third World governments and guerrilla groups, most of them anti-democratic but also anti-communist (anti-communist was the key word here), have been relying on Western military assistance for their survival. The Baltic states have the advantage of being not only free-market oriented (and thus, anti-communist), but also democratic (another anti-communist feature).

These three countries never were and never will be a military threat to Russia. If they are successful in their political and economic reforms, they could be a positive example to other post-Soviet republics.

The West has to date provided only limited assistance to the Baltic countries, and the Western Europeans have still not decided what role the Baltics will play in the new European security structure. The Baltics, however, cannot wait forever.

Vilnius Seminar on Baltic-Scandinavian Security Region

93UN0471B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 8 Dec 92 p 7

[Article by Yuriy Stroganov, ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA staff correspondent in Lithuania: "Our Neighbor, Baltoscandia"]

[Text] There is no such country on the map yet. Nor is there any such association of states. But the region exists and, judging by many signs, its boundaries could soon be more clearly defined. In any event, that was the idea behind a seminar on security in the Baltic region held in Vilnius.

Attending the seminar were representatives of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Great Britain—defense system experts, diplomats, political scientists, and heads of military agencies. Thus the seminar could in fact be considered an important step toward the creation of an association (union? federation?) of the countries in the region.

The idea of Balto-scandia is also the subject of serious study in scientific circles. Here is the opinion of Alfonsas Eidintas, a well-known Lithuanian scientist and doctor of historical sciences:

"This year the Lithuanian Supreme Council issued a decree rejecting membership in any post-communist unions or zones. In view of the natural balance of power in the world, it is hardly likely that we could join NATO, even if it were to insist that we join. A union of the Baltic countries—after the withdrawal of Russian troops, naturally—could serve as a good foundation for the simplest sort of union, at the very least an environmental and associative one: Baltoscandia."

Leading scientists in Lithuania concur: when choosing its defense partners Lithuania should be more seriously oriented toward its closest neighbors—Latvia and Estonia—

as well as toward the other countries in Balto-scandia. Sudden integration into the NATO structure would not likely be to its advantage.

Russians Handing Over 'Secret' Military Airfield to Lithuania

93UN0471A Moscow TRUD in Russian 9 Dec 92 p 1

[Article by Gediminas Koncius, reporting from Vilnius: "Lithuania: Departing Troops' Surprise": "Secret Airfield Astounds Experts"]

[Text] You must admit that the former Soviet Army was able to keep a secret. No one in Lithuania even suspected that the military airfield at Zokniai, near the city of Siauliai, would prove to be perhaps the biggest surprise left behind by the withdrawing Soviet military. Now that the fighter-bomber regiment is completing its redeployment to Russian territory and foreign experts have been allowed to visit the airfield, they have gotten the chance to see a truly unique installation. Its excellent runways, on a par with the best in Europe, are capable of handling the largest airliners. Experts have appraised the value of those runways at \$2.0 billion.

Adjoining them is an extensive military aircraft repair shop, which could easily be modified to repair and service civilian passenger and transport aircraft. Furthermore, the airfield is located only 100 kilometers from the planned Via Baltika Highway, which will link the Scandinavian and Baltic countries with Southern Europe. Nearby is a major rail center, and it is only about 150 kilometers to the warm-water port of Klaipeda. Incidentally, the port of Riga in neighboring Latvia is even closer.

To that it should be added that the international airport in Vilnius is not a promising prospect for development. The first inquiries have already come in from abroad about the possibility of landing at Siauliai.

Will the Lithuanian government be able to reap maximum benefit from this unexpected windfall? Will it be able to convert the airfield into an important transportation complex for the entire Baltic region? Unfortunately thus far there has been more talk about the airfield than real action. And in this era of dirty deals someone has already absconded with copper communications lines and attempted to steal reinforced concrete sections from the runways...

CAUCASIAN STATES

Army Prosecutor on Creation of Military Court

93US0193B Paris HARATCH in Armenian 29 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by Arpi Totoyan: "An End to Desertion?"]

[Excerpt] Everyone who manages, through superhuman effort, not to despair at the sight of the almost shameful state of Armenia's military organization will take a breath of consolation when he reads the interview with Vagharshak Vardanyan who was appointed Armenia's Main Military Procurator on 5 October. Vardanyan was born in the Mayisyan village of Akhuryan in 1952. He served as an inspector and military procurator in the Soviet army. He was appointed the deputy military procurator for the

Soviet 7th Army stationed in Armenia. In 1990 he was promoted to become the Military Procurator of the said force. An interview with him by Ashot Aghababyan was published in HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYUN on 13 October.

In the interview the organization of the Armenian military Procurator's office is presented. This is the first time that Armenia is having a military Procurator's office: "In short everything is starting from scratch." The country will have five regional military Procurator's offices: Zangezur, Yerevan, Gumri, Sevan and Gugark. The Main Military Procurator has been handed lists of candidates for regional posts. The principal role of the newly created office will be to oversee the correct implementation of laws within the armed forces. Its domain of supervision will include the defense forces, the internal security forces, national security staff, border guards, military institutions and enterprises, defense industries, military commissariats and military schools.

Referring to the widespread phenomenon of desertion in the national army, the interviewer asks: "Where did this mentality start, and how did it take root in our youth?" Vardanyan explains that everything started from the campaign three or four years ago exhorting Armenian young people not to serve in the Soviet army of occupation. He says that there were objective reasons for that: In recent years 104 Armenians had been killed in Soviet army units. He adds that if Armenian young men had served in the Soviet 7th Army, which is stationed in Armenia, "today we would not be facing a broken force." He continues: "We lost the moment. Led by emotion, we did not realize the importance of the moment, and now we are reaping the fruits of that. We instilled the spirit of desertion in our children. Now they are evading their own national army." He also points out the essence of this pain and offers a way to cure it: "The deserters are not being punished. That is why their ranks are growing."

In addition to the sin of desertion, Vardanyan comments on the nature of other offenses: "[There is] looting of state-owned military property. In the past they were stealing from the 7th Army. Now they are stealing from our own national army, although the scope and motives are different." There are still incidents of theft, looting, abuse of office and attempts to disturb law and order.

Will the military court try only those offenders who are drafted or the volunteers as well? The chief Procurator's answer is very clear: "The defense of the homeland is sacred work for all of us. It is that awareness that will lead us to the border and battlefield." Vardanyan adds that sometimes people wish to justify their desertion with their feelings of fear. He says: "What fear? When you are a soldier, you defend your people and homeland with a gun in your hands. Thank God, we have many dedicated people who do not wait to be drafted into the army. I was a Yeraplur again recently. I saw the graves of many 16, 17 and 18-year-old young men."

The portion of the interview which inspires most confidence is the determined stance he expresses with regard to deserters: "Many deserters feign sickness. A deserter is a

deserter and must be punished. The army is not kindergarten, and there will always be hardships. Hardships are for men."

At the end of the interview, the chief Procurator answers a question about political parties. Like R. Vasilyan [former leader of the now disbanded Armenian National Army], the commander of the Noyemberyan region, Vardanyan is very unambiguous on this issue: "The Procurator's office does not and will not have any links to any party. The Military Procurator's office can implement only one policy: the policy of preserving legality at the state level." [passage omitted]

Steps for Creation of Army Urged

93US0193A Paris GAMK in Armenian 29 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by Mark Harutyunian: "Armenia's Army"]

[Text] Armenia has a problem of defending its borders, but it has no army. A qualified general, Norat Ter Grigoryan, has been invited as the commander of Armenian forces. He will organize the Armenian army gradually with modern concepts relevant to military science. Armenia is implementing conscription. This means that there is a need for an army, which a common-sense reality.

The people of Armenia are defending their homes, villages and farms, especially in the border areas, to the best of their abilities, with the organization of an expeditionary force. The expeditionary force consists of volunteers; it is an auxiliary force, but it is not an army. In this period of staggering, the expeditionary force is playing an important role, but it is not a state solution even if it has the natural backing of the government.

This assessment does not mean that Armenia is completely deprived of armed forces. There are a few regiments, each comprised of approximately 1,500 soldiers. According to expert opinion, Armenia needs an army of 40,000 soldiers to be able to defend its borders especially since it does not have the benefit of natural borders with its neighbors. The need to defend the homeland with armies is inevitable until the establishment of peace and cooperation.

The formation of an army is inevitable. Even Switzerland, which has declared its neutrality and which knows that it is not subject to any external threats, has a very modern army. Armenia has insecure borders and cannot be defended with the good will of others. General Norat Ter Grigoryan is expected to express himself as a specialist to provide numbers, an estimate of costs and the qualitative nature of the army.

The development of the people's civic awareness is of vital importance in this regard. Vazgen Sarkisyan faced a negative disposition by the people with regard to conscription during his term as minister of defense. The young men did not respond to their draft notices, dealing a severe blow to the national aspirations of Armenians. These negative attitudes do not help the reconstruction of our homeland. It is time to come out of the narrow circles of power to win the confidence of the masses, by words and deeds, that Armenia and the Armenian nation will be led by basic national values. Such moves will lead the masses to respond positively to the draft notices.

We must contribute to the formation of an Armenian army not out of humanitarian or philanthropic considerations but out of the knowledge that only Armenian platoons, brigades, battalions and companies can defend the Armenian homeland. Nations have always known to respond positively to the call of patriotism when leaders inspire confidence—as the French did in response to General Charles de Gaulle's call on 18 June 1940. In a democratic system the army is not a political tool. This must also be explained to the people.

There is a large number of Armenian officers and soldiers in the former Soviet and the present Russian army who can return to Armenia and serve in the Armenian army. Because of developments in the Caucasus, Armenian officers and soldiers may not be viewed in a positive light as the descendants of a nation that is destabilizing the region. However, Armenian authorities must offer the families of these soldiers housing—which is not so easy—in order to entice them to return.

Another basic problem is the procurement of military materiel for the army. The departing Soviet army has transferred arms and ammunition [to Armenia] (although Azerbaijan has benefited more because there were a larger number of military units on its territory). It is evident that military technology is developing very rapidly and that arms are becoming obsolete very quickly. Armenia must eventually produce its own military resources and make use of advances made overseas. There is a drive in that direction because the regional powers, especially Azerbaijan, are not standing idle.

This patchwork of thoughts can have meaning only when it is decided in Armenia to form a modern national army, different from a border-guard force. Azerbaijan already has a national army; it does not hide that fact and benefits from the specialized assistance of Turkish officers.

Armenian authorities must recover the time they have lost and hasten the pace of forming a national army. This is not a question of militarism; self-defense and upholding national rights are imperative obligations. This is neither a disposition of aggressionism or a plot against peace. This is not a easy task, nor will it be easy, but we cannot evade it out of populist considerations.

Karabakh Military Procurator Views Tasks

93US0185A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 31 Oct 92 p 3

[Interview with Karabakh Military Procurator Azad Shir ogly Sultanov by Kh. Ordukanova; date and place not given: "Life by the Laws of War..."]

[Text] Azad Shir ogly Sultanov is the military procurator of Karabakh. He graduated from the history faculty of Gyandzhinskiy Pedagogical Institute. After serving in the army in Brest, he returned to his native city where he worked in the museum of history and regional studies. But because he always dreamed of becoming a lawyer, he decided to enter the Moscow Law Institute. He worked in the editor's office of the journal SOVETSKAYA YUSTITSIYA, and then after graduating from the institute he served as chief of the legal department of a major repair and construction administration in the capital. War brought on by the Armenians forced him to return to Baku from

Moscow. He rejected an invitation to work in the staff of the military procuracy, and on 9 September he was appointed deputy military procurator of Karabakh.

This week Lieutenant Colonel of Justice Azad Sultanov became the military procurator of Karabakh. He lives with his family and works in Agdam. This is his first interview as military procurator, exclusively with BAKINSKIY RAB-OCHIY.

[Ordukhanova] Azad Bey, what is the situation in Agdam today?

[Sultanov] This is a true frontline city. The enemy regularly subjects it to artillery fire literally by direct laying. This hell begins at eight or nine in the morning and goes on until midday. A breathing spell of an hour or two, and then back to the fire. And that's the way it is every day.

I think that the enemy has been able to study Agdam well. He is using sighted fire against administrative buildings, the bakery, gasoline pumps and so on. Recently the "Hailstorm" hit the regional police station, which is quite close to our procuracy.

[Ordukhanova] It has become known in Baku that an Armenian assault force was landed by the town of Artek. What can you say about this?

[Sultanov] There was no assault landing of any sort, and this was officially announced by Minister of Internal Affairs I. Gamidov. It was communicated to us by portable radio that our column traveling from Kelbadzhar was subjected to fire by what we supposed to be an Armenian assault force. Colonel N. [last name illegible], the brigade commander, alerted his soldiers and sent an intercept group into the area of fire. S. Gamidov, the head of law enforcement of Terterskiy Rayon, efficiently gathered his police associates together and went there with them as well.

Knowing the situation, right off we knew without even a second thought that in this terrain, this was not an assault landing. We believed that this was the work of a group of bandits hiding out in the forest. As it turned out, it was our own soldiers, who hadn't determined the facts, that fired upon the column. The result of the tragic mistake was three persons dead and two burned-out vehicles. An investigation is presently under way. This was a regrettable loss because, you see, the column was carrying humanitarian cargo. It was sent by performers from the Baku Circus and financed by money earned in shows put on in Turkey. Moreover they were also escorting the column together with the republic's Minister of Culture Polad Byul-Byul ogy.

[Ordukhanova] How do you explain our military failures in the Agdam sector?

[Sultanov] Why only failures and defeats? We have also enjoyed successes in this sector. I personally have high hopes for the new brigade commander, who has just arrived here. He is a regular officer, and he fought in Afghanistan. The brigade commander will take steps to rectify the situation in quick time.

[Ordukhanova] We unfortunately know what a state of emergency is. But what are its characteristics in the zone of combat activities?

[Sultanov] A state of emergency means life according to wartime laws, the laws of war: a system of checkpoints for traffic going in and out, continual patrols of the streets by army and police forces, and protection of vitally important facilities.

We are waging a just war on our territory against a well-equipped Armenian army. There is no doubt that we will win, but until the fighting abates, blood will flow and people will die.

You know, there were many things that I didn't understand in Moscow. Naturally I never forgot who I was, and where I was from. I always remembered my duty to the motherland. Paradoxical as this may seem, it was precisely the information blockade in which Azerbaijan found itself that motivated me to make my choice. Today in Karabakh, at the front line, the real face of the tragedy has revealed itself to me. The state of emergency is an extraordinary measure, one dictated, I repeat, by the conditions of war. And the war is being fought by the best sons of Azerbaijan, regardless of nationality. As you know, I am not a casual observer here, but I cannot talk without a feeling of shock, without emotion, about the mass displays of heroism by the republic's sons and daughters. I saw youngsters rescuing wounded through the "Hailstorm" and bullets, I saw people, no longer young, who left their homes and their accustomed routine to come to the aid of the fatherland, and voluntarily join the ranks of those who are fighting at the front line. And those who are fulfilling their military duty by patrolling the streets and roads are putting their lives at no lesser risk.

[Ordukhanova] Yes, but even though Agdam is living in conditions of unceasing bandit fire, life must still go on. Even under these conditions, there are people who are getting rich on speculation.

[Sultanov] That goes without saying. I see this myself every day. Speculation goes on in the city from morning to midday! Everything is being traded: contraband from Turkey and Iran, goods from the near frontier.... Perhaps nowhere in the world can you see such a thing: People are buying things and turning right around and selling them with a "mark-up."

Not everyone of course is a speculator—there are ordinary customers here as well: they usually come from the neighboring towns. But these are not the most typical representatives of Agdam's marketplace. I am astounded that luxuries are put out for show in Agdam's secondhand market in a time of war. You can buy everything here (if of course you have the money), including humanitarian aid goods, medicines, cigarettes, a whole sea of cigarettes! Fighting this open speculation is not a function of the military procuracy (although each of these resourceful fellows has his front—a store, an association, a firm, etc.). This is a matter for law enforcement. By the way, you'll never see any action of this sort in Terter, where S. Gamidov, the head of law enforcement, will never come anywhere near the speculators' market. But I can only talk about my own emotions—I detest these well-dressed, healthy, sated dealers with Marlboros between their teeth! I just about fall into despair whenever I see how scornfully they look at those around them. You can't imagine how hard it is for me to restrain emotions I reasonably feel

when I look at them and remember how soldiers in their emplacements share their last cigarette. I will never forget a young soldier who was riding through this bazaar when he saw a vendor's tray displaying goods from beyond the sea, and its owner was standing beside it counting a thick wad of banknotes. The youngster was going into combat, and he knew that he might not return. "If I could only have a pack of Camels!" was what I thought I would read in his eyes. But no, his eyes burned with contempt!

I understand that we are in a painful transition from so-called socialism to capitalism. There are many deformities in this transition, and our situation has been aggravated by the fact that a war is going on. Unfortunately the republic hasn't yet developed laws with which to fight the evil that speculation is—something that is punished by the most severe measures in wartime. I probably won't be saying anything new if I say that it will not be easy to win the war without a strong rear. And a strong rear means more new legislation, and excellent work by local law enforcement organs. Legal anarchy in the rear is a knife in the back of soldiers fighting on the front.

[Ordukhanova] What can you say about the nature of crimes which the military procuracy must investigate? How unusual are they?

[Sultanov] For the most part these are unusual legal violations, ones that are not encountered "on the economy." Recently our procuracy conducted a comprehensive inspection of enlisted personnel and their weapons. And we were compelled to institute criminal proceedings on the basis of the inspection results. Here is one deplorable fact that I can cite: Eighty-six armed soldiers have deserted. By the way, the law has also been violated in several rayon military commissariats, and criminal proceedings have also been instituted in relation to them.

Working in the conditions in which we find ourselves is not easy—artillery barrages, bombing, and a weak criminological and technical base. Every investigator of the procuracy has seven to eight criminal cases to investigate, and sometimes there aren't enough hours in a day. Most of their families are in Baku. When I came here once for a few hours one of my investigators asked me to pass his wages on to his relatives. And I knew that the timing was good—it wasn't difficult to see that his family was in dire straits. Behind every such story and detail, which appear to have little importance in the rear, stands the fate of an individual in a war zone. During my time of work in Karabakh I have come to the conclusion that as long as people do not obey the laws and do not maintain discipline in the army, the war will not end soon.

[Ordukhanova] Hearing about desertions is a hard thing, but there is also the opinion circulating in Baku that it is the poorest that are being sent to the front, that they are being tossed right out onto the front line without any training.

[Sultanov] I can't agree with the first assertion. The war is being fought by different people, people of different ages and different social groups. They are fighting heroically, and since the time that I have been here I became persuaded, and came to understand, how great the strength of our people's spirit is! And it is indestructible. But as in any war, this one has its heroes and traitors, its volunteers and

deserters. We are presently inspecting the military commissariats of more than eight rayons, and if we reveal any facts of substitutions and forgeries, there will be no mercy for anyone.

As far as the notion that green troops are being sent to the front line, there is an element of truth to it. But why is everyone forgetting that war sometimes does not afford the luxury of time, that hours and minutes are sometimes the deciding factor here?! Recall that during the Patriotic War, which has been proclaimed the Great, soldiers went to the front directly from the military commissariats. But for the sake of justice let me say that to the extent possible, our soldiers are given a minimum of a month of combat training, and periods of quarantine do exist.

[Ordukhanova] Are any prisoner exchanges occurring between our side and the Armenians, and do you have any information on the mood in the enemy camp?

[Sultanov] No exchanges have occurred. Our enemies demand a living Armenian for every one of our killed warriors. As far as the mood of the civilian population among Armenians is concerned, it is quite definite: they curse the irregulars who dragged them into this bloody adventure. The brutality of these irregulars is boundless. By the way, very little is being written in the press about the practiced sadism and the atrociousness with which they mock our prisoners and finish off the wounded. Nothing like this has ever happened on our side. I am constantly making visits to the positions, and I know about all of this firsthand. This once again says something about the people's strength of spirit. And seeking contacts with the enemy is hopeless—you won't get anything from them other than insidiousness, guile, deceit and meanness.

[Ordukhanova] It has become clear from this interview that the daily life of the military procurator of Karabakh is not an easy one. But can you tell me specifically what takes up your day?

[Sultanov] Everything—pain, anger, despair, joy, hope.... The work goes on from nine in the morning to two at night, and sometimes around the clock.... Crime is our greatest concern; but no thought is given to risk here, and when it comes to the "rain of lead," to the "Hailstorm," you get used to it.

Of course, no one works alone. We get a great deal of help from soldiers and officers of the National Army and from the police. Thus, recently we were investigating a crime committed in Terterskiy Rayon. Investigation of the case involved considerable risk, and we were provided a lot of help by the rayon's police chief, I. Bagirov. The efficiency and professionalism of his associates allowed us to save time and conclude the matter successfully. The leadership of the republic's military procuracy and the Ministry of Internal Affairs also help us very much in our work.

[Ordukhanova] One last question: Are you sorry that you came?

[Sultanov] Never, not for a second have I doubted the correctness of my choice. I am fortunate that I am with the people in the most difficult days of our motherland. The selflessness of our soldiers never ceases to delight me. Of course I'm happy that I left Moscow for Azerbaijan, that I am working at the front line. I see how the motherland's

defenders—from the private soldier to the commander—are fighting. And I can feel how strong and great our people are. This gives me strength, and faith in victory. There is one other thing that I would like to say: You know, the crimes that we investigate are minor compared to the all-victorious heroism of our soldiers.

Progress of Fall Conscription Campaign Reported

*93US0193C Athens AZAT OR in Armenian 7 Nov 92
p 1*

[Text] Units of the Armenian army will begin inducting the first groups of the fall conscription most probably on 10 November. The conscripts will serve their tour of duty only on Armenian territory except one group which, in accordance with treaty provisions, will be dispatched to various military schools in the CIS to take officer training courses.

A Draft Commission, headed by V. Shirkhanyan, First Deputy Minister of Defense, has been formed by government decree to organize the conscription properly.

Shortcomings of Georgian Air Defense

*93US0180B Tbilisi SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA
in Russian 13 Oct 92 p 2*

[Article by Col Valeriy Simonov, chief of reconnaissance, 19th Separate Air Defense Army: "Georgia: An Air Threat Exists, But There Is No One to Raise an 'Aerial Shield'"]

[Text]

Not Until Lightning Strikes...

The realities are such that Georgia's air borders are open to any penetration from all sides—for entry of contraband, drugs, weapons, explosives and terrorists, and even for a fire strike against any objective. It is now much easier, safer and more economical to deliver "goods" to any point in the republic by air than by land.

A paradoxical situation has evolved: on one hand Georgia has a well developed air defense infrastructure (atomic explosion-proof command posts, airfields with formidable aircraft shelters, fire positions for surface-to-air guided missiles, emplacements for radar stations, fully equipped military posts), while on the other hand all of this infrastructure is incapable of operating due to a catastrophic shortage of personnel and an absence of the most elementary things for maintaining the vital activities of its facilities.

There are of course two reasons for hope. First of all, we still have an officer corps of sufficient size that can place the entire infrastructure into motion. Many of these officers had fought in Vietnam, Egypt and Syria. Second, effective air defense fire weapons will be activated to defend Georgia. These include Su-27 and Su-15 fighters, and S-75 and S-125 surface-to-air missile complexes. For example the Swiss journal INTERAVIA called the Su-27 "the most capable fighter in the world." It is excellently armed—10 air-to-air missiles and a built-in 30-mm gun. Or consider the S-75 and S-125 surface-to-air missile complexes. The former can destroy airborne targets at altitudes from 100 m to 35 km at ranges to 56 km, while the second can do so at altitudes from 20 m to 18 km at ranges up to 25 km.

If You Want Peace, Compensate for the Threat

Georgia is already aware of the aggressive intentions of the confederation of the peoples of the Caucasus. This initially public organization has transformed in reality into a military-political bloc, together with its own president, parliament, Council of Ministers, arbitration court, supreme religious council, headquarters and armed forces.

As we know, representatives of the Chechen nationality are playing an active role in the confederation. It should be kept in mind that a large quantity of combat equipment, weapons, ammunition, enough to feed "hot spots" for a long time, such that they will never die out, were seized from Russian troops in the Chechen Republic. The following were taken: 42 tanks, 38 BMPs [Armored Personnel Vehicles], 14 BTRs [Armored Transport Vehicles], 14 BRDMs [Armored Reconnaissance Vehicles], around 32,000 assault rifles, 13,000 pistols, 460 rifles, over 1,000 machineguns, 1,000 grenade launchers, 565 antitank guided missiles, on the order of 14,000 hand grenades, 10,000 units of tank ammunition, 12,000 units of BMP ammunition, and 8,000 units of gun and mortar ammunition. Add to this the 1,050 units of small-arms weapons, 46 tonnes of ammunition, 186 units of motor vehicle equipment, 48 tonnes of gasoline and diesel fuel, 20 rail cars of food, clothing and equipment seized from air defense units; a Ministry of Internal Affairs regiment has around 2,000 small-arms weapons. On the order of 120-150 L-29 and L-39 trainer aircraft were nationalized at the Khankala airfield (not far from Groznyy). That is where ammunition is being stored in the event of war. The mentioned airplanes can each carry two bombs weighing 100 kg or two blocks of 16 free rockets. The range of the airplanes is 350 km.

The 3d Field Army of the Turkish ground forces has deployed by the borders of Georgia and Armenia. It contains over 110,000 men, more than 1,000 tanks, and on the order of 106,000 guns and mortars, including a battery of atomic guns. In addition the 2d Tactical Air Command is also operating in the support of this army. It is armed with over 200 warplanes, including a squadron of airplanes capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Western specialists estimate that the personnel of this force grouping are distinguished by high combat readiness, organization and military discipline. Iran, the armed forces of which total 775,000 men, 1,600 tanks, around 330 helicopters and over 200 warplanes, stands not far from the Georgian border.

The Highest Interests of All

Interests are the only thing that count in politics. Relations between states based on promises and traditional ties cannot be permanent or stable. They must be established on the basis of mutual advantage, with regard for the common national interests of each of the sides. This pertains fully to policy in the area of air defense as well.

For Russia for example, it would be advantageous to have reconnaissance and early warning resources stationed far beyond its borders. Georgia also has its own considerable interest. Presence of a rather strong air defense system on its territory (as for what sort it is—national, mixed, or of different composition—is immaterial) is a powerful deterrent to unsanctioned penetration of its airspace. This is

why in my estimation it would also be advantageous for Georgia to have Russian air defense forces on its territory. Apprehensions that they might influence the internal political situation are groundless, because they are exclusively defensive forces. An air defense infrastructure and the principal specialists are already here. All we need to do is saturate the units and personnel with locally conscripted personnel, and to attract Georgian officers to them who had served previously in kindred units and who graduated from the corresponding military schools. And finally, establishment of a new air defense system will require enormous outlays, which are presently beyond the means of the republic's economy. There is hardly any reason to believe that Western countries will supply armament and equipment worth hundreds of millions of dollars to the republic for just a "thank-you." For example a single American F-15 fighter costs on the order of \$15 million, plus the million required annually for its maintenance and service. Georgia's defense requires a minimum of two fighter regiments, which is around 60 airplanes. Besides them, we need surface-to-air missile complexes, radar stations and a great deal of other support equipment.

With the onset of peace on Georgian soil, the focus in the area of national defense is shifting to air defense. The fact is that the republic's mountainous terrain and its large number of natural obstacles makes it impossible for the attacking side to field large groupings of ground forces. However, this type of terrain makes it possible to successfully transfer airborne, sabotage and reconnaissance groups, and to make wide use of aviation.

The question that naturally arises is this: Why should we dismantle what we have already created, tuned and tested through many years of operation, and have used successfully in defense of Georgia? Whatever the case, in a certain while life will compel the Georgian taxpayer to open his wallet for restoration of what has been damaged. The situation in Azerbaijan can serve as a graphical lesson. There, the air defense infrastructure was plundered after its nationalization was announced, and it cannot be restored. The local population removed the concrete ceilings and blocks from the command posts (obviously for personal construction), took apart the floors and roofs, pried off the doors and frames in military posts, and dismantled lavatories, toilets, gas ranges and other household equipment. The electronic contents of support vehicles were tossed out, transforming them into ordinary transportation. In the end, this neither increased the might nor brought wealth to either the republic or its people. Now the national airspace is plowed with impunity by light aircraft and warplanes from contiguous countries.

How Do We Hold on to Russian Specialists?

The experience and knowledge of Russian specialists in air defense are more valuable than the "iron" with which they work. Without them, everything will fall into decay and become irreversibly inoperable after a few weeks, or, in the best case, after a couple of months. But most officers and warrant officers have one desire—to move anywhere in Russia where they could serve normally and live normally without constant fear for the fate of their close ones. They have grown tired of their uncertain position.

Russian officers and warrant officers would agree to serve on Georgian territory if, judging from decisions of officers' assemblies, the following conditions are met: time of service—a month or two, pay—doubled (one half paid by the Russian Ministry of Defense and the other by the Georgian Ministry of Defense), provision of housing at the place of service in Georgia and, upon returning, in Russia, provision of all forms of pay and allowances on the basis of existing norms, duty-free import and export of personal property outside the republic.

If Only There Were Wisdom Enough for All

A decision to disband the 19th Separate Air Defense Army was made in Moscow at the highest level. It will cease to exist before April 1993, and, together with it, the "air shield" that could serve Georgia will come down. There will be no dependable air defense, the republic's inhabitants will no longer feel secure, and without this, there will be no certainty as to one's future, or a desire to engage in constructive labor.

And one last thing: No matter how relations establish themselves between Georgia and Russia because of the mistakes of politicians and military commanders, time will bring them together in the end. We are natural allies and neighbors.

Georgian Decree on Pensions for Servicemen

93US0180A Tbilisi SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA
in Russian 10 Oct 92 p 6

[Decree of the Government of the Georgian Republic "On Approving the Interim Statute of Pension Support to Servicemen of the Armed Forces of the Georgian Republic and Their Families"]

[Text] The Government of the Georgian Republic resolves:

1. To approve the attached Interim Statute on Pension Support to Servicemen of the Armed Forces of the Georgian Republic and Their Families.
2. To recompute the pensions of pensioners who are not on active service in the armed forces, in the system of intelligence agencies and in internal affairs organs of the Georgian Republic, and who receive higher pensions, and to pay pensions in accordance with the data in the Interim Statute.
3. To award pensions to persons on active duty in the armed forces of the Russian Federation and living on the territory of the Georgian Republic, on the basis of an agreement concluded between the Georgian Republic and the Russian Federation.

4. The Interim Statute becomes effective upon its approval.

[Signed] *Georgian Republic Prime Minister T. Sigua, Acting Chairman of the Government;*
G. Beridze, Acting Administrator of the State Office of the Government of the Georgian Republic

The Interim Statute determines the conditions, norms and procedure of pension support to servicemen and their families. Its purpose is to defend the interests of the indicated persons.

The Interim Statute consists of nine chapters. These are the principal provisions: pension for years of service, disability pension, pension for loss of breadwinner, calculating pensions, awarding pensions, paying pensions, cancelling and awarding pensions to persons who go on active duty in the armed forces of the Georgian Republic, amending pensions. They specifically determine all of the details of pension support to servicemen and their families.

Considering the great interests of citizens, we publish two chapters of the Interim Statute below—on the conditions under which pensions are awarded for years of service, and on the amount of pensions.

Chapter II. Pension for Years of Service

Article 10. Conditions for Awarding Pensions for Years of Service

Pensions are awarded for years of service:

a) to officers, extended-service servicemen and persons serving on contract (petty officers, warrant officers, NCOs, privates, seamen), and enlisted and senior personnel of internal affairs organs who have served 15 or more years by the date of their discharge from service;

b) to officers, extended-service servicemen and persons serving on contract (petty officers, warrant officers, NCOs, privates, seamen) and enlisted and senior personnel of internal affairs organs who are discharged from service for reason of age or illness, in view of a reduction in forces, or on the basis of impaired health, if by the day of their discharge from service they are 50 years of age and if their total time of service is 20 or more calendar years, of which not less than 10 years were in military service or in internal affairs organs;

c) to persons who had been on active duty in the armed forces of the former USSR, the Commonwealth of Independent States or other foreign countries, as well as in the system of internal affairs organs of the former USSR and the Georgian Socialist Republic, and then were accepted for active duty into the armed forces or into the system of the Georgian Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs, or who were transferred from one department to another out of official necessity.

For the persons indicated in this clause, their years of service in the armed forces of the former USSR, the Commonwealth of Independent States or other foreign countries, as well as in state security and internal affairs organs of the former USSR and the Georgian Socialist Republic are to be included in the total number of years served upon their retirement;

d) to persons who served on active duty in the armed forces, in state security and internal affairs organs of the former USSR and the Commonwealth of Independent States and are now receiving pensions from the corresponding departments.

The amount of pensions awarded to pensioners indicated in this clause is determined with regard for presently existing official titles and military (or special) ranks and for any extra percentage payments based on years of service.

Article 11. Amount of Pensions

Persons listed in Clause "a," Article 10 who have served 15 or more calendar years are awarded a pension of the following amount:

a) for serving 15 years—40 percent of monthly salary for official titles and ranks, and if retirement from service is due to illness or age—45 percent of monthly salaries for official titles and ranks.

Three percent of monthly salary for official titles and ranks is added to the pension annually for service above 15 years. However the amount of the pension must not exceed 75 percent of these sums;

b) to persons listed in Clause "b," Article 10, the amount of pensions is determined: for a total time of service of 20 years—40 percent of monthly salaries for official titles and ranks, and for every year above this total time—1 percent of monthly salaries for official titles and ranks, with regard for the fact that the amount of the pension must not exceed 75 percent of these sums;

c) for persons listed in Clause "c," Article 10, the pension for years of service is awarded in observance of conditions established in Clause "a" of this article, and upon discharge from the armed forces or internal affairs organs of the Georgian Republic the amount of their pensions must not exceed 75 percent of salaries for official titles or military (special) ranks.

Pensions for years of service are determined for persons listed in Clause "d," Article 10 with regard for salaries and extra percentage payments for presently existing official titles and military (or special) ranks and for time of service for persons retiring from the armed forces and from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Georgian Republic; however, the pension must not exceed 75 percent of these sums.

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Edicts on Turkmenistani Military Appointments

93UM0207A Ashgabat TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 23 Oct 92 p 2

[Turkmenistani President S. Niyazov edicts of 22 October 1992 conferring military ranks; parens around a letter in a name indicate poor legibility; empty parens indicate one letter missing]

[Text]

Edict of President of Turkmenistan on Conferring Military Ranks

Confer military ranks as follows:

Colonel

Lieutenant Colonel **Bartun**, Sergey Anatolyevich; Lieutenant Colonel **Bolekhan**, Mikhail Dmitriyevich; Lieutenant Colonel **Gamlyavy**, Vladimir Vladimirovich; Lieutenant Colonel **Gladkov**, Vladimir Ivanovich; Lieutenant Colonel **Golovin**, Aleksandr Alekseyevich; Lieutenant Colonel **Druzhinin**, Aleksandr Antoninovich; Lieutenant Colonel **Yershov**, Vyacheslav Leonidovich; Lieutenant Colonel **Karpov**, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich; Lieutenant

Colonel **Karyukin**, Aleksey Nikolayevich; Lieutenant Colonel **Kozorezov**, Vyacheslav Nikolayevich; Lieutenant Colonel **Kniga**, Ivan Borisovich; Lieutenant Colonel **Kuzkov**, Yuriy Fedorovich; Lieutenant Colonel **Loshchenov**, Nikolay Vasilyevich; Lieutenant Colonel **Lup(l)ov**, Valeriy Ivanovich; Lieutenant Colonel **Martynov**, Aleksandr Alekseyevich; Lieutenant Colonel **Marchenko**, Aleksandr Vladimirovich; Lieutenant Colonel **Moiseyev**, Vladimir Dementyevich; Lieutenant Colonel **Mukhammednazarov**, Mukhammedkurban; Lieutenant Colonel **Muradov**, Chorli; Lieutenant Colonel **Nazarenko**, Vladimir Pavlovich; Lieutenant Colonel **Plyaskin**, Igor Nikolayevich; Lieutenant Colonel **Pyatin**, Gennadiy Ivanovich; Lieutenant Colonel **Salyamov**, Ravkhan Gatayevich; Lieutenant Colonel **Stolyarik**, Ivan Iosifovich; Lieutenant Colonel **Sevastyanov**, Vladimir Aleksandrovich; Lieutenant Colonel **Sivudenko**, Oleg Fedorovich; Lieutenant Colonel **Shadrin**, Boris Grigoryevich;

Colonel of Medical Service

Lieutenant Colonel of Medical Service **Artykov**, Abdyresul Bekhbitovich; Lieutenant Colonel of Medical Service **Mametgeldyyev**, Agageldy; Lieutenant Colonel of Medical Service **Rozyyev**, Kurbyanyaz;

Lieutenant Colonel

Major **Abakumov**, Anatoliy Gavrilovich; Major **Albekov**, Ibragim Minirovich; Major **Akimov**, Asad Akhmedovich; Major **Anokhin**, Anatoliy Alekseyevich; Major **Antipenko**, Mikhail Petrovich; Major **Belosludtsev**, Vitaliy Valeryanovich; Major **Boyev**, Vasily Pavlovich; Major **Vlasov**, Veniamin Vladimirovich; Major **Goncharov**, Vitaliy Grigoryevich; Major **Grishutin**, Gennadiy Nikolayevich; Major **Guseynov**, Rovshan Nadir-ogly; Major **Glukhov**, Vladimir Arsentyevich; Major **Groshev**, Igor Grigoryevich; Major **Derkach**, Aleksandr Valentinovich; Major **Dmitriyenko**, Viktor Alekseyevich; Major **Dryanov**, Aleksandr Vyacheslavovich; Major **Yevseyev**, Valeriy Aleksandrovich; Major **Ilyasov**, Sergey Byashimovich; Major **Ivantsov**, Nikolay Vasilyevich; Major **Kushayev**, Iskander Kamilovich; Major **Kvasov**, Nikolay Alekseyevich; Major **Kazachenko**, Oleg Georgiyevich; Major **Kudryavtsev**, Aleksandr Pavlovich; Major **Kopytov**, Aleksandr Sergeyevich; Major **Leshi(n)**, Yuriy Dmitriyevich; Major **Lopotov**, Aleksandr Rafailovich; Major **Lukyanenko**, Sergey Ivanovich; Major **Leba**, Sergey Dmitriyevich; Major **Lenkov**, Vladislav Ivanovich; Major **Linkov**, Nikolay Aleksandrovich; Major **Lipnyagov**, Vladimir Yakovlevich; Major **Norov**, Khamid Izyumovich; Major **Mereddurdyev**, Rinat Geldyyevich; Major **Malinovskiy**, Valeriy Valentinovich; Major **Orazov**, Tirk(ish) Artikovich; Major **Pushkin**, Vladimir Petrovich; Major **Prokopyev**, Aleksandr Vasilyevich; Major **Pavlov**, Nikolay Vasilyevich; Major **Rodionov**, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich; Major **Redzkeпов**, Atamurad; Major **Salikhov**, Nail Ravilyevich; Major **Sevastyanov**, Vasily Nikolayevich; Major **Starokozhev**, Aleksandr Ivanovich; Major **Stepanov**, Aleksandr Sergeyevich; Major **Sidorov**, Vladimir Leonidovich; Major **Sopi()**, Vyacheslav Vladimirovich; Major **Tarakanov**, Yuriy Mikhaylovich; Major **Tatarinov**, Vladimir Vladimirovich; Major **Tkachenko**, Viktor Fedorovich; Major **Fedulov**, Sergey Vasilyevich; Major **Khokhlov**, Vladimir Ustinovich; Major **Tsyvchka**, Sergey Viktorovich; Major **Tsyganv**, Ivan Nikolayevich; Major **Charyyev**, Bayram Geldyyevich; Major **Chepur**, Vadim

Grigoryevich; Major **Shiryayev**, Sergey Nikolayevich; Major **Shamolin**, Vladimir Viktorovich; Major **Shevlyakov**, Aleksandr Vyacheslavovich; Major **Shumlyanskiy**, Sergey Anatolyevich; Major **Yurchenko**, Aleksey Dmitriyevich; Major **Yesipov**, Sergey Viktorovich;

Lieutenant Colonel of Medical Service

Major of Medical Service **Kazaryan**, Sergey Marti(k)ovich; Major of Medical Service **Orlov**, Viktor Ivanovich; Major of Medical Service **Podolchenko**, Vitaliy Nikolayevich; Major of Medical Service **Podshibyakin**, Sergey Yevgenyevich; Major of Medical Service **Radoshnov**, Yevgeniy Vladimirovich.

[Signed] President of Turkmenistan S. Niyazov
Ashgabat, 22 October 1992

Edict of President of Turkmenistan on Conferring Military Ranks

Confer military ranks as follows:

Colonel

Lieutenant Colonel **Kaplanov**, Anatoliy Kuliyeich;

Lieutenant Colonel

Major **Annadurdyev**, Kurbangeldy Ishankuliyeich; Major **Tretyakov**, Valeriy Pavlovich; Major **A(n)yyev**, Chary Major **Sadyev**, Mukhamed Kakabayevich; Major **Sentov**, Nurmurat Turayevich; Major **Zakirov**, Rinat Agzamovich; Major **Khakberdyev**, Azadi Nurburdyevich; Major **Yusupov**, Nurmukhamed Penayevich; Major **Taganklychev**, Amanklych Nazarklychevich

[Signed] President of Turkmenistan S. Niyazov
Ashgabat, 22 October 1992

Night Battle in Dushanbe

93UM0175A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Nov 92 p 1

[Report by KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Aleksandr Pelts and Valeriy Zhukov of the Kovar information agency under the rubric "Reported From Dushanbe": "Night Battle in the Capital: Another Russian Serviceman Wounded"]

[Text] The logic of civil war is unpredictable. Last night's events in the capital of Tajikistan have confirmed this fact once again. Toward morning on 24 November the two warring groupings began intense shelling in the area of the Dushanbe airport and the meat combine, as well as around the settlement of Yuzhnyy.

It is still not clear whether the night battle was a planned action or whether it broke out spontaneously. Law-enforcement agencies refuse to make any comments, claiming that they lack information. The headquarters of the 201st Division also declined to assess the situation. We only know that one Russian serviceman was wounded in the night shelling at a check point near the airport.

Battles continue to be fought in Tajikistan's Yavanskiy, Kabad'yenskiy and Pyandzhskiy rayons. As we know, the people's deputies are attempting to halt the bloodshed. They have summoned the field commanders to Pyandzh

for talks. On Monday evening Abdumalik Abdulodzhanov, chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers, Guldestasho Imronshoyev, minister of internal affairs, and Maksud Ikramov, chairman of the Dushanbe Gorispolkom [City Executive Committee], met with leaders of the armed formations operating in Dushanbe and its environs. The parties in the discussion acknowledged the need for the field commanders to meet with the members of parliament. The commanders also set forth some counter-conditions. They feel that discussion is possible only if the blockade of Dushanbe is first lifted and the military formations return to "their own territories."

On 24 November a big column of large fuel trucks left Dushanbe for the area of Tursunzade accompanied by an armored group from the 201st Motorized Rifle Division. They are to deliver aircraft fuel to the airport, since trains bunched up south of Dushanbe cannot reach the city due to the continuing blockade.

Three-Stage Development Process for Kazakh Armed Forces

93UM0184B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 24 Nov 92 p 3

[Article by Fedor Ignatov, KazTAG—TASS: "Kazakhstan's Military Doctrine: Armed Forces Will Be Developed in Three Stages"]

[Text] The main orientation of Kazakhstan's military doctrine is its defense nature. Colonel-General Sagadat Nurmagambetov, the republic's minister of defense, and Colonel Kim Serikbayev, candidate of military sciences, outlined the doctrine today. In an article disseminated through KazTAG [Kazakh News Agency] channels, they expressed firm conviction that the "security of each sovereign state of the Commonwealth, including Kazakhstan, can be ensured not by their own armies separately, but only by the collective protection of the CIS countries." Therefore, the article emphasizes, Kazakhstan's military

doctrine proposes cooperation with all countries of the Commonwealth in accomplishing joint defense tasks on the basis of multilateral and bilateral treaties and agreements.

In the authors' opinion, organizational development of the Kazakh Armed Forces will be completed in three stages, with the last two each lasting up to 1.5-2 years. In the first stage (until the end of 1992), it is planned to complete formation of the structure of the Ministry of Defense and command and control bodies of the armed services, sign agreements with the Russian Federation and other states of the Commonwealth on a number of key problems, and determine the final structure and numerical strength of all armed services.

Political Organs To Be Reformed In Kazakhstan's Armed Forces

93UM0207C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 28 Nov 92 p 1

[Article under rubric "From Our Information Bureau": "They Intend to Set Up an Institution of Educators in the Kazakhstan Army"]

[Text] "Having disbanded political organs and banned the party and Komsomol, the former leadership of the center unfortunately did not set up structures which would engage in soldiers' moral education," emphasizes an article by Republic of Kazakhstan Minister of Defense Colonel General Sagadat Nurmagambetov and Candidate of Military Sciences Colonel Kim Serikbayev, printed in the newspaper KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA. "Practice shows that educational work is not now being performed in many subunits..." Our correspondent Colonel Anatoliy Ladin focusses attention on that part of the article which states that the question presently is being studied of setting up an institution of deputy commanders for educational work in the Kazakhstan Armed Forces in place of assistant commanders for work with personnel.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Lessons of Japanese Experience in Conversion

93UM0152B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 28 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by Oleg Rosnitskiy under rubric "Perspective":
"Conversion Pangs: Russian Authorities Continue To Balance"]

[Text] Protectors of the military-industrial complex got another breather again: defense expenditures in the coming year will exceed R1.5 trillion, arms purchases will grow, and the priority in scientific and design work will go to dual purpose technologies. An amount ten times less will be allocated for conversion and, in Yegor Gaydar's words, a "competent" conversion will be conducted "under state supervision" (Arkadiy Volskiy's program), so that neither avalanching conversion nor (especially) privatization of defense enterprises by labor collectives threatens the director corps. We are promised that another abundance of consumer goods will be organized in the spirit of the past, primarily sophisticated household equipment produced at defense enterprises. Vacuum cleaners, television sets, washing machines, video tape recorders and other abundant material goods will pour out as if from a horn of plenty. Why this? For this was not the case even in relatively well-off times; the military-industrial complex was not able to satiate even the domestic market for the unpretentious Soviet consumer. It is also not clear what will be produced, for example, by former chemical weapon plants, although "experts" are found who assert that "destruction of chemical weapons can enrich Russia" (IZVESTIYA, 22 September 1992).

It is of course not easy for the government: first China is set as an example for it, then Japan, which in the 1940's, they say, carried out a policy of harsh state regulation of the economy and in that way allegedly turned from a ruined country into a developed power. But the entire focus is that Japan specifically suffered a severe fiasco on this path, and the economy's revival began later, in the 1950's, after decisive steps were taken to liberalize it. We mentioned this briefly in connection with the problem of conversion (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 14 August 1992). Inasmuch as Japan's experience really is impressive, let us see just what can be derived from it for Russian conversion.

For long prewar decades and in the war years, Japanese enterprises lost the ability to work for self-repayment and became fully dependent on the state under conditions of competition. All trade operations, supply, prices on raw materials and finished products, as well as finances of enterprises were subjected to rigid control on the government's part. Thus this was the typical militarized economy of a totalitarian state, features of which are so familiar to Russians.

Inasmuch as manufacture of any military product was prohibited after the end of the war, the Japanese did not have to carry on ridiculous discussions about exporting arms as a means of conducting conversion, about which we recently wrote (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 21 July 1992), and the government simply had no other way but to

begin a program of structural transformations and demilitarization of the economy under conditions of exceptionally limited financial resources. Japan experienced stagnation in industry over a lengthy period under conditions of inflation and a shortage of raw materials in the presence of obsolete, worn-out production equipment. Over 900 plants were confiscated for the reparations account (all plants for producing arms and aircraft as well as half the capacities of the machine tool building industry). Reparation demands were eased only after intensive negotiations with occupation authorities in February 1947; this was the first precondition for renovation of industry.

Further, arms makers demanded that the state compensate for the losses they suffered during the war and they put forward claims for a sum of 443 billion yen which the Japanese government was forced to recognize. But satisfaction of the claims increased the budget deficit and unwound a spiral of hyperinflation. Compensation payments were stopped after lengthy negotiations, but the government developed a package of special measures aimed at restoring credit worthiness of enterprises. This procedure essentially was completed during the period from the end of 1948 up to the fall of 1949, and former military enterprises were fully freed of the legacy of war in the financial accounting sphere.

The next important stage in Japan's postwar development was liberalization of the economy and privatization of former military enterprises. Not only during the war, but also afterward, the government continued to exercise control and regulation of enterprises' economic activity with good intentions of expanding production, holding back inflation and maintaining the population's standard of living. It established fixed prices on key commodities at a very low level and compensated for the gap with real market prices through a system of subsidies. The government's actions led to the directly opposite result, evoking acute inflation and stagnation in production. In 1950 the majority of state measures for control and regulation had to be abolished, which created preconditions for a full-scale perestroika and development of a free economy, and an explosive growth of production began. In 1952 over 130 previously confiscated former military enterprises were returned to the Japanese government; they were disbanded and converted to private property.

A positive effect also was provided by other measures for democratizing economic life: dissolution of monopolies and adoption of antimonopoly legislation and new labor legislation. This led on the one hand to the appearance of sharp competition among companies and on the other hand contributed to formation of a system of constructive cooperation between employers and workers.

Having set a course for including Japan in the world economy, the government devoted special attention to encouraging exports of commodities, with the labor put into them making up their basic cost. In 1950 a program was worked out for accelerating exports and a state system of export insurance was introduced; in 1952 the Japanese Foreign Trade Association was instituted for gathering information on markets and holding fairs and exhibitions for developing foreign markets. Finally, in 1955 the Japanese Productivity Center was established, which actively

introduced American management methods and new technologies. Patents and know-how were acquired despite an acute shortage of foreign currency.

The Japanese Productivity Center was established as a nonprofit, nongovernment, trilateral organization with the involvement of the government, employers and trade unions. The U.S. government provided technical assistance for a sum of \$6.4 million. The Japanese Productivity Center began to send groups of Japanese abroad to study production. Over 25,000 representatives of the most diverse layers of Japanese society spent time abroad and hundreds of foreign specialists lectured in Japan. The first such group was formed from workers of ferrous metallurgy, a sector which in a few years began to crowd the American steel industry. The Japanese Productivity Center is the largest center of this kind in the world. Its basic subunits are in Tokyo with branches in Washington, London, Paris, Rome and the FRG. The Japanese Productivity Center played the chief role in formation of the Asiatic Productivity Organization. Today Japan intends to open "Intellectual Assistance Centers" in all former socialist countries including the CIS. Joint research will be performed here and probationers will train who will be able to become acquainted with principles of compiling economic development programs. What can we derive from the experience of conversion Japanese style?

First: conversion will not occur if rigid political and economic coercive measures are not taken with respect to the military-industrial complex. In Japan these measures were carried out by occupation authorities. In Russia, thank God, its own government can display firm political will to conduct a genuine, not decorative, conversion. This condition for conversion's success was mentioned back in the time of the USSR's existence in the article "How To Conduct Conversion" (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 6 August 1991). According to Gorbachev's recent testimony, it was the resistance of circles close to the military-industrial complex that retarded reforms.

Second: conversion will be most successful in those enterprises which will be removed from the sphere of control of the military-industrial complex. Apologists for the military-industrial complex insist on diversification of defense enterprises, referring to the fact that the military-industrial complex can produce competitive products. They give as an example the successful export of weapons and production of sophisticated household equipment. Hence the incorrect conclusion is drawn that the military-industrial complex can produce competitive commodities for the people without difficulty. They silently ignore the fact that criteria of quality, price, and all marketing are incompatible for military and civilian products.

Third: enterprises being converted must function in a socially oriented market environment, under conditions of economic freedom and competition in a struggle for the consumer. Downsizing, demonopolization and privatization of enterprises must be carried out for this.

Fourth: conversion can be considered as having taken place when former military-industrial complex enterprises begin to saturate the domestic market with goods and enter the world market with their civilian products. Integration into the world economy is possible only on the path of

mass production of quality competitive commodities, which necessitates broad borrowing of foremost foreign experience in management and marketing and of achievements in civilian technologies.

Fifth: a state which has drawn millions of workers into the arms race is obligated to be concerned for the enterprises being converted, not by thoughtlessly pumping them up with empty non-cash credits not supported by anything, but by developing measures which make it easier for these enterprises to enter the market (concessional taxation for consumer goods, profit invested in conversion and so on).

Modern Japan restored its military potential within limits of necessary defense, remaining the least militarized among leading countries of the "Big Seven." But Russia now is choosing its military reform path guided by the principle of defense sufficiency, so that of course it is not a question of lowering its defensive capability, but defense sufficiency must be coordinated with capacities of a crisis economy. This is a very painful question which should be discussed especially. It is impossible to speak of any kind of structural perestroika of the Russian economy whatsoever without linking this directly with its demilitarization, which presumes a radical redistribution of labor, material and financial resources for the benefit of producing goods for the people.

And last: the state's lack of desire to share property with labor collectives of defense enterprises under conditions of a failure of the command-administrative system can have only one result—disintegration and degradation of that same S&T and production potential for whose preservation protectors of the military-industrial complex zealously plead.

Dynkin: Factors of Sensible Conversion Programs

93UM0152A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Nov 92
Morning Edition p 2

[Article by Aleksandr Dynkin, doctor of economic sciences: "Conversion Is Possible, But Its Scenario Has To Be Rewritten"]

[Text] *The word "conversion" does not leave the pages of the press, organizations working on this problem are multiplying like mushrooms after a rain, one conference replaces another. Only one thing is lacking—conversion itself. Perhaps this longed-for goal is simply unattainable!*

By the way, are successful examples of conversion known abroad? Very few. It was unavoidable in Germany and Japan as a result of defeat and occupation after World War II. The United States reduced defense expenditures from 41 percent of GNP in 1944 to 6 percent in 1947, but the majority of Pentagon military suppliers were civilian firms before the war and they easily returned to previous markets.

But there were essentially no examples in the world of successful large-scale conversion beginning with the 1960's. In the 1960's the French firm of Aérospatiale tried to begin producing refrigerators and travel trailers, but failed. In its report to Congress the American Arms Control and Disarmament Agency stated that 85 percent of conversion projects failed in the 1980's.

Nevertheless, a reduction of defense expenditures is going on throughout the world. Just what are modern approaches to this process in the West? Four principal ideas can be singled out. The first is a reorientation of defense expenditures in the scientific research and design stage. Appropriations for military research grew by 10 percent in 1992 with a general Pentagon budget reduction. This means that creation of new weapon models will be broken off more and more often in the design stage without mass production. The important thing is to improve the "quality" of military technologies without expenditures for their production, which can be unfolded rather quickly in case of necessity.

The second is the merger and acquisition of military firms by civilian companies, which permits adapting weapons producers more easily to civilian market requirements. For example, the Daimler Benz company recently acquired the Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm concern.

The third is elimination of superfluous arms production capacities by selling fixed capital, transferring some personnel to other subunits, even layoffs—naturally, with certain social guarantees.

The fourth consists of searches for new civilian markets based on technological compatibility of military and civilian products. Here the presence of a few large consumers or, even better, one consumer is desirable. It is preferable if it is in the person of the state. Such examples exist in the sphere of air traffic control system telecommunications, major systems for accomplishing banking operations, satellite communications and so on.

Numerous unsuccessful attempts by arms manufacturers to shift to a civilian footing led to a conclusion about the mutually exclusive culture of organizations working for the state compared with firms competing in the market. The process of military production innovations is determined by the logic of development of military engineering and technology. In a civilian firm the requirements of consumers and conditions of competition are in first place. All work is oriented toward achieving economic indicators, not specifications and performance characteristics.

Price formation on military products proceeds not from demand, but from expenses. A manifold excess of expenditures, especially in creating new systems, is an ordinary phenomenon. But the art of nonprice competition, the logic of the life cycle of consumer goods, organization of sales networks and after-sale service and, finally, financial accounting and advertising—all this irritates the heads of military concerns with its "frivolity." They are oriented toward technical parameters and delivery times and volumes. In other words, they have one very rich "customer" whom they have known well and for a long while—the Armed Forces. Therefore their transition to civilian conditions takes place easier when it is possible to work for one "customer" as before.

The second very important reason for conversion failures is the new content of S&T progress. The 1980's undermined once and for all the thesis of "spinoff," a transfer of military into civilian technology. Directions of S&T progress in military and civilian spheres have diverged irreversibly. The military sphere's high technologies often prove to be ineffective in civilian production. Moreover,

requirements placed by peaceful products on the level of technology more and more often end up higher than in the military sphere under the influence of fierce competition, and so technology transfer in developed countries today is heading rather in the opposite direction—civilian technologies are "putting on shoulderboards." This concerns electronics, communications equipment, transportation, and even new materials.

What do these world trends mean for Russia? A country which was in 6th place in the world in absolute GNP volume and 75th place in per capita terms cannot remain in 2nd place in arms production. In laying claim to the role of world power, Russia at the same time cannot in principle reject the technological arms race. World experience and our own experience indicates that the conversion process "did not get going." How can we get out of this "Bermuda triangle"? There can be no unequivocal answers. It is clear only that we must concentrate and develop the S&T potential of military industry by supporting only first-rate scientific research institutes and design bureaus. It is also necessary to close a considerable number of series plants, paying the wages and retraining their personnel. It is enormously more difficult to adjust peaceful production in the bulk of defense enterprises.

Just what can be heard most frequently from our practical persons? Their slogan is "preserve." Preserve S&T potential, preserve technological networks, preserve labor collectives. That is understandable in a human way; however, all this can be preserved by preserving the totalitarian regime and the "economical economy," but one will not succeed in creating a normal economy on this basis. The conceptual vulnerability of such an approach lies in the fact that it is based on existing capabilities and not real requirements of the economy and society.

It is said that the defense industry puts out basic consumer durables. Yes, it does, but they are noncompetitive and yesterday's, and some can be sold only in a closed deficit economy. The car from which plant is better: defense Izhevsk Plant or civilian Volga Motor Vehicle Plant? The answer is obvious. Therefore, unfortunately, conversion in its present form is doomed. What is promising is not preservation, but a new combination, a restoration, a recycling of all kinds of military production resources. A period of "creative destruction" and not stability and invariability is unavoidable.

Each defense enterprise moans about the drain of highly skilled personnel. One must bow low to people who make independent decisions to change their sphere of endeavor. There is no more effective method of transferring technology than through individual knowledge and qualification. And the problem here lies not in how many people are leaving the military-industrial complex but, conversely, in the fact that the mobility of our labor resources is relatively low as they are bound administratively (by registration) and economically (by absence of a housing market). At one time the takeoff of small high-tech businesses in the United States occurred as a result of a reduction in military space orders at the end of the Vietnam war and at the end of the Apollo Program. These small firms created spheres of the American economy such as microelectronics, new materials, biotechnology and

software. But founders of small firms often acquired their qualification by fulfilling Defense Department and NASA orders.

Restoration of the system based on commercial and not administrative criteria will occur only as a result of the spread of various forms of joint-stock ownership. Therefore enterprises which are withdrawn from the military-industrial complex must be converted in an accelerated manner into a joint-stock form of ownership, including with benefits for involvement of foreign capital. A portion of fixed capital can be auctioned off.

It is also possible to satisfy the existing credit hunger for reprofiling needs with the help of special investment funds. They can be created on a mixed state-private basis by deducting a portion of the profit from state weapons export and by involving international financial institutions, foreign capital and so on. It is important that these investments be made under business plans worked out in detail, and not just "for conversion" in general. In other words, restoration of all kinds of resources of a portion of the military-industrial complex must lead to a change in culture of organizations and in the direction of the consumer economy.

Rebrov Opposes Cutting Research Funding at Arzamas-16

93UM0179A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Nov 92 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Mikhail Rebrov: "How Can Arzamas-16 Be Saved?"]

[Text]

Everyone Worried About the Nation's Future Should Think About This.

Arzamas-16 is called both a source of nuclear weapons and an arsenal of peace. Despite the mutual exclusivity of these two definitions, both of them are consistent with the reality. I must admit that when I departed the "secret" city after spending several days there, I did so with mixed feelings of delight and depressing alarm. No, it was not the fantastic power of the radio-calibrated nuclear charges, the strictness of the regimen followed or even the uniqueness of the scientific and technical facilities which amazed me. To the military man all of this is somehow ordinary. Something else depressed me. The threat of ruin hung over Arzamas-16. The multipurpose center of nuclear scientists is on the brink of financial ruin, loss of the intellectual capacity built up over the years, deterioration of its laboratories and highly professional teams, the disintegration of its schools of science....

It is always sad when flags are lowered. This is a different matter, however. We are once again operating according to the "shoot-from-the-hips" principle and forgetting the wisdom of "look before you leap." Is this a result of glaring incompetence on the part of those entrusted with high state positions or the illusory hope of quick economic gains from cutting allocations for updating nuclear weapons and science in general? Probably both. One cannot understand the situation, however, without adding to this a depressing shortsightedness concealed by demagogic slogans.

I shall admit that what I have said will be taken in different ways. Particularly now, when we have taken the first steps toward a nonnuclear future. I can also foresee the screams at mass meetings: "Enough militaristic expansion"! And attitudes like "We have lavished so much money on the creation of nuclear weapons! How much more must we put into the deep pocket of the VPK [military-industrial complex] to satisfy its insatiable appetite? Does our near-starving state need nuclear parity with satiated and rich nations?" These and other such questions are typical of late. And it would appear that the answer has been found. The times of strategic necessity for the creation of hydrogen bombs are past. The planet is moving toward a nonnuclear world.

All of this is so... and not so at all.

I shall not bring up the reasons for the appearance of the nuclear weapons which enveloped the world in the tenacious embrace of fear. Nor will I deny the fact that the planet lives in this fear even today, because the creation of the atomic bomb has split human history into two eras, as it were: "before" and "after". And during the "after" era the Pentagon made plans for a "blitzkrieg" against us, hatching up the insane "Pincher," "Bushwhacker" and other projects. I can say without the slightest exaggeration that for almost half a century now the planet has not seen a global nuclear war because of Arzamas-16.

Let us not search for cautious diplomatic formulations. Let us call a spade a spade. The fact that Russia had nuclear weapons has forced many people to think before making demands of or issuing ultimatums to us. Seriously and frankly speaking, just who believes today that war can be waged with nuclear weapons? That one side can inflict the first strike and not receive a retaliatory strike? This is absurd. It is criminal naivete.

For many years we have considered the very idea that nuclear weapons creates a "balance of fear" to be seditious. This was the "ideology" of the West. We spoke of a "balance of reason." But then, they are one and the same. And all the talk by the Americans that we have more than they, they less than we, is nothing other than a subterfuge of the politicians.

The universal banning and destruction of nuclear weapons has not gone beyond the stage of discussion and timid first steps. The weapons continue to be perfected both here and there. And this will in all likelihood go on for a long time. Who is spending how much on this is another matter. I quote Russia's Minister of Nuclear Power Engineering V. Mikhaylov: "The Americans are spending a half-billion dollars a year on their nuclear testing program, whereas we are spending only the equivalent of what Moscow eats up in a day...."

Another question arises with respect to reducing the number of nuclear weapons. What should that number be? Gorbachev's adventurist slogan of eliminating all nuclear weapons by the year 2000 gave rise to radiation phobia. We went to the extreme, coming up with false, comforting reasons such as the "logic of fear." Logic cannot be frightening or nonfrightening, but good has to have teeth. Any child knows that today. If we go beyond the bounds of the rational, the reverse process will be a great deal more expensive....

I am not imposing my ideas upon nor criticizing anyone. This is more an appeal to those who occupy high positions in the government and the Supreme Soviet, those who advise the nation's leadership, to get down to the essence of the matter in order not to find ourselves in an absurd position which only evokes bitter smiles in the professionals (and I have talked to many).

It is surprising that the world is still prepared to consider Russia as a great nuclear power, while we seem to be trying to prove to ourselves and everyone else that there is no need to consider us. And we are burying alive something which has become a national treasure.

At Arzamas-16 I met theoreticians and practical workers whose names are known throughout the world. Academicians, chief designers, heads of scientific programs, engineers of the highest skill, companions-in-arms and successors to I.V. Kurchatov, A.D. Sakharov and Ya.B. Zeldovich, they have not only created a nuclear shield for the fatherland but also increased the prestige of Russian science. Yu.B. Khariton, A.I. Pavlovskiy, Yu.A. Trutnev, Ye.A. Negin, S.G. Kocharyants, S.N. Voronin, G.N. Dmitriyev, V.A. Belugin.... Should I go on?

Who are these fantasizers and dreamers about whose feats we still know almost nothing? Simple, modest people who have devoted their lives to a large, extraordinarily difficult and dangerous cause. That cause was described well by Samvel Georgiyevich Kocharyants: "The main difficulty is to avoid making a mistake. You go to meet danger because you want to make things safe for everyone...."

I have named only eight names, but they have won enough gold stars and medals to.... I hope the idea is clear. But it is a matter of something else. They are united by the fact that they are individuals, strong in their convictions, and it would be impossible to divert them from the path which they consider to be the only right one. The main thing, however, is the fact that this is spiritual strength. This is why they are creative people whose endeavors are aimed at creating good for all of us.

"Do you think that we earn money only from weapons and therefore do not want disarmament? That is nonsense," said center director Vladimir Aleksandrovich Belugin heatedly. "We are in favor of reducing the number of tanks, ships, missiles, warheads and bombs, including nuclear bombs. What does scientific research have to do with this? Without it there can be no parity. And it has nothing to do with the number of bombs or warheads but with their caliber. We work with dangerous technologies, but we have not made any mistakes. There have been no accidents with the weapons."

"But are you not afraid that with the split-up of the country the number of those possessing nuclear ammunition will increase?" I asked.

"We are afraid of that," Academician Aleksandr Ivanovich Pavlovskiy entered the conversation to say. "We count on the prudence of the politicians, though. We want to believe that it will prevail over ambitions. Assertions that Ukraine could 'duplicate' the nuclear charges it possesses constitute basic ignorance. And our mission is one of enhancing the safety, reliability and effectiveness of nuclear weapons. There is no alternative, and we must not

treat the nation's defense capability lightly. What the USA has agreed to reduce has no effect upon its defense capability, after all, and they are hard at work producing new ones...."

That is the reality. Donning the mantle of peacekeeper, members of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group at their recent session proclaimed nuclear weapons to be "the political guarantee of strategic stability." France and the USA joined our moratorium on nuclear testing after they had conducted a series of explosions. Great Britain has announced that it "cannot reduce the number of tests without the total destruction of nuclear weapons." And they have all agreed that "the elimination of nuclear weapons is an unattainable goal."

I repeat: The "philosophy" of nuclear weapons is a harsh one. Fall behind, and you can expect dictation. And painful as it is to admit, we have already begun falling behind in some areas, especially since the well-known attempts to "privatize" our once-unified defense capability.

Those who work at Arzamas-16 are not just professionals of the highest caliber. They are creative people in a broad range of areas, and what they produce—whether it be a third-generation bomb or a device to meet the needs of the civilian economy (which is without equal anywhere in the world, incidentally)—exhibit beauty, elegance and 100-percent reliability. This is the problem. Conversion, a term on everybody's tongue today, has its dilemmas. To some it represents millions of hectares of corn in the polar region; to others, a source of titanium pots and meat grinders produced on high-precision lathes with digital controls. In short, any idea can be taken to the absurd. The Arzamas people are following their own path. They are developing highly unique equipment for automobile production, the oil and gas industry, for AES [nuclear power plant] safety, for medicine.... Their laser instruments for microsurgery on the eye, their precision dosimeters and X-ray machines—from the world's smallest diagnostic instruments to clinics on wheels—are capable of amazing even the most sophisticated expert.

And their magnetic-fuse devises, fiber optics, synthetic diamonds, technologies for recycling and purifying drinking water and for obtaining super-pure materials for the electronics industry, materials for radiation protection, piezoacceleration meters, their aquabeds for treating burns in a dry, liquified medium.... It would be impossible to name everything which has originated at Arzamas-16!

Who will use these things? Who will order them? Who will evaluate them? The introduction of these developments, which hold the promise of great profits, is hampered by the bureaucratic structure of science on the one hand and the bureaucratic structure of government on the other. We do not even have a market for scientific developments where sharp businessmen—both Russian and foreign—could come onto a good thing. The Americans, who initially took the smug attitude that they could learn nothing from us, are now convinced that our people were not born yesterday either. Their design is to buy up our unique technologies for nothing and erase from the minds of nations the memory of Russia as a great nuclear and space power.

Arzamas-16 has gone over to a three-day work week. There is nothing with which to pay the people. The electricity is being turned off. It is anticipated that everyone will be placed on forced, extended leave in the near future. The loss of our parity today would pose a danger for the entire world, however. The path to complete trust—and that is the only way to have nuclear disarmament—is longer than it might appear. And, naturally, it requires the most thoroughgoing and effective methods for monitoring the observance of agreements. With respect to the billions spent on the nuclear arsenal, they are being used for their designated purpose, down to the last kopeck. They are going for the security of Russia, in the interest of each of us. And no matter what they say, people respect the strong. They do not dictate terms to, do not threaten and do not rob the strong. This is why Arzamas-16 must be saved.

DOCTRINAL ISSUES

'Stratagem' in the Defense

93UM0119D Moscow VOYENNY VESTNIK
in Russian No 5-6, May-Jun 92 pp 53-56

[Article by Col A. Ogurtsov: "'Stratagems' in Defense (From the Experience of Wars and Troop Exercises)"]

[Text] A fairly great deal of attention has always been given to mastering military stratagems. Ancient peoples regarded them as the basic elements of military art. Homer once said that in war one needs to harm the enemy in every way and deceive him for which all means are allowed. This was due to the fact that techniques unexpected for the enemy made it possible to achieve success with equal or fewer forces. The experience of various battles and major engagements were studied and summarized. For example, the Greek Polien, who lived in the second century, compiled eight volumes with a description of 900 stratagems, and the Roman praetorian Fronton examines 563 methods of deceiving the enemy.

Today, the importance of stratagems is increasing sharply. The qualitative changes in the material base and the diversity of weapons in armed conflict make surprise and use of stratagems one of the most important principles of combined-arms combat. In this regard, the article by Colonel V. Orlyanskiy, in which the author tried to disclose the mechanism of deceiving the enemy on the tactical level as it applies to an offensive*, merits attention.

At the same time, such articles devoted to defensive combat are rarely encountered in the military press. It is much more difficult to deceive the enemy in defensive combat. You see, the initiative belongs to the attacker. He determines the time, place, and line of attack and chooses the type of maneuver and other tactics. Nevertheless, the experience of the Great Patriotic War, local wars, and troop exercises shows that if a defense is properly organized, there can be considerable opportunities to mislead the enemy.

In particular, I would like to examine in more detail primarily measures associated with concealment of actions.

During the preparatory period and in the course of combat, commanders usually try to deceive the enemy with respect to the direction of concentration of the main

effort, alignment of the combat formation, fire plan and obstacles, and engineer preparation of strongpoints and positions. In addition, they strive to create a false picture of the actual status of their subunits, placement of combat equipment and armament, and the times and nature of upcoming actions.

It should be stipulated right away that all the planned measures in this area must appear authentic, otherwise they will not achieve the planned goal. Here is an example of that.


In the first half of September 1944, our command was trying to deceive units of the German XIX Mountain Rifle Corps defending on the coast of the Arctic Ocean. The operation of 10 radio stations was identified in the marshy woods east of Lutto. It was as if several divisions were located here. However, it was extremely difficult to conceal the very fact that such large forces were concentrated here. And the fascists understood this. First, it requires much time; second, there were absolutely no roads in the proposed area. That is why the measures by the Soviet troops did not achieve their goal. Thus, the best simulation will not produce the desired effect if there are no traces of the vital activities of subunits, that is, if decoy actions are not carried out along with the simulation.

It is hard to overestimate the importance of concealment in deceiving the enemy. It helps to preserve the survivability of the troops and their combat effectiveness and makes it difficult for the enemy (or prevents him from doing so altogether) to detect and identify subunits and also to choose the optimum direction of the main attack. The ways of achieving concealment vary: keeping the commander's concept secret; countermeasures to reconnaissance (raiding parties); camouflage of troops, equipment, and armament; and others (see diagram). Practical implementation of them must be done with consideration of the radical changes that have taken place, above all, in reconnaissance assets.

For the sake of preserving their combat effectiveness, the defenders should take camouflage measures everywhere against all types of enemy reconnaissance—optical, optical-electronic, acoustic, radar, communications, electronic, infrared, and so forth. Their capabilities are decreased considerably by special coatings, fundamental digging in, and fortification shelters, which simultaneously preclude the use of munitions with radar homing heads. In addition, it is advisable to shelter equipment with layers of clay, ice, snow, brushwood, fallen pine trees, and so forth.

As the experience of the past war shows, the use of aerosols and smoke provides a fairly good camouflage effect when used in conjunction with other measures. Aerosol screens in a defense can be prepared in advance on routes of advance of reserves and second echelons. Tanks and armored personnel vehicles [BMP's] use individual smoke systems when disengaging and withdrawing to take up more favorable lines.

Well thought-out camouflaging of positions plays a very important role. When positioning weapons, one must try to make them blend in with the surroundings and not stand out. It is much easier to do on uneven, multicolored surface that has a contrasting plant and light covering. It is



considerably more difficult to camouflage on even, uniform terrain, such as a green meadow or snow-covered field. To do this, besides coloration, grass, sod, snow, and other such things, as well as standard camouflage nets are used as background. The latter are also erected from available materials in the form of a frame made of branches with twigs, clumps of grass, straw, and the like intertwined in them. On terrain overgrown with bushes, vertical camouflage screens made using the bushes as the base prove worthwhile.

One must state the need to constantly change techniques and methods of camouflage. Stereotyped use or repeated use of a successful method can lead to disastrous consequences.

The actions of artillerymen of the 282d Guards Tank-Destroyer Regiment at a bridgehead beyond the Oder River in April 1945 can serve as an instructive example. The terrain on which the regiment was defending was void of all vegetation. It was impossible to dig emplacements for the guns and shelters for the crews—swamp water began to appear almost immediately. Using logs, boards, and fences from a half-destroyed populated area located nearby, the gun crews then made protective walls around the guns. The picture of the deserted village turned out to be so natural that the enemy did not drop a single bomb or fire a single shell on the fire positions. Only after the regiment opened fire did the fascists discover its position and subject it to intense shelling. Thus, as experience shows, once the fighting starts, camouflage of fire positions no longer saves you from losses. Subsequently it is necessary to change positions or take up earlier-prepared alternate positions.

Dummy strongpoints, trenches, and fire positions are created and dummy minefields set up to deceive the enemy and reduce his fire. Based on experience of the Great Patriotic War, up to 50 percent of these objects were taken to be the real thing. For plausibility, they must have mockups of armament and equipment that would reproduce all the identification features of real models. In doing so, it is desirable to make some of the mockups with a high degree of detailing, and the rest can be made more simplified. Dummy areas are more likely to be taken to be the real thing if the armament and equipment in them are situated in a proportion close to the real establishment.

Naturally, concealment in a defense must be supplemented by other measures to deceive the enemy. The history of wars and the experience of troop exercises indicate, for example, that skillful setting up of fire ambushes and creation of fire pockets as methods of stratagems have repeatedly brought success. In particular, the actions of Lieutenant Colonel M. Abramov (Moscow Military District), the commander of a motorized rifle battalion, at a recent exercise were sufficiently convincing.

The "enemy," having overcome the resistance of the defenders in the security area, reached the forward edge of the battalion's defense and attacked it on the move. Advancing along the road, the enemy was able to wedge into the defense and was preparing to commit the second echelon to battle. Lieutenant Colonel Abramov decided to draw the advancing enemy into a fire pocket, destroy him, and restore the lost position. He gave the commander of the motorized rifle company defending in the center of the

combat formation a brief order: "The 2d Motorized Rifle Company, using artillery fire, smoke, and covering-force subunits, is to withdraw in the direction of the first reference point and elevation 'Komandnaya' and occupy the third trench. In coordination with adjacent subunits, use fire from all weapons to stop the enemy and defeat him in the vicinity of the barn, the rocks, and elevation 240.0."

In the instructions on coordination, the officer reported that in the interests of disengagement, at the signal "Geben," a fixed barrage "Grab" was to be placed against the attacking subunits at the road intersection. At the same time, the "enemy" was to be blinded at the edge of grove "Svetlaya" with a two-minute shelling using smoke mines. On the left flank, an antitank ditch was to be prepared using explosives. To reinforce the flanks, the battalion commander ordered an antitank platoon and the armored group of the 3d Motorized Rifle Company to deploy at the fire position lines.

Having detected the withdrawal of subunits from the forward edge, the attacker shifted efforts to the center of the battalion's defense area, where in succession it encountered the fixed barrage, the antitank ditch, and minefields placed in front of the third trench using portable mine-laying systems. The attack became bogged down. The reserves were approaching from the rear, amassing in the fire pocket that was formed. Concentrated artillery fire combined with the crossfire of all the battalion's weapons and the strike by army aviation against the "enemy" tanks and armored targets did their job. Lieutenant Colonel Abramov's concept was successful, and the subunits restored the defense at the forward edge.

In conclusion, I would like to note that the drawn out polemics about the role, place, and also the ratio of deception and stratagem has not cleared up the problem completely, but has even added a certain terminology mess to it. I will state my viewpoint. Military terminology should clearly interpret general and special concepts, not permit multiple meanings and differences. Obviously, the editorial staff of Military Encyclopedia could take on such work. Incidentally, the pre-revolution editions of 1885 and 1912 gave a fairly precise definition of stratagem. It was interpreted as a measure aimed at deceiving the enemy, that is, this is an implemented stratagem.

Footnotes

*VOYENNNY VESTNIK, 1991, N 6.

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Gareyev Urges Shift of Focus to Local Wars

93UM0164A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Nov 92 p 2

[Article by Army General Makhmut Gareyev in the "Military Construction: A View on the Problem" column: "Locals Wars and Troop Training"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The Army and Navy are completing the summer training period and making preparations to begin the new training year. What may we expect this time? This depends on many factors, including the amount of weight accorded the lessons presented us by life as we organize the training

process and the educational work with personnel. A military scholar shares with us his thoughts on the subject.

The cessation of the "cold war" and the differences between the two military-political blocs, with the substantial arms reductions, have created an entirely new international situation. States are reviewing and rewriting their military policies and military doctrines. The Russian Federation is operating in this environment, as everyone is aware, concentrating her efforts on the assurance of her security via political means. However, in spite of the positive changes at play in the world, there still exist economic, territorial, national, and other differences which can affect Russia's state interests.

Also to be taken into account is the existence of a large number of nuclear weapons, conventional weapons, and large force concentrations and military bases located on the approaches to the state borders of Russia and the CIS. We also face other potential threats. Thus, the probability that a large-scale war will be launched against Russia is considerably diminished but cannot be entirely ruled out. In my view, that is why it is advantageous to approach at the very outset the construction and training of the Armed Forces with consideration given to assuring their readiness to accomplish missions geared to repelling large-scale aggression.

Yes, today we are becoming increasingly aware of the threat posed by the breakout of local wars and conflicts. This is associated with an increase in the role of mobile forces. But are the latter of and by themselves sufficient? The point here is that mobile forces (such as airborne troops) can carry out independent actions only for limited periods of time before they develop a distinct need for reinforcements. In addition, with the existing geopolitical situation of Russia, the large distances, poorly-equipped lines of supply and communication, and the insufficiencies of air, sea, and ground transport means, the delivery of mobile forces to threatened areas will be quite time-consuming.

Let us recall what happened when we attempted to accomplish missions by employing relatively small forces, such as in the Soviet-Finnish War and during the infusion of troops into Afghanistan. The scale of the conflicts expanded and the military actions assumed a drawn-out aspect, thus causing higher losses and necessitating the commitment of more and more forces. Political aspects aside, it is possible to draw from the Afghanistan experience and from other local wars the purely military conclusion that peacekeeping forces (including Russian forces) acting under the aegis of the U. N. or independently for the purpose of countering aggression and conflicts must operate decisively, concentrating sufficient and effective men and materiel capable of accomplishing their assigned missions in a short period of time. Also let us not forget the fact that military conflicts, as has often occurred in the past, can turn into major wars. Therefore, the foundation of the Army and Navy - their organizational structure, weapons, mobilization reserves, command and control system, and logistical system - must be designed so as to afford the possibility of accomplishing missions associated with the countering of large-scale aggression.

And yet, as stated above, the probability that a large-scale war will be launched against Russia, if it does exist, is merely a potentiality, one of the future. Conversely, local military conflicts are breaking out today; they require the Army and Navy to possess a certain degree of readiness. This must naturally be kept in mind in planning the training for the latter. The point here is that combat actions associated with local conflicts possess pronounced specificities. They are of the hotbed variety. They often lack a clearly defined front, with armed bands often mixing with the local populace. The enemy's aircraft can be expected to strike from any direction. And so forth, and so forth. Preparations to counter this must be made beforehand, otherwise...

It is sufficient to reflect on the abovementioned sad and well-publicized experience of the war in Afghanistan. Actually, by that time we had already acquired the bitter experience of the Vietnam War. Nonetheless, we went ahead once more, entering Afghanistan with the standard rifle divisions and regiments, which in their structure were cumbersome and equipped with their heavy materiel. They were not suitable for fighting in mountains, let alone against armed bands employing guerrilla tactics. Only as we gained combat experience and suffered heavy casualties did we start to reorganize. We did not employ regiments and divisions as such, instead committing reinforced battalions or combat groups. The troops found it necessary to revise their tactics to conform to the requirements imposed by the theater of military operations.

In a word, we were to gradually improvise, utilizing the bitter experience we were acquiring on the spot - in Afghanistan - to arrive at the idea of that in which we are now engaged: creating mobile forces intended to accomplish specific missions in local wars and conflicts.

However, most paradoxical is the fact that, in spite of the 10 years of combat experience in Afghanistan and the experience gained in other local wars and military conflicts, our military art until very recently remained oriented exclusively toward global and large-scale war. We continued to look upon the local war experience as something temporary, random, atypical, and as bearing no relationship to modern armed warfare, as something underserving as far as "serious" military art is concerned. And now we must make up for lost time. It is fortunate that we have the opportunity of looking at the experience gained by other armies, which set out much earlier to undergo reorganization for the purpose of accomplishing missions associated with local wars and conflicts.

What are my views on where to mount our main thrust relative to procedures to train for and conduct combat activities in local wars?

First and foremost, it seems to me that we should carry out a thorough study and forecast of the military and political situation in general and, in particular, of geographic areas where military conflicts exhibit the most probability of breaking out, with the purpose being to elicit the causative factors and apply timely measures for eliminating and localizing these factors. There are quite a few scientific and administrative institutions in the Russian Federation engaged in this kind of problem to some extent or other. However, the latter operate without coordination, only in

rare instances compiling forecasts of that which may occur, instead harping on the past, limiting their activity to writing and appearing on radio and television. What is required is in-depth examination of nascent problems, with formulation of specific proposals geared to taking socio-political, economic, and other measures.

To address the problem, in my view, there is a need for a scientific analysis center - a small one would be sufficient - at the Russian Federation Security Council that would coordinate the study and forecasting of the military and political situation in general and that of the more explosive areas in particular, one that would summarize the results and prepare practical proposals applicable to taking timely measures. This kind of work could be engaged in by the General Staff Center for Strategic Military Research; the respective analytical subdivisions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Security, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Foreign Intelligence; and the Russian Federation Academy of Sciences.

Second, to effect a fuller utilization of local war experience for incorporation into the construction and training of the Armed Forces, there is a need for this experience to undergo thorough study and generalization in command and control agencies, research institutions, and military schools. That is why it is necessary to lift the security restrictions imposed on information associated with the Korean War of the 1950s, the war in Afghanistan, and other local wars. I must point out in this regard that it would be helpful to conduct a deeper and more objective analysis of the causes of the war and combat experience gained in the Persian Gulf conflict. It seems to me that the descriptions of that event available so far border on the spectacular, rather than present an accurate account of that which actually transpired. It is difficult to derive accurate and objective information from local war experience in the absence of knowledge about all aspects of a situation and associated factual information. Critical study of complete information and eyewitness accounts would make it possible to write works and textbooks that would provide a broad and factual basis for devising principles for operational and combat training applicable to troop command and control.

Crying out for serious revision relative to the nature of military threats and defensive missions is the definition of possible ways of employing the Armed Forces and their strategic actions. It seems to me that modern actions impose requirements demanding that we review the following types of strategic actions:

- strategic deployment (mobilization, operational deployment, and regrouping of reserves: partial for local wars and conflicts, complete for countering large-scale aggression);
- employment of the Armed Forces in local wars and military conflicts (depending on the dimensions of armed conflict, the use of combat capability and operations of mobile forces and of covering forces acting in concert with the Air Forces, Air Defense Forces, and Naval Forces, in continental strategic areas and sectors; combat activities and operations geared to repel enemy aerial attacks; aerial operations; combat activities and operations of Naval Forces);

—employment of the Armed Forces in a large-scale armed conflict, which in the course of action would entail initiation of currently standard strategic operations.

All of the above should be included in the respective regulations governing combat employment of the Armed Forces. It seems to me that the principles for conducting and training for the conduct of combat activity in local wars and conflicts should be revised so as to be more detailed and thorough compared to what has been available. It is possible that mobile forces may require that separate regulations be written.

And, finally, there is a need to develop more comprehensive and thorough methods for providing operational and combat training for application to local wars and conflicts. The foreign press has reported that NATO armies in their planning for the 1993 training year are pursuing an ongoing change in emphasis relative to ways of accomplishing missions associated with "crisis control," in this manner moving away from the traditional instruction for commanders and staffs along the lines of large-scale military activities. The matter is obviously such as to dictate that the Russian Armed Forces also define the goals they are to pursue in command and control training. There is a requirement for study and drill in troop command and control and for training in carrying out combat activity in local wars and conflicts. It is apparently necessary in general in the system of operational and combat training to devote greater attention to the aforementioned problems. It is necessary to a certain extent to train commanders, staffs, and troops to operate in unusual situations in particular areas, with some subunits requiring training in performing as part of peacekeeping forces.

Of course, the above does not signify that we should discard the pursuit of missions related to the conduct of "classical" combat activities in the countering of large-scale aggression. However, at this stage, it is necessary to increase the amount of attention we are to devote to theoretical development and practical mastery of problems that can no longer be ignored. What we are discussing here are methods for teaching and conducting combat activities and troop command and control for accomplishing missions associated with local wars and conflicts.

MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

New Polish Defense Doctrine

93UM0177A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Nov 92 p 3

[Article by Captain Vadim Milekhin: "Poland Adopts a New Defense Doctrine"]

[Text] The National Defense Committee, which is the highest agency shaping defense policy in the Polish state and is headed by the Republic of Poland's President Lech Walesa, has adopted a new defense policy for the Republic of Poland. It defines the principles for strengthening the state's security and will bolster Poland's position in the international arena.

The content of the Republic of Poland's defense doctrine is set forth in two documents: "The Principles of Polish Security Policy" and "The Security Policy and Defense

Strategy of the Republic of Poland." These documents indicate that Poland considers its borders to be inviolable and has no territorial claims against neighboring states, with which it strives to cooperate, and that it rejects the use of force or the threat thereof.

It is stated that the main strategic goal of the nation's foreign policy is Poland's integration into Western Europe by becoming a member of the EC and NATO. It is stated that NATO will continue to be a "basic factor for political stability and peace in Europe" and that a U.S. military presence is recognized as "a substantial factor for stability and peace on the continent." E. Milewski, head of the National Security Office under the president, has stated that Poland's future membership in the North Atlantic alliance will have a favorable influence upon its relations with Germany as well as with Russia.

The documents state that the armed forces of the Republic of Poland are to defend the nation in case of a local military conflict and to have the capability to resolve any such conflict to the benefit of Poland. Neither of the documents names likely enemies. E. Milewski points out, however, that Poland has to consider a possible external threat, primarily from the East. In his opinion, such a threat could be other than just military. The possibility of a halt to deliveries of strategic raw materials—natural gas, for example—or a wave of refugees from the republics of the former USSR is not ruled out.

With respect to a large-scale war, it is the Polish Army's mission "to offer resistance as long as possible to restrain aggression, inflicting maximum losses upon an enemy, to wage a determined defense and gain time for other states and international organizations to take action."

E. Milewski reports that the nation's defense doctrine contains no mention of the concept of NATO-bis [not further identified] once proposed by L. Walesa. He also notes that the doctrine calls for the Polish Army to be 60- to 70-percent professional in the future. At the present time cadre personnel make up 50 percent of Polish Army personnel.

The nation's National Defense Committee also approved the concept of establishing a national guard, a special military formation directly subordinate to the head of state.

New NATO High Mobility Formations

*93UM0175B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 24 Nov 92 p 3*

[Article by Col Yuriy Kostin under the rubric "About the New T/O Structures of the NATO Forces"]

[Text] In the years immediately ahead practically all of the NATO nations will undergo significant reductions of their armed forces. This is a result of the altered military-political situation in the world in general and of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe specifically. The new strategic concept of the north Atlantic alliance and the renewed national military doctrines call not just for preserving the combat capabilities of the armed forces in the new situation, however, but for further enhancing them.

Furthermore, the military leaders of most of the NATO nations are giving priority to the establishment of small

but more mobile military formations. Great Britain and the Netherlands, for example, have begun establishing airmobile brigades, two of which are to be included in a multinational division of a NATO rapid-response corps. The FRG, France and Italy are prepared to follow their example. In addition, there are plans in the future to establish so-called light infantry brigades. These, together with the airmobile formations, will in great part determine success on the battlefield in possible military conflicts.

It is an interesting point that in the plans for establishing the light infantry brigades, a special role is to be assigned to disinformation. Employing its facilities comprehensively, it will be capable of simulating the deployment, the maneuvering and other operations of a military formation like a heavy brigade, which is intended to mislead the enemy and bring about the most advantageous development of the situation.

Military experts of a number of European NATO nations are performing intense research into possible organizational structures for the military formations. The greatest interest is produced by various structures for a mechanized division which will replace the corresponding armored and motorized rifle divisions within the next 10-15 years. Such a division, according to its designers, will consist of five brigades (three mechanized brigades, a headquarters and an army air brigade).

According to preliminary calculations the mechanized brigade will have 5,000 men, 120 tanks and 160 armored combat vehicles, 100 self-propelled field artillery pieces and 440 antitank weapons, as well as combat and logistical support facilities. This will enable it to engage in combat operations for two 24-hour periods and successfully to defend in the zone of attack of an enemy tank division.

Qualitatively, an army air brigade designated for the rapid maneuvering of fire power and cutting off enemy attempts to break through, particularly on weak sectors and exposed flanks, could be a new formation of the mechanized division. Sixty attack helicopters of the brigade would be able to inflict heavy strikes upon the enemy's tank units, including those located deep in the rear. It is important to note that since the brigade will have a transport company and a supply company (in a direct-support battalion), it could be less dependent upon the supply of GSM [fuels and lubricants] and would be able to conduct combat operations without replenishing its supplies for a minimum of two 24-hour periods.

The Persian Gulf War served as a powerful stimulus to the development and creation of weapons produced using new technologies. It is therefore planned in the future T/O structures of units, formations and large formations of ground troops of the NATO nations to have a significant number of combat robots, which can be formed into subunits and even units. Even now different options are being worked out for the employment of a group of combat robots of an army corps, which will drastically enhance its combat capabilities by robotizing the ground and air weapons systems—specifically, by using automated systems of directed-energy weapons.

But this is all in the future, as they say. For the immediate and short-term future the army corps will continue to be the main operational formation of many NATO nations.

For one thing, the bloc's military experts feel that it has maximum flexibility for being included in divisions and brigades or combinations thereof. In the second place, the corps system provides for the smooth transition to close interaction among the formations engaged in combat operations at the tactical and operational-strategic levels. In the third place, the army corps has adequate capabilities for conducting combat operations independently in the execution of missions arising unexpectedly. Finally, the communication and the troop command and control facilities at the disposal of the corps commander enables him to coordinate their operations practically within a real time frame.

The fact that corps-size formations are being retained does not mean that the same approach is being taken to their manning in all the nations of the North Atlantic alliance. While Turkey, Greece and Belgium are following Italy's example and effecting a phased conversion of their forces to the brigade system, the FRG and the Netherlands are sticking with the division system for the formation of corps. France, however, like Great Britain, which has disbanded its only army corps, has entirely rejected the corps system for the organization of its armed forces.

In assessing the scope of the structural changes occurring in the forces of the European NATO nations, it would be a good thing to look at the Bundeswehr's development program, since the FRG's example is most indicative in this respect. Under the long-term program for the development of the FRG's ground forces, Structure-5, it is planned fundamentally to restructure them by 1995. The main feature of the restructuring will be a combining of the two present independent components of the ground forces (ground and territorial troops).

At the corps level it is planned to combine the headquarters of the three army corps (1st, 2nd and 3rd) with the headquarters of the territorial commands (North, South and East). In peace time the new command elements will have a dual designation: 1st Corps-Territorial Command "North" in Münster, 2nd Corps-Territorial Command "South" in Ulm and 3rd Corps-Territorial Command "East" in Potsdam. Their staffs will actually function as the staffs of army corps which will also have subunits for performing territorial defense missions in time of war.

The combat troops of the corps command elements are to include eight division commands, which are to be formed out of the present 12 divisions and eight military districts. Each of the eight division commands will include three mechanized brigades, an infantry regiment and identical division systems of combat and logistical formations, units and subunits.

And so, the number of brigades will be reduced from 48 to 28 in the reorganization, the vast majority of which (23) will be mechanized brigades. In other words, by the end of the reorganization the mechanized brigade will be the main tactical formation of the Bundeswehr's ground forces.

An analysis of plans and actual steps being taken in the forces of the NATO nations convincingly demonstrates the fact that a constant search is being conducted for optimal T/O structures which will be in keeping with the demands of present times but will also meet the challenges of

subsequent development of the military-political and the strategic military situation in Europe and the world as a whole.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 'Somali Storm'

93UM0212A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Dec 92 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Manki Ponomarev: "After 'Desert Storm'—'Somali Storm'?"]

[Text] The reports of information agencies are again reminding us more and more of military dispatches. "A United States Navy task force—three ships with helicopters and 1,800 marines on board—is approaching the coast of Somalia." "The French frigate George Leng has been cruising off the coast of the Horn of Africa for several days now." "The UN is dispatching an additional force of up to 4,000 'blue helmets' to Somalia...."

Events taking place in the Horn of Africa and its shores bring to memory Operation Desert Shield, when, following Iraq's seizure of Kuwait, multinational forces were created and tens of thousands of soldiers from the United States, Britain, France, and other states were concentrated on Saudi Arabian territory. It is in this manner that preparations are now being carried out for yet another military operation. But this time the location will be Somalia—a country which has suffered a great deal, and which is engulfed in a brutal struggle for power among warring groups and overcome by hunger caused by drought. At least 300,000 people have perished in a year and a half.

Some time ago, the UN undertook to provide the Somalis with food relief assistance. But the small military contingents situated in Mogadishu turned out to be incapable of safeguarding or fairly distributing the humanitarian cargo in this country swept by anarchy.

Under such conditions, the UN considered it necessary to resort to military force in order to resolve the crisis in Somalia. The UN Security Council is actively discussing the situation. A proposed draft resolution envisages a broad-scale military operation.

Within the framework of this operation, the United States intends to send 20,000 military servicemen—chiefly marines—from a base in California to the Horn of Africa. Their deployment is to be secured by a shipborne assault landing force which is already approaching the Somali coast. Equipment will be sent from the base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. Designated to command the operation is General Robert Johnston, who served as chief of staff of the forces taking part in the war against Iraq.

Many countries have already declared their readiness to participate in a new operation under the aegis of the UN. They see no other way of resolving the crisis. But the world community should do everything in its power to see to it that the actions of forces in the Horn of Africa constitute in fact a shield for the Somali people, and not another storm similar to "Desert Storm."

Sisnev, Repin Report on Operation 'Restore Hope'
*93UM0231A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Dec 92 p 3*

[ITAR-TASS report of 7 December by Vissarion Sisnev and Anatoliy Repin under the rubric "The Pulse of the Planet": "A Landing Force Is Approaching Mogadishu to Provide Humanitarian Aid to the Starving Somalis"]

[Text]

Vissarion Sisnev, from Washington:

Once again, as in the days of the Iraqi war, television cameras are recording the youthful, confused faces of Marines with orders to prepare for shipping out to the African continent. As we know, however, it does not depend upon the soldier, and their commander in chief George Bush has already gone on television to say that the decision is signed and sealed: American soldiers will perform their humanitarian duty under the authority of the UN Security Council. He also assured the Somalis that the USA is pursuing no political goal and will not determine the outcome of the struggle among warring groups which has plunged the country into chaos. The very fact that the president has agreed to this action, when he has less than two months left in the White House, surprised both Washington circles and UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali himself. As recently as August the Pentagon did not want to hear of setting up an "air bridge" to Somalia.

At briefings by Secretary of State Eagleburger and Secretary of Defense Chaney they both explained the decision in almost the same words. Essentially, it was that "this mission is feasible from the practical standpoint, but there is no one in the world except the United States which can carry it out right now." With respect to feasibility, that depends upon what one has in mind. There is no question that America has enough food reserves and transportation as well, as the armed forces, to provide protection for delivering the food to Somalia's dying hinterland. Brigadier General Libutti warned at a meeting in the White House, however, that if the USA is not careful its troops could remain in Somalia 10 or even 15 years.

President Bush, however, who has the complete support of his successor Clinton in the matter, assures us that the Americans in uniform will leave the starving nation as soon as they can be replaced by a coalition formed under the auspices of the UN.

Anatoliy Repin, from Cairo:

The lead Marines of the 28,000-man contingent of the UN international force are being sent to a Somalia in such a chaotic state that it is already being called a country without a government. Since former President Mohamed Siad Barre, who unleashed a bloody internecine war in his own country in 1988, was driven out, several armed groups have struggled for power and dozens of armed gangs of bandits and thugs have held sway. Famine has swept the country, and epidemics rage there. According to witnesses, around 1,000 people a day are dying.

The Third World press is calling the UN action belated. Considering the fact that 300,000 Somalis have already fallen victim to the anarchy this year, this is probably

indeed so. One cannot say that the world community has totally ignored the Somali tragedy, however. For many months, in a terrible situation, risking the lives of their volunteers, the International Red Cross and around a dozen other charitable organizations from a number of Western nations have attempted to deliver thousands of tons of food and medicine to the starving. Assistance through the UN was stepped up in September. The "Blue Helmets," a Pakistani force of several hundred soldiers, were sent to Somali to guard convoys of motor vehicles carrying humanitarian aid. They have constantly run up against resistance on the part of the warring generals and armed gangs, however. The "Blue Helmets" found themselves blockaded at the Mogadishu International Airport. The pillagers took as much as they pleased from every shipment to the capital's maritime port, engaging in fierce fighting among themselves for the booty.

In Mogadishu, where operation "Restore Hope" is being launched (the landing of Americans could begin this Tuesday), there have been spontaneous demonstrations in support of the UN action. In addition to the USA, France, Canada, Belgium, Italy, Morocco, Turkey, Egypt and Mauritania have expressed a readiness to take part in the undertaking. Israel recently also expressed a desire to join in these international actions.

Not all observers share the opinion of the Pentagon and the U.S. State Department that operation "Restore Hope" will basically go smoothly. For example, the initial large-scale landing of American troops is evoking an acute reaction on the part of Islamic fundamentalists. And what will be the behavior of the large armed groups and affiliated gangs when they are deprived of their only source of sustenance—the theft of the food sent as aid? Nor is the possibility ruled out that some of the armed groups will go up against the American command simply to strengthen their position and gain a crucial trump card in the struggle with their rivals. This could further complicate prospects for a political solution to the situation.

The shooting and robbery in Somalia are not subsiding even on the eve of the landing of international forces. Many gangs have moved from Mogadishu to interior regions of the country—to the city of Baidoa, among others. On Sunday 20 people were killed there. All eight workers with charitable organizations there hastily left the city. It will not be so easy to restore hope in this country.

While this issue was being readied:

The first 1,800 Marines of the 28,000 U.S. military personnel to be sent to the Horn of Africa as part of the operation are prepared to land in Somalia within the next few hours. A transport which left the Kenyan port of Mombasa yesterday carrying around 700 tanks, armored personnel carriers and other equipment is to join the three U.S. Navy ships cruising near the Somali coast. The mission of the first wave is to establish control over the port of Mogadishu and the airport at Baidoa, where the landing strip is capable of receiving heavy transport aircraft.

SECURITY SERVICES

Russian Border Troops Leave Iranian Border to Azerbaijanis

93US0159A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 18 Nov 92 p 7

[Report from the Iran-Azerbaijan border by ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA special correspondent Sergey Nagayev: "We Are Leaving"]

[Text] The waters of the Araks [River] which separate Azerbaijan and Iran are swift and muddy. Until recently the banks of this river were guarded from "our" side only by Russian border troops. Now only two of the four Russian border detachments previously stationed here—the Lenkoran and the Prishib detachments—are left; step by step, Azerbaijan is assuming responsibility for its own international borders.

Unfortunately, these steps are often awkward. The Russians leaving that border have had their toes stepped on and been nudged in the back by the radicals from local national organizations more than once, as if it were a great pleasure to guard what are essentially foreign borders in direct proximity to the Armenian-Azerbaijani carnage, and as if the border troops were clinging to this land like their own. But they are just people under orders. In this case, an order directing them to watch over Russia's interests on its "remote approaches." And official Baku, which has not had an organized structure of national border troops until recently, was also very interested in keeping the Russian Ilya Muromets here, by the way, in spite of all the independence declarations. And he remained in an independent state. And the border troops had to endure a great deal during this time: a blockade of their posts, seizure of their facilities, property, and weapons, and firing, threats, and insults.

The first Russian border detachment taken out of Azerbaijani territory was the Nakhichevan Detachment. The redeployment took place before Azerbaijani President Abulfaz Elchibey's visit to Moscow and before the signing of documents which defined, at the government level, the procedure for dividing the property between the two sides (in half) and regulating other details of the withdrawal. However, in Nakhichevan, where G. Aliyev is the ruler, as we know, they decided at first to divide the property half and half without waiting for the high-level agreements. But at the last moment, Geydar Aliyevich stated that if the Russians take their share of the property and arms with them, he would not guarantee their safety.

"In Nakhichevan, we were forced to leave everything," recalls Colonel Gennadiy Mishenin, a representative of the Russian Federation Border Troops headquarters. "Moreover, Aliyev stated that this Russian border detachment has been disbanded, and a new national detachment will be formed on its basis."

For a military man, there is no need to explain the conditions under which a subunit may be disbanded (and only by higher authorities). This condition means the loss of its colors, as a rule. So that this did not take place with the Nakhichevan Border Detachment, or, more simply stated, so that their unit colors were not taken away, they decided to resort to a ruse. When the real banner was taken

out, wrapped in cellophane, Colonel Mishenin held it against his chest, but they attached a hastily sewn imitation to the flagstaff. This is the way they left. Without luggage, with the symbol of military honor and valor under a soldier's blouse. As if they were not the representatives of a friendly state, but defeated enemies who had been mercifully permitted to go back home. And this, of course, is not to reproach the border troops by any means.

In general, the withdrawal of our troops from foreign soil nearby and the inevitable question of dividing the property automatically call to mind a well-defined association—a family divorce. On one hand, the people want to observe the proprieties or at least conceive of their actions as being objective. On the other hand, the weapons, equipment, and so forth, are needed both by those who are leaving and those who remain to serve.

The withdrawal of the second Russian border detachment (the Goradiz, previously the Gadрут Detachment) from Azerbaijan, which I witnessed, shows that the association with divorce is not entirely coincidental. Division of the automatic weapons, the canned food, and the uniforms—in a word, everything—proceeded normally, although it was always necessary to seek compromises. How are the vehicles to be divided, for example, if each one of them has deteriorated differently?

The Russians can be understood, of course: their service and living facilities are to be organized in a new place, in Derbent. But in this sense we can probably see the Azerbaijanis' situation as well. However, some persons think that the Russian border troops who leave all their immovable property at the places where they were formerly stationed have the right to the movable property—without confiscation. It's a difficult question. In this specific situation, in any case. Indeed, giving up something "for no particular reason" is both expensive and hard on one's self-respect. However, the Azerbaijani side is firmly standing its ground. Of course, they can seize everything, generally speaking. We could have left Nakhichevan in a more worthy manner, too. But at that time it was quite probable that we would have had to pay in blood. Call out the assault forces as "first aid?" Again human casualties were possible. So the border troops, gritting their teeth (often literally), were forced to scrupulously "bargain" and divide. But when will financial security come to Russia again? We don't know. But then, something else is clearly apparent: the main objective is to protect the lives of people and peaceful relationships with a neighboring state. There will probably be no objections to this, in principle. After all, by following this logic, Russia obviously can forget about its interests not only in a material sense, but a moral sense as well. I suspect that the politician and the mother of a soldier who was killed would comment on this reasoning differently. However, an intergovernmental agreement on the procedure for withdrawing the border troops from Azerbaijan has already been signed, and it must be strictly observed.

In Derbent, the new post of the Goradiz Border Detachment, the echelon with equipment and personnel arrived early in the morning. Without any "adventures" along the road: the officers feared that some armed group not subordinate to official Azerbaijani authorities would attempt to seize their weapons. But there was no problem.

The border troops were quartered in a sanatorium on the shore of the Caspian. The facilities had been leased until spring, that is, until the beginning of vacation season. Were they lucky, you will ask? The summer sanatorium has no hot water or heating. And the cold wind from the sea will not allow you to become soft. At the same time, it should be taken into account that housing was provided here for the officers' families. In rooms where no stoves are provided to prepare their food, which is usual in institutions of this type. But the officers' wives are not depressed, for the war is far away, and they do not have to be in constant fear of a stray shell, and they do not have to be afraid that their children will be taken hostage.

The waters of the Araks, which separate Azerbaijan and Iran, are swift and muddy. It seems that our common home at one time—the Soviet Union—has been washed away by the same capricious current of time. The stones of the former building are being tossed about in the waves by the millstones grinding out human destinies. How will the peoples "settle down," and in what kind of buildings—states? There is no answer. One thing is clear: no matter what happens, peace must be maintained where possible. So the officers of the newly arrived border troops said their farewells more than once in Azerbaijan, saying that they would like to see Russia as a good neighbor. It would appear that not very much is required for this in our troubled time—mutual respect and tolerance in parting. Especially when servicemen are parting.

Border Troop Responsibilities in Transcaucasus Viewed

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[Article by Oleg Vladynin in the "View on the Problem" column: "A Shift in Border Latitude?"]

[Text] Just whose borders are we guarding? We were to hear this far from rhetorical question put to us time and again by Russian border troops on duty in the Transcaucasus. It must be admitted that a person would be hard put to find someone who could supply a direct answer. To be sure, after the formation of a new entity—the Commonwealth of Independent States—on the greater part of the disintegrated Union and Russia's declaring her jurisdiction over all Border Troops of the former USSR, the feeling has come about that the lads wearing the green caps are patrolling the outer borders of the CIS on the basis of mutual consent with the member states. However, it so happens that the new formula that explains to some extent the presence of Russian Border Troops on the territory of countries which have gained their independence may apply in some places, but certainly not in the Transcaucasus.

Of the three sovereign republics located in the area under discussion, one never did join the CIS. Another one seemed to become a member, with her signing a number of the founding documents, but, judging from the aspirations displayed by her leading political forces, she is maintaining a steady course toward disengagement from the entity. The third one, on the other hand, states emphatically that she is a member of the Commonwealth, but in this way and that makes it known that she is counting on deriving material

benefits relative to the international association's members' obligation of rendering mutual assistance in the environment of armed conflict with her neighbor.

Paradoxically, the above seemingly different points of view held by the republics with respect to the CIS render problematic the conduct of routine border service in all the republics. In the absence of the possibility of redefining the service to pursue exclusively local goals and to resubordinate the service to serve strictly local interests, the ubiquitous border posts remaining from "Union" times are perceived as constituting nothing less than atavism—a hindrance to all. The posts simply are not permitted to function normally.

The air space above virtually the entire Transcaucasus is closed to flights by Russian military, and, especially, border troop aircraft. Each takeoff of one of our fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft must be cleared at the very highest governmental level of the particular republic. In the case of border posts separated by considerable distances and those situated in different areas, including those in countries at war with each other, this is associated with very serious difficulties of administration and virtually complete paralysis of logistics. The situation is such that some local authorities often refuse to grant permission for deliveries of bread, let alone of other food supplies and expendable materials. Everything must be obtained from Russia.

However, the above difficulties are not the worst of it. In only nine months of this year there were seven men killed and dozens of men wounded in the Transcaucasus Border District. They are fired upon from behind corners, in darkness, and shot in the back. Sometimes things go so far as manhandling by a mob. An officer was stoned to death in Azerbaijan. There were about 300 illegal acts committed against border troops in this period. The Russian Border Troops Press Center cites incidents of the taking of hostages and robbing of servicemen, attacks on border posts, unauthorized removal of equipment, theft of weapons and military property. If we add to the foregoing the ceaseless exertion of psychological pressure on uniformed personnel, a topic about which much was told us by Major General Viktor Zemtsov, the commander of the Transcaucasus Border District, it becomes clear that both the local authorities and a considerable part of the populace now look upon Russian border troop personnel as aliens.

The situation as it has developed constitutes a definite impetus for the rapid withdrawal of all personnel from all the Transcaucasus border posts and transferring them to Russia. What is there that can keep us there? From the formal point of view, only the Armenian-Turkish border may be said to serve as the outer boundary of the CIS. However, even that situation is shaky, since segments located to the right and left are not legally Commonwealth borders.

Incidentally, at the meeting of Major General Zemtsov and Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan held in the end of October, the topic discussed was continuation of Russian border troop presence in the republic. Although the agreement signed by both sides holds the presence to be temporary, the transition period that would end when the border segment would be turned over to national units was not defined by any time frame. It has no limits. The

republic's leadership offers as its explanation the impossibility of predicting when the republic will be capable of training its cadre for border duty under the current conditions associated with the hostilities. But is that really so?

First, according to information provided by the Transcaucasus Border District, Armenia is preparing to set up in the near future a system of very close control on the Azerbaijan border by rendering the line a state border in the full sense of the term. No advantage is to be gained by taking on the added burden of setting up control on the Turkish border. Second, it is undesirable to pull out of areas waging armed conflict with the neighbor cadre that has acquired combat and service experience. The presence of Russian border troops in the republic's south can have some influence on maintaining a higher combat potential of national forces in the east. And, third, Levon Ter-Petrosyan has stated a number of times that paramilitary units that are not under the control of the authorities are active in Armenia. If we are to grant that they and they alone are definitely responsible for theft of weapons, unauthorized removal of more than 20 vehicles from border troops, laying siege to border posts, and the September attempt to take over the Megri border detachment, you will agree that this is another case where the Armenian side retains a definite advantage. One can only wonder about the solid guarantees of security given Russian border troops, since, after all, the paramilitary units are forces lacking control who are "having some fun." And the ones supplying the bandits' arsenals are, as before, aliens.

Incidentally, the situation in Georgia is similar. In spite of the epithets so infamously and abundantly hurled at all the Russian servicemen, the republic's authorities are in no hurry to make an official statement demanding the withdrawal of the border troops. Although they passed a state border law, came to an agreement on this issue with Turkey, and initiated the organization of structures associated with their borders, they are still putting off arriving at a resolution of taking over the job of guarding segments of their border proper. Why? The reasons are apparently the same as in the case of Armenia.

It is no accident that in seething Abkhazia, according to officers of Transcaucasus Border District Troop Headquarters observing the situation, both of the opposing sides continue to provoke the border troops in a manner calculated to draw them into the conflict as an ally, and this while constantly accusing the Russian troops of "aiding and abetting" the enemy. And, since they have not been successful in this effort so far, they continue to grind out more and more spates of accusations which at times border on the absurd. An example is a case of a pilot who was shot down in the Sukhumi area while flying a Georgian Su-25, to be picked up by border troops and sold to Abkhazians for five million rubles. There is no hesitation to put out this kind of statement on the part of very highly-placed officials: the republic minister of defense, the commander of the Air Force, the chairman of the Border Security Committee—even though they knew full well that Georgian helicopters were hovering over the spot minutes after the parachuting pilot touched down on the sea.

Nonetheless, it is possible to understand them. It must be vexing to them to have such excellent troops at hand and still not be able to use them to further their interests. But

let me repeat the question I asked above: What is keeping the Russian Border Troops there? What function do they serve in that kind of situation? Suffering sieges, isolation, constant exposure to violence, and generally not able to do even a fair job of guarding the border, with the latter in all respects no longer belonging to us. Is it not possible to effect a resolution of the problem in the same manner as that initiated recently in Azerbaijan?

We have already reported on the completed withdrawal of two Russian border troop detachments (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 13 November 1992). One of them was literally thrown out of Nakhichevani. The local authorities simply confiscated the border troops' weapons, vehicles, equipment, and unit property. And the personnel and their dependents were subjected to an unbelievable inspection of their personal belongings, after which they were evacuated by air. Must we wait until that kind of occurrence is repeated elsewhere in the Transcaucasus? There is another example proving that this kind of problem can be resolved in a civilized manner, with the interests of each involved side given due consideration.

The second detachment was withdrawn from the settlement of Goradiz after Russia signed an agreement on the border troops stationed in Azerbaijan. This pact in many respects was similar to the one reached with Armenia. There are however considerable differences. Protocols appended to the agreement contain clauses specifying the procedure and definite time frames to be observed for withdrawing troops from the republic's soil.

The matter took a turn for the better after discussion at the highest level in a meeting between Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Abulfaz Elchibey. The Azerbaijan side agreed with the time frame proposed to withdraw the Russian border troops and proceeded to initiate active preparations for taking over stretches of the border. As a result, the republic analyzed the situation, weighed her options, offered to even accelerate the process of border post takeover and division of property. That became a reality. The border troop detachment stationed in Goradiz pulled out of Azerbaijan completely six months ahead of schedule. We also travelled along with them as they made their move to Dagestan by rail.

That is where the Russian border troops will continue their duty. One detachment is stationed near Makhachkala, another near Derbent. The first post has been set up. Two more detachments from Azerbaijan are due to arrive in Dagestan by May. The near future will see their functions consisting of guarding the Caspian shore and customs service on the routes between the Transcaucasus and Russia. This will continue at least until the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet arrives at a legislative decision relative to the issue of determining whether the administrative border of the former RSFSR is to be considered as the state border of the Russian Federation and maintaining thereon the same kind of security as on the boundaries of the USSR, or if the border is to remain "transparent," in the manner agreed to in the very beginning by the states entering into the Commonwealth arrangement. In a word, this for Russia continues to be an open question.

This is where Azerbaijan holds to a definite position. The latter was explained to us by Major General Iskander Allakhverdiyev, chairman of the republic's Border Security Committee:

"I think that our border troops will not be able to take over soon in the north of Azerbaijan. We have no plans to do so in the near future. Only customs stations will be operating there."

So what do we have so far? On Dagestan's south the Russian Federation has a "transparent border." Further to the west is a gap—segments which are unguarded. The border troops stationed in this sector are located quite a distance to the south—in Georgia and Armenia—but they cannot function fully there, as we have stated above. In addition, the security system formerly in place there has been destroyed in many border locations, demolished by the local populace. The Russian Border Troop High Command, fully realizing the need to withdraw the detachments, is making early preparations to take this step by seeking new locations for the units. In this connection, it is guided by the sole distinct criterion for determining the country's boundaries at the present time: the administrative border of the former RSFSR, with the list of possible locations including Vladikavkaz, Nalchik, Cherkessk, and, understandably, any settlements located in Chechnya. And we believe that there is no need to explain the serious difficulties the border troops face here once more. There is

turmoil in that area, also. Is it possible to escape another combination of events whereby the border troops will once again fall into a situation similar to the one they now face in the Transcaucasus?

"We are keeping that possibility in mind," said Major General Viktor Zemtsov in answer to our question. "That is why we are not planning at the present time to perform any capital construction on the territory of the North Caucasus republics, instead restricting ourselves to building housing for officers' dependents. We have started to station training units in Stavropol and Krasnodar Krays; we intend to transfer district troop headquarters to Stavropol."

Thus, the highly troublesome nature of the border troop situation in the Transcaucasus combined with the uncertainty of troop redeployment tend to render the Russian border a broken line that is unprotectable. The warring former Soviet republics; Iran with its well-known smugglers; the Near East teeming with terrorists—our country is actually being laid open to all of that. There is only one way to effect a change in this most dangerous situation, and that is to pass the Law on State Borders as soon as possible, which would result in a clear definition of the boundaries of the Russian Federation and associated organization of protection. The personnel doing the actual job—the border troops—do not possess the authority to preempt political decisions.

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